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PREFACE 
Very soon after the Energy Systems Program (ENP) of IIASA had 
been set up to work on the energy problem, close links were 
established with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
in Nairobi. UNEP had recognized at an early stage our generation's 
worldwide responsibility to secure and preserve a sound and sus- 
tainable environment for mankind and the necessity for responsible 
action. This perspective coincided with the aims of IIASA's 
ENP, which was confronted with the task of elaborating a con- 
cept permitting us to provide a world of 8 billion people or 
more with enough energy to live under economically and environ- 
mentally acceptable and fair conditions. 
This close cooperation with UNEP, therefore, has been a 
great opportunity for us at IIASA; it has not only helped us to 
gain new insights but has also been a tremendous stimulus to 
our work in general. We recall this collaboration with high 
appreciation and sincere gratitude. 
The present report summarizes the major portions of the 
research work of some 140 scientists from over 19 countries who 
have contributed to the long-term global energy study carried 
out by the Energy Systems Program at IIASA. Above all it high- 
lights those elements of research which are of particular inter- 
est and relevance to the joint UNEP/IIASA Project "The Compari- 
son of Energy Options: A Methodological Study." 
In addition, this status report goes beyond the content 
of this project in that it also attempts to place the project- 
related research into the context of the other findings of the 
Program. (The overall findings of its study on the global 
energy system, Phase I, are fully reported in "Energy in a 
Finite World," report by the Energy Systems Program Group of 
IIASA, Wolf HSfele, Program Leader, to be published by Ballinger 
Publishing Co., Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A.) Thus, in a 
synthetic manner, it describes the general global long-term 
concept of the energy problem that has evolved in IIASA's 
Energy Program over the past eight years. 
The reader will be offered an overview in the Introduction 
to this report (Chapter 1 ) .  This chapter illustrates the 
evolution of the work performed under the UNEP/IIASA contract 
and its links to the evolution of ENP's findings in general, 
and guides the reader to the substantive qualitative and quanti- 
tative results obtained. 
The chapters on energy demand and on energy options and 
resources (2 and 3) lay the groundwork for comparing technologi- 
cal strategies in an appropriate quantitative framework. This 
framework results from anticipated demographic infrastructural 
and economic developments as well as from the physical conditions 
of the globe's energy resources and technological progress to 
harness them at the scale needed. 
Some of the "human constraints" to expanding purely technical 
solutions of the energy problem are investigated in Chapter 4 on 
risk and health. 
Two global energy demand/supply scenarios are detailed in 
Chapter 5 on energy strategies. These scenarios interlink quali- 
tatively the technical possibilities of extending the present 
global energy system within a range of economic evolutions in a 
principally stable and cooperating world. 
Conclusions from the analysis and comparison of long-term 
global energy options are finally drawn and assessed in a 
synthesis chapter (6). I 
The results reported here could not have been achieved 
without the aid and assistance of many institutions and indi- 
viduals whose support we gratefully acknowledge. 
Wolf Hafele 
Deputy Director, 
Program Leader, Energy Systems Program 
NOTE ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THIS REPORT 
No single author can be named for the present report as it 
represents a synthesis of the work of all 140 scientists in- 
volved in the Energy Systems Program. The difficult and de- 
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results as well as actually formulating the text of the report 
was accomplished by Hannes Porias, former Assistant to the 
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ABSTRACT 
This report examines the dimensions of the world's energy problem 
as it might evolve over the 50 years from 1980 to 2030. The 
potential contributions to the global energy systems during these 
50 years and beyond that might be made from renewable energy 
resources, from fossil resources (including especially coal), 
from the solar resources, and from nuclear resources are explored. 
The impacts of energy technologies on human health and the global 
environment are addressed. In particular the problems associated 
with analyzing and managing these risks are examined. Two quanti- 
tative, internally consistent scenarios of feasible balances 
between worldwide energy supply and demand during the next 50 
years are reported in detail. Certain global environmental 
impacts associated with these scenarios are also determined. 
Finally, the methodological approach of this study is reconsidered 
and assessed by a critical comparison of the conclusions drawn 
and their wider implications--implications which must also be con- 
sidered in energy systems planning and for policy decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE ENP AND THE I IASA/UNEP 
CONTRACT IN THEIR DYNAMIC CONTEXT 
Bow can the  world  move from i t s  p re sen t  energy sys tem,  r e l y i n g  
on cheap but  s carce  f o s s i l  r e s o u r c e s ,  t o  one s u s t a i n a b l e  o v s p  
t h e  tong run? This question stood at the beginning of the energy 
activities of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA). It prompted a global and long-term orientation 
of ILASA's Energy Systems Program (ENP) right from its start. 
This approach takes into account that the world's energy 
system is global in nature already now, with strong interdepen- 
dencies between developing and developed regions. Out of a world- 
wide energy consumption of approximately 8 TWyr/yr, more than one 
third is provided by hydrocarbon export to the industrialized 
countries. These amounts would not be accessible without the 
help of a sophisticated technological system and through large 
investments by the industrialized nations. 
The time scale appropriate for such investigations appears 
to be a period of 15-50 years. Studies by Marchetti et al. (1978, 
1979) clearly point to the fact that it takes several decades for 
a new primary energy source to capture a significant share of the 
energy market CFigure 3 ) .  Furthermore, 50 years is not very long 
for a radical change to take place, considering, for example, the 
time span of a human generation to be 30 years, or the lifetime 
of a nuclear reactor to be on the order of 2Q-30 years. 
Yet it was clear to the ENP Group from the onset that this 
broad orientation in space and time necessitated development of 
an entirely new approach to the question of energy; the conven- 
tional scientific tools available, which involve a high degree 
of data disaggregation, did not appear suitable as a main line 
of study. 
Therefore, ENP first attempted to c o n c e p t u a l i z e  the energy 
problem, identifying its essential components and their inter- 
relationship. The initial result is the concept outlined in 
Figure 2. Accordingly, one sets out to ask: how much energy is 
F/(1-f I FRACTION (Fl 
1900 1950 2000 2050 
YEAR 
FIGURE 1 Global primary energy s u b s t i t u t i o n ,  1860-2030. Loga- 
rithmic p l o t  of t h e  t ransformat ion F/(l-F) where F is t h e  frac-  
t i o n a l  market share.  Smooth l i n e s  a r e  model es t imates  of h i s t o r -  
i c a l  da ta ;  s c a t t e r e d  l i n e s  a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  da ta ;  s t r a i g h t  l i n e s  
show where energy sources fol low l o g i s t i c  model s u b s t i t u t i o n  
paths.  Source: Marchet t i  and Nakicenovic ( 1979) . 
FIGURE 2 An approach t o  energy systems. 
ava i l ab l e  i n  t he  world; where, i n  what form, and when; and how 
can it be obtained? O r ,  i n  sho r t ,  what energy resource8 can w e  
r e l y  on? The answer is  c lo se ly  r e l a t e d  t o  another  question: 
what i s  the s i z e  of t h e  g lobe ' s  energy resources ,  and how does 
t h i s  volume compare t o  the a c t u a l  needs? Thus energy demand 
comes t o  be t h e  appropr ia te  ya rds t i ck  f o r  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
resources a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  p r inc ipa l  f o r ce  d r iv ing  t h e  energy 
system; the vexed ques t ion  is whether t h i s  demand can a t  a l l  be  
m e t  by t h e  supply. Energy s t r a t e g i e a  give  t h e  answers. Such 
s t r a t e g i e s ,  conceived t o  s t r i k e  a balance between expected demand 
and p o t e n t i a l  supply, descr ibe  poss ib le  pathways i n t o  an energy 
fu tu r e .  Comparing such paths he lps  t o  i d e n t i f y  a l t e r n a t i v e  
energy o p t i a n s .  Fina l l y ,  t h i s  concept recognizes  c o n s t r a i n t s  
l i m i t i n g  the scope o f  poss ib le  choices.  
This  was, i n  b r i e f ,  ENP's comprehension of t h e  energy prob- 
l e m  a t  t h e  t i m e  when t h e  c o n t r a c t  on 'The Comparison of Energy 
Options: A Methodological Study t o  t h e  United Nations Environ- 
ment Programme" was proposed in 1975. The concept descr ibed 
above was adopted t o  se rve  a s  t h e  main s t r u c t u r e  of approach. 
The study,  which began i n  1976, i s ' subd iv ided  i n t o  s eve ra l  t a s k s :  
TASK 1 .of the UNEP/IIASA study r e l a t e s  to  energy demand; TASK 2 
is concerned w i t h  energy resources and their a c c e s s i b i l i t y ;  
TASK 3 cen t e r s  on t h e  a n a l y s i s  of two c o n s t r a i n t s ,  namely r i s k  
and hea l t h ;  TASK 4 s t u d i e s  t h e  balancing supply and demand. The 
p r e sen t  paper c l o s e l y  fol lows this setup;  it r e p o r t s  on the work 
done and concludes w i t h  an at tempt a t  syn thes iz ing  t h e  r e s u l t s  
obtained i n  t h e  var ious  t a sks .  
For an app ra i s a l  of t h i s  s tudy,  one may a l s o  want t o  know 
t h e  amount of work pu t  i n  and t h e  type of support  received. I n  
f a c t ,  the r e s u l t s  t o  be presented a r e  based on an e f f o r t  t o t a l -  
i ng  almost 10 years  o f  work o r  some 200 person-years. These 
r e s u l t s  a r e  an outcome of work t h a t ,  bes ides  the main support it 
has  received by UNEP and I I A S A ,  has a l s o  been sponsored by s e v e r a l  
o t h e r  o rgan iza t ions ,  such a s  t h e  Ministry o f  Research and Technol- 
ogy and t h e  Volkswagenwerk Foundation, FRG; t h e  Austr ian National  
Bank; and t h e  Electr ic  Power Research I n s t i t u t e  and the Ford 
Foundation, USA. It  has involved a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by more 
than 20 i n t e r n a t i o n a l  and na t i ona l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a l l  over  t h e  
world. 
The second s t e p  f o r  ENP ventur ing t o  g r a sp  t h e  energy prob- 
l e m  was t o  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  assess t h e  va r ious  elements of t he  energy 
system. F i r s t  t h e  approach ou t l i ned  i n  Figure  3 was developed. 
It i n d i c a t e s  t h a t ,  un l i ke  t h e  procedure i n  o t h e r  s t u d i e s ,  ou r  
approach was no t  t o  p r o j e c t  t h e  p r e sen t  development i n t o  the 
fu tu r e .  Rather, t h e  goa l  was f i r s t  t o  d i s c e r n  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  long- 
term requirements and p o s s i b i l i t i e s  and on ly  then t o  t r y  t o  con- 
ce ive  s u i t a b l e  pathways i n t o  t he  long-term f u t u r e .  
During t h i s  phase, l a s t i n g  u n t i l  t he  t u r n  of 1977/78, our  
e f f o r t s  focused on examining t h e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  the var ious  energy 
technologies  and their systems impl ica t ions .  Before the genera l  
backdrop o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  on resource a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  t a s k  fo r ce s  
looked i n t o  ques t ions  o f  nuc lea r  energy and c o a l ,  and o t h e r  op- 
t i o n s  such a s  s o l a r  energy were evaluated.  Considerat ion of 
major c o n s t r a i n t s  t o  the in t roduc t ion  of energy technologies  in- 
cluded t h e  s tudy of i s s u e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  r i s k ,  h e a l t h ,  s tandards ,  
and t h e  c l imate .  For our  climate work u n t i l  t h e  end o f  1978, 
UEJEP awarded us a c o n t r a c t  on "A Systems Study of Energy and Climate".  
Until 2000 Beyond 2030 
b 
Muddling Through? Transition Post-Transi tion 
FIGURE 3 Time phases o f  energy. 
The quest ion of energy demand was approached from various 
vantage points .  A f i r s t - o r d e r  approximation of t h e  ana ly s i s  
c l e a r l y  ind ica ted  t h a t  more formal t o o l s  would have t o  be devel- 
oped i f  long-term energy s t r a t e g i e s  w e r e  t o  be designed. Then 
a suggest ion by Academician Styrikovich,  Member of t h e  Academy 
of Sciences of t h e  USSR, w a s  taken up t o  s tudy  t h e  evo lu t ion  of 
the energy systems i n  s eve ra l  world regions and t h e i r  aggregat ion 
i n t o  a global  s t r a t e g y .  Thus, i n  p a r a l l e l  t o  t he  q u a l i t a t i v e  
work under way i n  t h e  var ious  t a sks ,  a methodological a c t i v i t y  
was i n i t i a t e d  t o  produce a set  of models capable of handling 
long-term, world-regional energy s t r a t e g i e s .  
A p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  dea l ing  with such a group of models i n  
a s e n s i b l e  way was to  develop a "mental model," on t h e  b a s i s  of 
which t h e  q u a l i t a t i v e  f ind ings  of t h e  Program could be t r a n s l a t e d  
i n t o  a comprehensive and cons i s t en t  v i s i o n  of t h e  fu tu r e .  This 
f i r s t  syn thes i s  was completed by t h e  end o f  1977.  I t  was pres- 
ented  to  t h e  World Energy Conference i n  I s t anbu l  i n  t h e  format 
of a handwritten 35 TWyr/yr demand and supply scenar io  f o r  
seven world regions f o r  t h e  year  2030. 
This  reference  scenario--the f i gu re s  o f  which were t o  be 
understood a s  q u a n t i t a t i v e  i nd i ca to r s  of q u a l i t a t i v e  conclusions-- 
l e d  us  t o  one fundamental observation: t h a t  it is u n r e a l i s t i c  
t o  expect  any s i n g l e  energy technology t o  be capable of meeting 
t h e  o v e r a l l  energy requirements of t he  coming 50 years .  On t h e  
con t ra ry ,  a l l  t h e  supply technologies  t h a t  can prudently be used 
w i l l  have t o  be employed t o  meet t h e  demand. Conservation, re- 
duced economic growth, e t c .  may lower t h e  demand, bu t  w i l l  not  
so lve  t h e  energy crisis i n  t h e  long run; while  it would s e e m  
e a s i e r  t o  s t r i k e  t h e  supply and demand balance i n  t h i s  case ,  t h e  
p r i c e  t o  be paid  i n  terms of o v e r a l l  economic development w i l l  
be high. And s t i l l ,  every supply source w i l l  be needed t o  m e e t  
t h e  energy demand. 
This  f i r s t  assessment was t h e  point  of depar tu re  f o r  t h e  con- 
cept ion  and development of two d e t a i l e d  s cena r io s  t h a t  were t o  
provide a cons i s t en t  quan t i f i c a t i on  of our  q u a l i t a t i v e  v i s i ons .  
This a c t i v i t y  took up a l l  of 1978 and 1979.  In  1978,  t h e  metho- 
dology and, i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  model set was t e s t e d  and f i r s t  
approximations were computed; i n  1979  t h e  runs were completed 
and an o v e r a l l  q u a l i t a t i v e  and q u a n t i t a t i v e  syn thes i s  was under- 
taken. 
The focus of t h a t  t h i r d  and l a s t  s t a g e  was on t he  model set.  
These models, which a r e  i n t e r l i n k e d  bu t  i nd iv idua l l y  operable, 
serve  t o  determine a cons i s t en t  view of t he  development of t h e  
energy s e c t o r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  genera l  economic development i n  
t h e  var ious  world regions .  "World region" i n  t h i s  context  should  
be understood i n  an economic sense r a t h e r  than i n  a s t r i c t l y  
geographical sense. Seven such regions were i d e n t i f i e d  t h a t  
allow f o r  a c e r t a i n  amount of d isaggregat ion ,  i n  order  t o  r e f l e c t  
s p e c i f i c  and p a r t i c u l a r  cond i t ions ,  and t h a t  t ake  account of t h e  
c o n s t r a i n t s  due t o  t he  necessary l a r g e  amounts of da t a .  The 
regions a r e  (see Figure 4 )  : 
I North America 
I1 USSR and Eastern Edrope 
I11 Western Europe, I s r a e l ,  South Af r ica ,  Oceania and 
Japan 
I V  La t in  America 
V South and Eas t  Asia, Af r ica  except ing  both South Af r i ca  
and t he  o i l  producers i n  North Af r ica  
V I  The Middle E a s t  and North African o i l  producers 
V I I  China and t h e  o t h e r  c e n t r a l l y  planned Asian economies. 
Figure 5 is a schematic represen ta t ion  of t h e  model set. 
On the  b a s i s  of scenar io  p ro j ec t i ons  of t h e  economic developinent 
and of p ro jec ted  populat ion growth, t he  energy demand model MEDEE 
(moddle d 'hvolut ion  de l a  demande d ' enhrg ie )  computes t h e  second- 
ary energy demands, using assumptions on l i f e s t y l e s ,  t e chn i ca l  
e f f i c i e n c i e s ,  etc.  The l i n e a r  programming model MESSAGE (Model 
of t h e  Energy Supply System and i ts  General Environmental Impact) 
then determines t h e  optimal s t r a t e g y  f o r  meeting t h e  demand. 
Buildup r a t e s ,  c o s t s ,  and resource a v a i l a b i l i t y  a c t  a s  c o n s t r a i n t s .  
IMPACT, an input-output model, f i n a l l y  determines t h e  investment,  
l abo r  and m a t e r i a l s  requirements of t h e  s t r a t e g y .  These da t a  are 
compared wi th  t h e  i n i t i a l  scenar io  assumptions, t he  l a t t e r  are 
reviewed and by way of a d d i t i o n a l  i t e r a t i o n s  t h e  loop is completed. 
By t h i s  i t e r a t i v e  procedure, provis ion  is made f o r  t he  cons i s tency  
of t h e  s cena r io  d a t a  obtained.  For more information on t h e  models, 
see t he  r e spec t i ve  chap te r s .  
This  methodological approach aims a t  four  ob jec t ives :  
1 t o  s tudy  t h e  long-term, dynamic, and s t r a t e g i c  dimensions 
of reg iona l  and g loba l  energy systems; 
2 t o  exp lore  t h e  embedding of f u tu r e  energy systems and 
s t r a t e g i e s  i n t o  t h e  economy and t o  some e x t e n t  i n t o  t he  
phys ica l  and s o c i e t a l  environment; 
3 t o  develop a g lobal  framework wi th in  which t h e  g lobal  
impl ica t ions  of long-term reg iona l  o r  na t i ona l  energy 
p o l i c i e s  can be assessed;  
4 t o  eva lua t e  a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t eg i e s - - t o  compare options-- 
i n  phys ica l  and technologica l  terms, inc luding t h e i r  
economic impact . 
Region I (NA) North America 
Region II (SUIEE) Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
Region 111 (WEIJANZ) Western Europe, Japan, Australia. New Zealand, 
S. Africa, and Israel 
a 
.......-... Region 1V (LA) Latin America 
Region V (AfISEA) Africa (except Northern Africa and S. Africa), 
South and Southeast Asia 
Region VI (MEINAf) Middle East and Northern Africa 
0 Region VII (CICPA) China and Centrally Planned Asian Economies 
FIGURE 4 The IIASA world regions. 
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FIGURE 5 IIASA's se t  of energy models: a  s imp l i f i ed  represen- 
t a t i o n .  
It would be wrong, however, t o  expect  t h e  model se t  t o  deal  
with a l l  t he  important i s sues  of t he  energy problem o r  t o  cons ider  
t h e  model loop t o  be an automatic procedure. I n  some respec t ,  
comprehensiveness had been t raded  i n  f o r  f l e x i b i l i t y  and manage- 
a b i l i t y  of t h e  models. Generally speaking, models a r e  ins t ruments  
t h a t  a r e  l imi ted  i n  scope by d e f i n i t i o n .  Modeling can c e r t a i n l y  
no t  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  judgment, i n t u i t i o n  and common sense.  Thus, 
a l ack  of comprehensiveness and t h e  necess i ty  f o r  ope ra to r  i n t e r -  
vent ion a r e  f e a t u r e s  purposely b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  modeling loop. 
They allow one to  r e t a i n  c o n t r o l  and understanding throughout 
t h e  procedure and t o  avoid t he  f a l l a c y  of a sc r i b ing  t o  t he  models 
a  f a l s e  sense  of " t o t a l i t y . "  
The se t  of models does  n o t :  
1 t a k e  i n t o  account most i n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  s o c i e t a l ,  and p o l i t i c a l  
i s s u e s ;  
2 p r e d i c t  energy p r i c ing  p o l i c i e s ,  market f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  o r  m u l t i s e c t o r a l  economic dynamics; 
3 focus  on g r e a t ,  mu l t i s ec to r a l  d e t a i l  of use fu l  energy 
demand; 
4 t r e a t  technologica l  d e t a i l s  of small  s c a l e ;  
5 simulate c a r e f u l l y  t h e  f u l l  nuclear  f u e l  cycle  o r  ques t ions  
of s a f e t y  o r  arms con t ro l ;  
6 evaluate t he  e f f e c t s  of s p e c i f i c  t ax ,  quota,  regula tory  
and f i n a n c i a l  incen t ive  p o l i c i e s  i n  d e t a i l .  
The set of models does: 
1 describe t he  p o t e n t i a l  of a reasonable evo lu t ion  of g loba l  
and regional  energy systems; 
2 captwre t he  long-term, slowly changing nacroeconomic 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of developed and developing economies; 
3 fo recas t  aggregate f i n a l  energy demand ( f u e l s ) ;  
4 mode2 t h e  evo lu t ion  o f  t he  energy supply, conversion and 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  systems and, i n  s o  doing, incorpora te  resource ,  
c a p i t a l  co s t ,  environmental, and some p o l i t i c a l  cons t r a in t s ;  
5 c a t c u t a t e  t he  economic impact--capital ,  manpower, m a t e r i a l s  
etc.--of a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s ;  
6 produce c o n s i s t e n t  scenar ios  on g lobal  and world-regional 
levels. 
I n  summary, t he  work accomplished by t h e  Energy Systems 
Program Group (and with it t h e  IIASA/UNEP con t r ac t )  has undergone 
three  s t ages :  t he  concep tua l i za t ion  providing t h e  framework f o r  
the s tudy;  t he  q u a l i t a t i v e  assessment necessary t o  understand 
long-term systems impl ica t ions  of energy product ion and consump- 
t i on ;  and t he  t r a n s l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  v i s i o n  i n t o  q u a n t i t a t i v e  sce- 
narios, .which i nd i ca t e  pathways f o r  t he  next  50 years .  Thus t h e  - 
condi t ions  f o r  an  acceptable  f u t u r e  have been found to  be the 
following: i n  t h e  next  ha l f  a century,  t h e  w o r l d w i l l  have t o  
switch from f o s s i l  f u e l s  t h a t  a r e  e a s i l y  acce s s ib l e  and sca rce  
t o  f u e l s  t h a t  a r e  mors abundant bu t  less e a s i l y  access ib le .  A t  
the same t i m e  t h e  groundwork w i l l  have t o  be l a i d  f o r  t h e  post- 
2030 t r a n s i t i o n  t o  energy systems t h a t  a r e  capable o f  providing 
l a rge  amounts of energy over  very long per iods  of t i m e  without  
exhausting t h e  e a r t h ' s  n a t u r a l  and human resources.  
2 ENERGY DEMAND 
UNDERSTANDING ENERGY DEMAND : 
THE SETTING 
Today's energy discuss ion cen t e r s  more and more on t h e  i s sue :  
how much energy does our world require  t o  subs i s t ?  The discus- 
s ion  is f i e r c e  and o f ten  l e d  with much b i t t e r n e s s .  A broad 
range of f i gu re s  is quoted, but  t he r e  is no widely accepted 
est imate.  Consensus is sadly  lacking.  
The reason f o r  t h i s  s t rong  and d i s rup t i ve  divergence l ies  
pr imar i ly  i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a l l  p red ic t ions  of energy demand a r e  
based on fundamental value judgments. Ideo log ica l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  
e t h i c a l  and o t h e r  i n c l i n a t i o n s  l a r g e l y  con t r ibu te  t o  t h e  devel- 
opment of views a s  t o  what f u t u r e  soc i e ty  should be and how it 
should be run; and on t he  b a s i s  of these  s o c i e t a l  pe r spec t ives ,  
t h e  assumptions on fu tu r e  energy demand a r e  genera l ly  formulated. 
This process i s  i n  almost none of t h e  cases  e x p l i c i t .  
S t i l l ,  even i f  we were ab l e  t o  c r e a t e  a common platform on 
which t o  p l an t  our  assumptions t h e  problem would no t  be solved. 
I f ,  supposedly, agreement could be reached on t h e  s e rv i ce s  
s o c i e t i e s  should provide,  w e  st i l l  could no t  determine what t h e  
r e l a t e d  energy demand would be. Theore t i ca l ly ,  by way of a 
"Gedankenexperiment", it i s  poss ib le  t o  run a soph i s t i c a t ed  and 
w e l l  developed economy wi th  no energy use a t  a l l .  C. Marchetti  
( see  Hafele 1977)  envisages a scheme (Figure 6 )  where t h e  ocean 
thermal g rad ien t  u t i l i z e d  i n  a Carnot cycle procures compressed 
a i r ,  which i n  t u r n  is used i n  a c i v i l i z a t i o n  c e n t e r  i n  order  t o  
move a c a r ,  f o r  example. Accordingly, no energy is used but  t h e  
entropy of t h e  system is increased;  what is consumed is a kind 
of "negat ive entropy".  
Our economic systems r e l y ,  i n  t he  present  a s  i n  t he  pa s t ,  
mainly on f o s s i l  resources which provide t h i s  "negentropy". 
Obviously, a technologica l  scheme, such a s  t he  one o u t l i n e  above, 
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FIGURE 6 Negentropy c i t y .  
could not be implemented i n  p r ac t i c e  f o r  probably a t  l e a s t  another  
century; ye t  Marche t t i ' s  not ion i nd i ca t e s  t h a t  t he r e  i s  no physical  
reason why economic growth should automatical ly presuppose growth 
of energy consumption. A decoupling o f  energy use from general  
economic a c t i v i t i e s  i s  i n  p r i nc ip l e  feasible--by s u b s t i t u t i o n  of 
c a p i t a l  and man's know-how f o r  energy use. 
I f  one wants t o  follow the  concept of s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  one 
must admit t h a t  t he  development and in t roduct ion  of new techn ica l  
systems t h a t  use energy wre e f f i c i e n t l y  has always been a very 
lengthy process.  Take t he  progress i n  prime movers, f o r  ins tance;  
it has taken decades t o  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  improve the  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  
r e a l  world systems (Figure 7 ) .  Because of t h e  time requirement, 
w e  must the re fore  expect our  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s  t o  remain qua l i t a -  
t i v e l y  t h e  same i n  t h e  foreseeable fu tu re .  
Assuming t he  p resen t  pa t t e rn s  t o  p e r s i s t ,  what then i s  t h e  
r e l a t e d  energy demand? 
W. Sass in  (1979)  has i n  t h i s  context  examined i n  some d e t a i l  
se t t lement  p a t t e r n s  and r e l a t e d  energy d e n s i t i e s ,  a r r i v i n g  a t  
some su rp r i s i ng  r e s u l t s .  A s  Table 1 shows, t he  d i f fe rence  i n  
energy consumption between India  and t h e  F.R.G. r e s u l t s  pr imari ly 
from the  l i f e s t y l e s  i n  r u r a l  a reas .  I n  urban a r ea s ,  t he  per- 
c a p i t a  energy consumption d i f f e r s  only by a f a c t o r  of 2.5, and 
i s  even higher  i n  Ind ia  than i n  t h e  F.R.G i f  compared i n  terms 
of energy consumed pe r  m2 of b u i l t  up area .  Independently of 
physical ,  c l imat ic , and  s o c i a l  condi t ions ,  conurbations appear 
t o  requi re  worldwide an energy dens i t y  of 10 w/m2, and r u r a l  
a r ea s  one of 1 ~ / m 2 .  Considering t he  spread of urbaniza t ion  
(Figure 8) p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t he  less developed coun t r i e s ,  a 
d r a s t i c  increase  i n  energy demand must be expected. One can 
imagine an extreme case f o r  2050 of 8 b i l l i o n  people l i v i n g  i n  
l a r g e  conurbations t h a t  take  up 10% of t he  con t inen t ' s  surface  
and consuming 80 Twyr/yr of energy--ten times a s  much a s  today. 
FIGURE 7 Efficiency of p r i m  movers. 
TAELE 1 Energy consumption densities in developing and developed countries. 
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These broad o u t l i n e s  demonstrate t h e  va r i e ty  o f  poss ib le  
opt ions on energy demand. 
However, without a c l e a r  i nd i ca t i on  of how energy demand 
might sens ib ly  develop over  t h e  next  decades it is impossible t o  
t a c k l e  t h e  energy problem. Indeed, resources,  technologies ,  etc  . , 
must be measured aga ins t  energy demand t o  judge t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l s  
meaningfully. 
Therefore much e f f o r t  has gone i n t o  our  s tudy o f  energy 
demand. I n  view of the  complexity o f  t he  problem, we d i d  no t  
s t r i v e  f o r  p rec i se  p red ic t ions  bu t  aimed a t  e s t imat ing  a band- 
width of reasonable developments t h a t  could be matched by ade- 
quate supply. 
This takk was complex. With no ready-made approach ava i l -  
ab le ,  w e  s t a r t e d  ou t  t o  explore t h e  methodologies ava i l ab l e ,  i n  
search of a method appropriate  f o r  t r e a t i n g  t h e  long-term energy 
problem. 
Approaches Explored 
Various approaches t o  energy demand were examined and t h e i r  scope 
and l i m i t a t i o n s  i d e n t i f i e d ,  i n  t h e  hope t h a t  t h i s  research  would 
provide us with new i n s i g h t  i n t o  t h e  many f ace t s  of energy demand. 
The s t udy ' s  global  o r i e n t a t i o n  required t h e  chosen method 
t o  be appl icable  t o  a l l  t he  e x i s t i n g  economic s y s t e m .  F i r s t ,  
an attempt was made t o  develop an econometric method s u i t a b l e  
f o r  studying market a s  w e l l  a s  planned economies. 
The s t e p s  undertaken w e r e :  an ana ly s i s  o f  ind iv idua l  Eastern 
and Western coun t r i es ,  a cross-sect ion ana ly s i s  of coun t r i e s  with 
t h e  same type of economy, and an i n t e rna t i ona l  ana ly s i s  of coun- 
tr ies with planned and market economies. 
A s  a main r e s u l t ,  t h i s  a c t i v i t y  l e d  t o  a b e t t e r  understanding 
of t he  present  r e la t ionsh ips  between energy demand, p r i ce  mecha- 
nisms, and general income. In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  s tudy of e l a s t i c -  
i t i e s  was emphasized (e.g. Table 2 ) .  
D i f f i c u l t i e s  were above a l l  encountered i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
analys is .  For one, t he  econometric approach is data- intensive 
and adequate da ta  a r e  scarce .  For another t h ing ,  t he  time element 
is d i f f i c u l t  t o  grasp with econometric models, o f f e r i n g  only a 
s t a t i c  view of economic and technologica l  s t r u c t u r e s ;  and the re- 
l a t e d  energy demand pro jec t ions  a r e  necessa r i ly  a s h o r t  t i m e  hor i -  
zon, d e f i n i t e l y  less than 10-15 years .  
The second approach used was e n e r g y  a n a Z y s i s  (Charpentier 
1 9 7 6 ) .  This was done t o  understand, from an engineering point  of 
view, t h e  changing of energy con ten t s  and requirements i n  goods, 
processes,and services .  A t y p i c a l  r e s u l t  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Table 3. 
TABLE 2 Individual countries, long-run elasticities. 
NOTES: Comp. = composite estimate of coefficients. Upper figures = estimated 
coefficients. Lower figures in parenthesis = standard errors. Underlined 
figures = elastic coefficients (absolute value > unity). 
TABLE 3 Total energy consumed per $ f ina l  output in  French industry, 1971 
(kwh (th) ; $ = 4.5 F)  . 
Total Energy Consumed 
Sector per $ Output 
Food industry 2.20 
Building industry 16.07 
Glass industry 16.03 
Steel  industry 34.85 
Non-steel industry 33.16 
Firs t  metal process 11.44 
Electrical  and mechanical industry 6 .01 
Chemical industry 11.41 
Texti les  industry 2.92 
Paper industry 5 .62  
Miscellaneous 4.93 
This method provided us with i n s i g h t s  i n t o  t h e  r e l a t i onsh ip  
between l i f e s t y l e s  and energy consumption. It a l s o  helped us  t o  
formalize assumptions on technologica l  progress and t o  introduce,  
t o  a c e r t a i n  ex t en t ,  t h e  concept of change i n t o  l i f e s t y l e  scenar ios .  
Third,  we attempted t o  quan t i fy  t h e  r e l a t i onsh ip  between 
energy consumption and economic development o the r  than by simply 
i n t e r l i n k i n g  aggregate GNP and energy consumption. To t h i s  end, 
factor anaZyei8 was used. The goal of this method is t o  sum up 
and reduce a given data  set by e x t r a c t i o n  of f a c t o r s  t h a t  repre- 
sen t  l i n e a r  combinations of t h e  o r i g i n a l  va r iab les .  I n  t h i s  way, 
groups of coun t r i es  with s i m i l a r  s t r u c t u r e s  can be i d e n t i f i e d  
and various development pa t t e rn s  can be s tudied.  
These prel iminary s t ud i e s  l e d  us  t o  adopt a scenar io  approach 
f o r  our  energy demand pro jec t ions .  A model, based on macroeco- 
nomic assumptions and l i f e s t y l e  scenar ios ,  was t o  be developed 
i n  o rder  t o  compute t h e  end-use energy demands i n  severa l  economic 
s ec to r s .  The procedure w a s  purposely held  t r ansparen t ;  using 
c l e a r l y  s p e c i f i c  assumptions t h e  method should enable us t o  
i t e r a t e  t he  modeling u n t i l  a set of cons i s ten t  and c l e a r l y  under- 
s tood energy demand data  w a s  obtained. 
Modeling Approaches 
The modeling technique de s i r ab l e  f o r  IIASA's global  approach was 
t o  account f o r  a g r e a t  d i v e r s i t y  of economic un i t s .  Several roads 
were explored, warrant ing a maximum chance of success.  
For d e v e t o p i n g  regions two models were considered. SIMA 
(Simulation of Macroeconomic Scenarios f o r  Energy Demand) (Parikh 
and Parikh 1979) , was adapted by J. and K. Parikh. It is an 
econometric model developed f o r  Ind ia  t h a t  d i s t i ngu i shes  
between t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and nonagr icu l tu ra l  s ec to r s  d r iv ing  the  
energy s ec to r .  The model s imula tes  economic growth paths f o r  
various pol icy  scenar ios ,  such a s  inc reas ing  fore ign a i d ,  i m -  
proving e f f i c i e n c i e s  i n  c a p i t a l  u t i l i z a t i o n ,  varying r a t e s  of 
growth i n  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and nonagr icul tura l  s ec to r s ,  and in-  
creas ing publ ic  investment through higher  taxes .  For each pol icy ,  
the  energy requirements a r e  computed by t he  model--with s p e c i f i c  
considerat ion of t he  needs f o r  noncommercial energy--and the  re- 
l a t e d  c a p i t a l  and foreign exchange requirements a r e  determined. 
SIMA has been very useful  a s  a  prototype rode1 f o r  s tudying 
the demand of t he  developing world. Employing it with a l t e r n a t i v e  
economic scenar ios  has fos te red  our  understanding of t h e i r  s p e c i a l  
condi t ions  and energy needs. 
The o t h e r  model on energy demand i n  l e s s  developed coun t r i e s  
(LDCs)  was SIMCRED developed by J. Parikh (1978). Future energy 
demand i s  projec ted  with a  s imulat ion procedure, t h e  parameters 
of which w e r e  est imated by a cross-country regress ion ana ly s i s  o f  
noncommercial and c o m e r c i a l  energy consumption and of electri- 
c i t y  consumption i n  connection with such f a c t o r s  a s  urban/ rura l  
populat ion,  agricultural/nonagricultural GDP, etc. (see Figure 
9 ) .  For a  s imulat ion,  urban and r u r a l  populat ions a s  w e l l  a s  GNP 
growth r a t e s  a r e  spec i f i ed  exogenously. The model outputs  a r e  
per-capi ta  commercial energy demand; 
t h e  r a t i o  of commercial energy t o  noncommercial energy; 
and 
a e l e c t r i c i t y  consumption. 
SIMCRED served t o  produce benchmark f i gu re s  i n  our e a r l y  modeling 
s tages .  
MUSE (Modeling Useful Energy) played a similar ro l e .  It was 
conceived by J . M .  Beaujean and T. Miiller t o  evaluate  t h e  useful  
and f i n a l  energy demands i n  deueLoped regions  on t h e  b a s i s  of 
l i f e s t y l e  i nd i ca to r s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t i e s ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  pro- 
duct ion,  income, and energy p r i ce s .  This model was purposely 
kept simple and t ransparen t ,  and soph i s t i c a t ed  techriiques w e r e  
shelved i n  favor of quick but  comprehensive and e a s i l y  under- 
s tandable r e s u l t s .  I t  b a s i c a l l y  c o n s i s t s  of a  set of energy ac- 
counting equat ions  with c o e f f i c i e n t s  obta ined by regress ion 
ana lys i s .  A s  i npu t s ,  it uses l i f e s t y l e  parameters (rooms pe r  
household, hot  water demand, e tc . ) ,  t echn ica l  parameters (insu- 
l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  energy i n t e n s i t y  of t r anspo r t a t i on ,  e t c . ) ,  
and economic i n d i c a t o r s  (GNP, t r anspo r t a t i on  requirements,  e t c . ) .  
The ou tpu t s  a r e  da ta  on use fu l  and f i n a l  energy demand pe r  s e c t o r  
and pe r  f u e l .  A l a t e r  development was MUSEDEV, a version s p e c i f i -  
c a l l y  o r ien ted  towards the  study of LDCs. 
A l l  these  e f f o r t s  provided us with a  background necessary 
f o r  choosing an approach t o  energy demand which 
would be p r ec i s e  enough f o r  t h e  computerization of demand 
pro jec t ions  t h a t  w e r e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d e t a i l e d  t o  serve a s  inputs  t o  
our  s t r a t e g i e s  s t ud i e s  (see Chapter 5) ; 
but  a t  t h e  same t i m e  would no t  be too  da ta  i n t ens ive ,  s o  
t h a t  a l l  t h e  regions under s tudy could be t r e a t e d .  
B. Chateau and B. Lapillonne .of t h e  I n s t i t u t  Jur id ique  e t  
Economique de 1' En8rgie of t he  Univers i ty  of Grenoble , France, 
had developed a general  approach f o r  assess ing  the  l o n g - t e n  
evolut ion of energy demand. This approach i s  based on t he  fo l -  
lowing s t eps :  
0 derived from crcss-country estimation 
FIGURE 9 Schematic diagram of t h e  energy demand model (S IMCRFD) ,  
J. Parikh (1978). 
1 Disaggregation of t he  t o t a l  energy demand i n t o  a mult i tude 
of end-use ca tegor ies  o r  s e c t o r a l  demands; 
2 Analysis of t he  main determinants governing t h e  long-term 
evolut ion o f  energy demand f o r  each end-use category; 
3 Organization of those f a c t o r s  i n  a s t r u c t u r e  which per- 
mits considerat ion of i n t e r s e c t o r a l  demand dependencies; 
and 
4 U s e  of a s imulat ion model based on t h i s  s t r u c t u r e ,  whose 
determinants a r e  i n  p a r t  endogenous t o  t he  model and i n  
p a r t  exogenously t r e a t e d  a s  scenar io  va r iab les .  
This methodology leads  t o  a very d e t a i l e d  and p r ec i s e  ana ly s i s  
of energy demand bu t  i s  extremely data- intensive.  Therefore,  i n  
cooperation with t h e  energy/environment s tudy group of Professor  
W. Foel l  a t  IIASA and the  Universi ty of Wisconsin, U.S., t h i s  
method was adapted t o  our requirements by B. Lapillonne and M. 
Muller. The model developed was c a l l e d  MEDEE-2 (Modsle d' Evolu- 
t i o n  de l a  Demande d'En6rgie ) (Lapillonne 1978). 
I n  designing t h i s  model w e  pursued severa l  ob jec t ives .  
F i r s t ,  it was t o  r e f l e c t  s t r u c t u r a l  changes a f f e c t i n g  long-term 
energy denand, such a s  t he  evolut ion  of s o c i a l  needs (e.9. growth 
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FIGURE 10 G e n e r a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  i n p u t ,  and o u t p u t  o f  MEDEE. 
and saturation), government policies, energy prices, and technol- 
ogy. Second, the model was to be applicable to different economic 
systems. Finally, the model output should include information 
about the potential market for each secondary energy source, so 
that an optimal mix of energy supply technologies could be deter- 
mined. 
Figure 10 sketches the model structure. On the basis of a 
scenario projection of GDP and GDP expenditure, a simple macro- 
economic module determines the contribution to GDP of various 
economic sectors.* Six major sectors are considered: 
agriculture 
construction 
mining 
manufacturing: 
- basic materials 
- machinery and equipment 
- nondurables 
- miscellaneous 
energy 
services 
Besides these macroeconomic assumptions, the scenario also 
specifies elements that cannot be extrapolated from the past, but 
which characterize the long-term evolution of economic, social, 
and technological structures. 
Three demand modules calculate the energy demand for the 
transportation (freight/passenger) , industrial (agriculture, con- 
struction, mining, manufacturing) and household/service sectors. 
-The energy demand of the "productive" sectors is directly or in- 
directly related to the GDP contribution of these sectors; the 
energy demand of the "consumptive" sectors is related to physical 
indicators. For substitutable uses (essentially thermal uses), 
the basic energy demand is calculated in terms of useful energy; 
additional assumptions concerning the penetration of various 
energy sources in their potential markets and their end-use effi- 
ciencies are required to determine the final energy demand. For 
nonsubstitutable uses, the energy demand is directly calculated 
in terms of final energy. Table 4 summarizes the sectoral energy 
end-use categories distinguished in MEDEE-2. 
MEDEE-2 is a flexible instrument allowing the explicit in- 
corporation of assumptions on long-term future aspects of life- 
styles and societies of the various world regions. It has helped 
us transcribe qualitative "visions" of energy needs into quanti- 
tative values of energy demand. MEDEE-2 is therefore a tool for 
calculating rather than for forecasting the evolution of energy 
demand conceived in a scenario. 
The Two Scenarios: Basic Features 
The Energy Systems Program has been aware of the pitfalls involved 
in the interpretation of results from a methodologically sophisti- 
cated procedure. Therefore, it has complemented its demand studies 
by attempts at gauging the order of magnitude of global energy 
demand through simple "back of the envelopen estimation. 
 h his rnacroeconomic module can a l s o  be skipped and the GDP shares of these 
sectors d i r e c t l y  spec i f i ed  as  a scenario.  
TABLE 4 Categories of Energy End Use Considered in MEDEE-2. Energy Sources are Coal (CL)r Motor Fuel--Gaso- 
line, Diesel, Jet Fuel Electricity (EL). F is Basic Energy Demand Calculated in Final Energy 
Forms; U is Basic Energy Demand Calculated in Useful Energy Forms 
a By definition in the model all present uses of electricity are included here. 
b ~ h e  energy sector should be considered separately if statistics permit. Its energy consumption should be deter- 
mined in relation to conversion from primary to secondary energy. 
NOTES: Of course, the restriction of certain categories here to just one or two fuel types misses other possibil- 
ities. For instance, pipelines may also use electricity or gas. 
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FIGURE 12 Total  energy consumption, 1975-2030: t h r e e  possi-  
b i l i t i e s .  The s o l i d  l i n e s  ind ica te  energy consumption; t he  
dashed l i n e  i nd i ca t e s  world population. 
A p a r t i c u l a r l y  i l l u s t r a t i v e  example is  an es t ima te  by Hafele  
and Sass in  (1976), po in t ing  t o  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  of  present-day energy 
consumption (see Figure '1). Only i n  t h r e e  coun t r i e s  is t h e  per -  
c a p i t a  consumption h igher  than  7 kWyr/yr (kWyears/year = kW). I n  
c o n t r a s t ,  t he  v a s t  major i ty  of t h e  wor ld ' s  population--about 72%- 
consume less than the  world average (2 kW/cap), namely 1 . 2  kW/cap. 
It i s  obvious t h a t  t h i s  i n e q u a l i t y  cannot p e r s i s t  and t h a t  
t h e  energy consumption p a t t e r n s  must come closer; t h i s  is a fo re -  
most goal of any long-term f u t u r e  energy s t r a t e g y .  Along t h e s e  
l i n e s  Figure 12 i l l u s t r a t e s  what it would mean i n  terms of  o v e r a l l  
energy demand [ I )  i f  t h e  average pe r -cap i t a  consumption remains 
t h e  same; ( 2 )  i f  it i nc reases  s l i g h t l y  t o  3 kW/cap; and ( 3 )  i f  
it i n c r e a s e s  t o  roughly t h e  p resen t  European l e v e l  of  5 kW/cap. 
Assuming an eventua l  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  world populat ion a t  
12.5 b i l l i o n  would t h u s  r e s u l t  i n  a l e v e l  of  energy demand t h r e e  
t o  e i g h t  t imes t o d a y ' s  value. This very rough estimate c l e a r l y  
s i g n a l s  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  problem ahead o f  us .  
A more d e t a i l e d  energy demand estimate was completed by 
Hafele and Sass in  (1977). Economic growth r a t e s  f o r  t h e  seven 
world regions (as depic ted  i n  the  In t roduc t ion)  were determined 
judgmentally: 2 .4%/yr  f o r  developed market economy c o u n t r i e s ,  
4.8,%/yr f o r  c e n t r a l l y  planned c o u n t r i e s ,  and 5.6%/yr  f o r  LDCS, 
with success fu l  conservat ion measures assumed f o r  t h e  developed 
regions.  
These demand cons ide ra t ions  l e d  t o  a 35 TWyr/yr world energy 
reference  demand scenar io  f o r  t h e  yea r  2030 (Figure 13) .  This  
value w a s ,  by no means, t o  be considered a s  a p red ic t ion .  It 
merely represented  a q u a n t i t a t i v e  estimate r e s u l t i n g  from a 
q u a l i t a t i v e  judgmental process  geared towards a compromise between 
I Pop. 
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FIGURE 13 Reference demand s c e n a r i o ,  world,  2030.  
t he  f ea s lb l e  and the  des i rable .  However, t h i s  e s t imate  was 
highly useful  t o  us when we i n i t i a t e d  t h e  formalized modeling 
procedure, serving a s  a "mental modeln o r  benchmark f o r  the  i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i on  of t he  d e t a i l e d  and i n t r i c a t e  r e s u l t s  obtained. 
The foregoing helped prepare t h e  background f o r  t h e  develop- 
ment of two scenar ios  f o r  each world region,  de l imi t ing  a band- 
width f o r  what could be considered reasonable pa ths  of develop- 
ment. Neither of t he  scenarios was meant t o  serve  a s  maximum o r  
minimum pred ic t ion ,  however; r e a l i t y  might b r ing  f o r t h  even lower 
values than those obtained i n  t h e  "Lown case o r  even higher  values 
than those  of t he  "High" case. Our a i m  was merely t o  conceive 
two cons i s ten t ,  poss ib le  sets of assumptions about t he  fu tu re  
t h a t  would smoothly f i t  with t h e  p a s t  and descr ibe  a fu tu r e  evolu- 
t i o n  devoid of major d is rupt ions .  A t  t h e  same time, t h e  range 
described by t he  scenar ios  was t o  be wide enough i n  order  t o  
account f o r  the  i nev i t ab l e  uncer ta in t i es .  
The scenar ios  described below a r e  i n  f a c t  no t  sheer  "bes t  
judgment" estimates. Several o f  our  i n i t i a l  assumptions had t o  
be revised  i n  t he  course o f  a lengthy l ea rn ing  process of iter- 
a t i v e  model runs,  consis tency checks, r eappra i sa l  by discussion 
with leading exper t s ,  etc. Thus t h e  i n i t i a l l y  exogenously de- 
f ined  inpu t s  were modeled t o  become w e l l  t e s t e d  and understood 
r e s u l t s .  
The scenar ios  a r e  driven by two bas i c  development var iables :  
population and gross domestic product (GDP). Both va r i ab l e s  a r e  
assumed t o  have decreasing growth r a t e s .  It is f u r t h e r  assumed 
t h a t  t he r e  w i l l  be no major changes i n  t h e  s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  environ- 
ment o r  i n  l i f e s t y l e s  except f o r  changes t h a t  accompany economic 
development i n  t he  LDCs. Energy p r i c e s  a r e  assumed t o  increase  
ushering i n  s t rong conservation measures. 
With t he  p r o j e c t ' s  focus on t he  energy i s sue ,  upper and 
lower bounds of poplat ion p ro jec t ions  are not  e x p l i c i t l y  given. 
The p ro jec t ions ,  which resulted from a s tudy by N. Keyfitz of 
Harvard Universi ty,  U.S.A.  (Keyfitz 19771, tend t o  be more a t  t he  
conservat ive end. A bare replacement of f e r t i l i t y  i n  developing 
regions is assumed t o  be achieved by 2015. Population growth 
rates gradual ly  decrease from cu r r en t l y  2%/yr t o  less than l%/y r  
by 2030. The growth r a t e s  i n  t h e  LDCs a r e  t h r e e  times higher  
than those  i n  t he  developed countr ies .  (The population data  
thus  obtained a r e  summarized in Table 5.)  Also note  t h e  inc rease  
i n  nonworking population, urbaniza t ion ,  and family s i z e  (Table 6 ) .  
For t he  assessment of economic a c t i v i t i e s ,  GDP was chosen 
a s  i nd i ca to r .  Throughout t he  study, 1975 U.S. d o l l a r s  and 1975 
o f f i c i a l  exchange r a t e s  and p r i c e s  were used.* For c e n t r a l l y  
planned economies World Bank estimates were employed (World Bank 
19771 . GDP,  defined a s  t he  s t a r t i n g  po in t ,  was measured country 
by country and then aggregated f o r  each region. 
W e  were aware t h a t  using GDP a s  i n d i c a t o r  of economic a c t i -  
v i t i e s  has  c e r t a i n  disadvantages.  For one, na t i ona l  GDP es t imates  
a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  use meaningfully f o r  comparison of g r ea t l y  d i f -  
f e r i ng  economic s t r u c t u r e s  ; and f o r  another  t h ing ,  aggregate GDP 
is not an adequate measure of welfare.  Overal l ,  however, GDP i s  
useful  f o r  broad comparisons, which makes it a w e l l  su i t ed  yard- 
s t i c k  f o r  our s tudy which aims a t  comprehensive understanding 
r a t h e r  than a t  exact ing  d e t a i l .  
Our i n i t i a l  GDP pro jec t ions  were based on s t ud i e s  conducted 
by t he  Workshop on Al te rna t ive  Energy S t r a t e g i e s  (1977) and t he  
TABLE 5 Population projections by region. 
Population ( loc) 
Base 
Year Projection 
Region 1975 2000 2030 
I (NA) 237 284 3 15 
11 (SU/EE) 363 436 480 
1x1 (WE/JANZ) 560 6ao 767 
IV (LA) 319 575 797 
v (A~/SEA)  1.422 2,528 3,550 
VI (ME/NAF) 133 247 35 3 
VII (C/CPA) 912 1,330 1,714 
World 3,946 6,080 7,976 
NOTES: 1975 data a re  midyear e s t b t e s  from United Nations Monthly B u l l e t i n  
of Statistics, January 1978. 
The same population projection is made for both High and Low scenarios. 
SOURCE: Keyfitz (1977). 
World Energy Conference (1978).  I n  t h e  cou r se  of o u r  work w e  
were brought  t o  r e v i s i n g  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s  downward i n  o r d e r  t o  
r e a c h  an e a s i e r  demand/supply ba lance .  The growth r a t e s  o b t a i n e d  
a r e  given i n  Table 7. I n c r e a s i n g  s c a r c e n e s s  o f  r e sou rces  and 
d e c r e a s i n g  popu la t ion  growth r a t e s  r e s u l t  i n  d e c r e a s i n g  GDP growth 
r a t e s .  
By assumption,  LDCs w i l l  con t inue  t o  depend on t r a d e  w i t h  
t h e  developed r e g i o n s  f u n c t i o n i n g  a s  a major s t i m u l a n t  t o  economic 
growth i n  t h e  deve lop ing  world.  Therefore  t h e  LD C' s  growth 
p o t e n t i a l  w i l l  be l i m i t e d  by l e v e l s  one o r  two percen tage  p o i n t s  
h i g h e r  t han  t h e  growth i n  t h e  developed r e g i o n s .  A t  t h e  same 
t i m e ,  t h e  economic s t r u c t u r e s  w i l l  deve lop  d i f f e r e n t l y .  Whereas 
t h e  i n d u s t r y  s h a r e  o f  t h e  developed world  w i l l  dec rease  ( e .9 . .  
from 32% t o  20% i n  t h e  High c a s e  f o r  North America) it w i l l  i n -  
c r e a s e  i n  t h e  deve lop ing  world (e. g . ,  from 36% t o  47% i n  t h e  High 
c a s e  f o r  L a t i n  America).  The s e r v i c e  s e c t o r  w i l l  g a i n  importance 
i n  t ie developed r e g i o n s  and have a c o n s t a n t  s h a r e  i n  t h e  develop-  
i n g  r eg ions .  
I n  summary, bo th  s c e n a r i o s  can be c o n s i d e r e d  a s  "moderate 
d e p a r t u r e s  from observed  t r e n d  cases . "  Compared t o  h i s t o r i c a l  
developments o r  p o l i t i c a l l y  set o b j e c t i v e s  o f  development, such 
a s  a r e  described by t h e  N e w  Economic Order (Leon t i e f  19771, t h e y  
a r e  low, perhaps  even  d i s c o u r a g i n g l y  low: i n  t h e  High s c e n a r i o ,  
growth r a t e s  i n  t h e  developed r e g i o n s  d r o p  by 5 0 % ;  o n l y  L a t i n  
America and t h e  Middle E a s t  w i t h  North A f r i c a  reach GDP/cap f i g u r e s  
on t h e  o r d e r  o f  v a l u e s  o b t a i n e d  f o r  t h e  OECD c o u n t r i e s  i n  1975. 
Proponents of  a nongrowth s o c i e t y ,  however, may c o n s i d e r  o u r  
assumptions  t o  be t o o  h igh :  t h e y  would e x p e c t  t h e  impact o f  
s c a r c i t i e s  and o f  economic maturation t o  b e  g r e a t e r  than  i s  re- 
f l e c t e d  i n  our  p r o j e c t i o n s .  
*Unless explicitly noted otherwise. 
TABLE 6 Demographic assumptions. 
Persons Popul. Econom. Persons Popul. Econom. Persons Popul. Econom. 
Per i n  Large Active Per i n  Large Active Per i n  Large Active 
Ilouseh. citiesa ~ o ~ u 1 . b  Ilouseh. C i t i e s a  Popul. Househ. citiesd Popul. b 
Region (a)  ( 0 )  (a) (8) ( 0 )  (0) 
I (NA) 2.98 36 44 2.48 37 44-48 2.24 38 44-51 
11 (SU/EE) 3.70 58 39 3.00 70 42-45 2.70 80 45-51 
111 (WE/JANZ) 3.00 49 45 2.72 52 49-50 2.56 55 50-52 
I V  (LA) 5.10 37 32 4.80 53 37 4.15 69 41 
v ( A ~ / S E A )  5.24 13  38 4.80 2 3 44 4.15 44 49 
V I  (ME/NAf) 5.25 29 27 4.90 45 31 4.35 65 36 
a Large c i t i e s  r e f e r  to  urban agglomerations a s  c l a s s i f i e d  i n  o f f i c i a l  s t a t i s t i c s  i n  Region 11; i n  Regions I and 
I11 with more than 50,000 petsons; and i n  Regions I V ,  V, and V I  with more than 100,000 persons. 
b Economically ac t ive  population is t o t a l  labor force  a s  a share  of t o t a l  population. 
SOURCES of base year data (and some projections) United Nations (1976); United Nations (1974); FA0 (1977); Paxton 
(1976); CMEA (1976); U.S. Department of Cormnerce (1976); S t a t i s t i c s  Canada (1975); Keyfitz (1977). 
TABLE 7 Historical and projected growth rates of GDP, by region, Hlgh and 
Low scenarios (%/yr). 
A. High Scenario 
Historical Scenario Projection 
1950- 1960- 1975- 1985- 2000- 2015- 
Region 1960 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
I (NA) 3.3 3.4 4.3 3.3 2.4 2 -0 
11 (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 5 .O 4 .O 3.5 3.5 
I11 (WE/JANZ) 5.0 5.2 4.3 3.4 2.5 2.0 
FJ (LA) 5.0 6.1 6.2 4.9 3 -7 3.3 
V (AF/SEA) 3.9 5.5 5.8 4.8 3.8 3.4 
VI W/NAf) 7.0 9.8 7.2 5.9 4.2 3.8 
VII (C/CPA) 8.0 6.1 5.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 
World 5.0 5.0 4.7 3.8 3.0 2.7 
.B. Low Scenario 
Eistorical Scenarro Projection 
1950- 1960- 1975- 1985- 2000- 2015- 
Region 1960 1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 
I (Nn) 3.3 3.4 3.1 2.0 1.1 1.0 
I1 (SU/EE) 10.4 6.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 2.0 
111 (WE/JANZ) 5.0 5.2 3.2 2.1 1.5 1.2 
N (LA) 5.0 6.1 4.7 3.6 3 -0 3 .O 
V (Af/TA) 3.9 5.5 4.8 3.6 2.8 2.4 
VI (ME/NAf) 7.0 9.8 5.6 4.6 2.7 2.1 
VII (C/C?A) 8.0 6.1 3.3 3.0 2 -5 2.0 
World 5.0 5.0 3 -6 2 -7 1.9 1.7 
a 
Presented for p q s e s  of corqarison with data of WAES (1977) and of other 
global studies which exclude centrally-planned economies. 
NOTE: Historical and projected values of GDP in constant (1975) U.S. dollars 
are given in Chant (1980) . 
THE LONG-TERM ENERGY DEMAND: 
ASSUMPTIONS, RESULTS, OBSERVATIONS 
GDP and population are important driving variables for long-term 
energy demand. But in order to capture other factors such as 
economic structure, lifestyle, and technological characteristics, 
MEDEE-2 was used to assess the energy demand. Unfortunately, 
disaggregated sectoral data are scarce in particular for develop- 
ing regions, and there is no widely accepted method for projecting 
the evolution of various socioeconomic activities and related 
technological parameters over a period of several decades. There- 
fore, our assumptions had to be guided by past trends, interregional 
and intercountry comparisons, estimated relationships reflecting 
the interdependence between various economic and social activities, 
and estimated prospects of future technological developments--with 
most parameters influenced directly by the aggregated GDP projec- 
tions. 
Table 8 records the assumptions made concerning the GDP shares 
of the three basic sectors agriculture, industry, and services.** 
Developing regions were assumed to show the largest changes, 
reflected mainly in a shift from agriculture to industry. In 
the developed regions the industrial sector supposedly decreases, 
with the economic activity shifting increasingly to the services 
sector. 
In a further step, then, projections of the evolution of 
certain socioeconomic activities (transportation system planning, 
equipment of dwellings, etc.) and of changes in lifestyles were 
introduced. 
In 1975, considering both the developed and developing re- 
gions together, the t r a n s p o r t  s e c t o r  accounted for 245 of the 
total final energy consumption. On the average, the developing 
regions (30-415) had a higher share than the developed ones (19- 
30%). The future of the transport sector in developed nations 
will be influenced by changes in the public attitude vis-h-vis 
energy availability, higher energy prices, government regulations, 
saturation of car ownership , and growing urban congestion. Thus 
we foresee a relatively lower growth in personal travel and a 
moderate increase in the use of public transportation in urban 
areas. At the same time greater economies in gasoline consumption 
will be achieved. In contrast, in the developing regions personal 
travel is far from saturation, and freight transport will increase 
strongly along with relatively high economic growth. Regarding 
the mode of transport, developed regions will move more towards 
plane travel and, except for North America, towards car travel. 
Developing regions* will significantly shift towards cars, and 
less noticeably towards trairs. The large share of bus travel in 
those regions will decrease substantially. Load factors are as- 
sumed to remain practically constant in the developled market 
economies. In the developed countries with planned economies 
*Although the developing regions proper include Regions IV, V, V I  and VII, 
Region VII generally required special  treatment. Thus, as is used here, the 
phrase "developing regions" should be taken t o  mean Regions IY, V, and VI. 
When Region V I  is  a l so  separated out from the others, exp l i c i t  reference w i l l  
be made in the t ex t .  
''* For more de ta i l s  see Khan and Htllzl (1980). 
TABLE 8 GDP sectoral shares assunrptirns ( %  of GDP) . 
-- 
High Scanarid Low Scenario 
1975 2030 2030 
Region Agricul. Industry a Service Agricul. Industry a Service Agricul. Industry a Service 
a 
Industry includes manufacturing, mining, construction, and energy sectors. 
SOURCES of data for the base year (1975); Regions I, 11, and 111--United Nations ( 1 9 7 7 ~ ) ~  Regions IV, V, and VI-- 
United Nations (1977b); and data on vario~is Region VI countries supplied by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social I 
Development, Kuwait. N 
-1 
1 
load f a c t o r s  a r e  expected t o  decrease by a f a c t o r  of 2 .  Simi la r ly ,  
i n  LDCs where overcrowding of buses and t r a i n s  i s  more o r  less 
standard p rac t i ce  today, a subs t an t i a l  drop i n  t h e  load f a c t o r s  
i s  assumed. 
Figure 14 summarizes t he  r e s u l t s  of t he  MEDEE-2 runs f o r  t h i s  
s e t  of assumptions. The d i f fe rences  between regions a r e  s t r i k i n g .  
North America experiences t he  smallest  r e l a t i v e  increase ;  t he  
o t h e r  developed market economies increase  t h e i r  mobil i ty  s t e a d i l y  
up t o  t h e  North American level .  The developed planned economies 
a l s o  experience a marked r e l a t i v e  increase  bu t  t h e  share  of t he  
personal t r a v e l  remains r e l a t i v e l y  low, due t o  considerable r a i l  
and urban mass t r a n s i t .  The b igges t  inc rease  can be observed i n  
t he  developing regions where energy use f o r  t r anspo r t  ( i n  t h e  
High scenar io)  grows by f a c t o r s  g r ea t e r  than 10. 
Households and t he  s e rv i ce  s e c t o r  consume both f u e l s  and 
e l e c t r i c i t y  f o r  heat ing ,  l i g h t i n g ,  cooling,  cooking, etc.;  t h e  
se rv ice  s ec to r  needs add i t i ona l  e l e c t r i c i t y  f o r  spec i a l  equip- 
ment, such a s  computers, o f f i c e  machines, etc. In  1975, these  
energy u s e s  i n  b u i l d i n g s  represented a 23-311 share  o f  f i n a l  
energy demand i n  t h e  developed regions and 11-145 i n  t h e  develop- 
ing  regions.  
Housing const ruct ion  i n  t h e  scenar ios  i s  t i e d  t o  population 
growth and t he  average number of persons per  household ( f o r  va lues  
see Table 9 ) .  I n  t h e  developed market economies, t he  share  of 
c e n t r a l l y  heated dwellings would reach 90% (1975: 45%).  A i r  
condit ioning would be ava i l ab l e  i n  30-401 of t he  households 
(1975: 12%) .  In  t he  developing regions t h e  number of r e s idan t a l  
dwellings would reach 1130 mi l l ion  by 2030 (360 mi l l ion  i n  1975). 
However, due t o  c l ima t i c  condi t ions  only 25% would need space 
heat .  
Service s e c t o r  f l o o r  a r ea  i s  projec ted  t o  increase  substan- 
t i a l l y  i n  a l l  regions.  Developed market economies would use by 
2030 1.7 t o  2.1 times, developed planned economies 3.2 t o  4 .4  
and developing regions 6 t o  7.5 more f l o o r  a r e a  than i n  1975. 
Some aggressive assumptions with respect t o  conservation 
and t h e  in t roduc t ion  of new technologies  have been made, p a r t i -  
c u l a r l y  wi th  regard t o  space heat .  Pre-1975 housing stock i n  
the  developed regions is supposed t o  reduce hea t  l o s se s  by 20- 
30% through 2030 through r e t r o f i t t i n g  of improved insu la t ion .  
Post-1975 dwellings woul? have an average hea t  l o s s  o f  only 50% 
of those  i n  1975. S o f t  s o l a r  energy, hea t  pumps, d i s t r i c t  hea t  
a s  w e l l  a s  s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f i c i e n c y  improvements i n  t h e  use of 
a l l  f u e l s  (10-25% f o r  f o s s i l ,  f o r  ins tance)  w i l l  con t r ibu te  t o  
reducing t he  consumption of t h e  space heat  sector. 
I n  con t r a s t ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  use f o r  electric appliances w i l l  
continue t o  grow. Whereas s a tu r a t i on  and improved e f f i c i e n c i e s  
might f l a t t e n  the  p resen t  growth curve i n  developed na t ions ,  
developing regions must be expected t o  reach l e v e l s  3-17 t i m e s  
hlgher  than tcclay--mainly because t h e  p resen t  l e v e l  of use is so  
low. 
Table 9 f o r  t h e  household s ec to r  and Table 10 f o r  t h e  
se rv ice  s ec to r  summarize t h e  model p ro jec t ions  obtained fro= 
those assumptions. 
I n d u s t r i a l  energy  use  covers a major por t ion  of the  world 
energy consumption today and our  scenar ios  do no t  envisage t h i s  
s i t u a t i o n  t o  change s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  

3 TABLE 9 Pro jec t ed  use fu l  energy requirements i n  households (10 kwh p e r  dwell ing p e r  y e a r ) .  
Iliqh S c e n a r i o  Low S a e n a r i o  
.
1975 2030 2030 
Space 6 A i r  Misc. Space b A i r  A i s c .  Space & A i r  Misc. 
- 
Water Condi- Elec. Water Condi- Elec.  Water Condi. E l e c .  
Wgion Cooking Heat ing t i o n i n g  Appl, Cooking l lea t ing  t i o n i n g  Appl. Cooking Heat ing t i o n i n g  Appl. 
I (NA) 1.2 25.3 1.0 3.9 1.2 18.2 2.0 8.0 1.2 18.2 1 . 7  6.3 
11 (SU/EE) 1.2 11.9 0 0.9 1.2 14.4 0.2 5.0 1.2 13.6 0.2 3.0 
111 (I.IE/JAIJZ) 1.3 9.5 0 2.0 1.3 12.8 0.5 6.0 1.3 11.4 0.4 4.5 
I V  (1.A) 1.9 1.0 0 0.7 2.1 2.9 0.4 3.4 2.1 2.3 0.2 2.2 
V (AF/SEA) 1.2 0.1 0 0.05 1.4 0.2 0.02 0.5 1 .4  0.1 0.01 0.3 
VI ( I . I E / N A ~ )  1.9 0.8 0.01 0.2 2.1 3.8 0.7 3.3 2 .1  3.1 0.4 1.2 
NOTES: u s e f u l  e n e r g y  is expressed  a s  e l e c t r i c i t y  equ iva len t .  
F igu res  h e r e  a r e  ave rages  f o r  a l l  d w e l l i n g s  w i t h i n  a region.  
I 
W 
0 
I 
TABLE 10 Useful energy p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  s e r v i c e  s e c t o r .  
Iligh S c e n a r i o  Low S c e n a r i o  ' 
1975 2030 2030 
S e r v i c e  S e r v i c e  S e r v i c e  
S e c t o r  kWh/m2 S e c t o r  kWh/m2 S e c t o r  kWh/m2 
Working Space & A i r  Misc. Working Space & A i r  Misc. Working Space & A i r  Misc. 
Area Water Condi- Elec. Area Water Condi- Elec. Area Water Condi- Elec. 
Reg i o n  
- (10~m') t lea t ing  t i o n i n g  Appl. (lo9m2) Heat ing  t i o n i n g  Appl. (lo9mZ) Heat ing  t i o n i n g  Appl. 
I (NA) 2.72 270 2 2 120 5.00 227 33 150 3.79 225 28 136 
11 (SU/EE) 1.50 256 0 40 6.65 186 12 100 4.75 186 8 80 
I11 (WE/JANZ) 3.00 110 2 40 7.26 96  8 104 5.99 9 5  6 83 
IV (LA 0.60 12 2 25 3.20 1 9  1 6  65  3.41 2 2 14  66 
V (Af/SEA) 1.25 1 0 15  9.40 2 2 38 6.90 2 1 33 
VI ( M E / N A ~ )  0.18 20 2 15  2.54 52 20 100 1.84 52 1 2  8 5  
NCYTE: U s e f u l  e n r r g y  is expres sed  as e l e c t r i c i t y  equ iva len t .  
TABLE 11 Assumed distribution of manufacturing activities, High scenario. 
1975 2000 2030 
Total Basic Mach.& Cons. Total Basic Mach.& Cons. Total Basic Mach. 6 Cons. 
Region Mfgea Mt1s.b  quip,^ Goodsd Mfg.a ~ t l s . ~  Equip.= ~ o o d s ~  Mfg.a ~ t l s . ~   quip.^ Goodsd 
I (NA) 24.5 25 43 32 22.3 2 3 47 30 20.7 21 52 27 
11 (SU/EE) 38.2 2 3 48 29 33.7 2 3 52 25 29.0 23 57 20 
111 (WE/JANZ) 33.6 3 3 42 25 31.3 31 46 23 28.1 28 51 21 
IV (LA) 24.8 31 26 43 30.4 36 35 29 33.0 35 4 2 23 
V (Af/SEA) 16.6 26 18 56 22.3 32 24 44 25.8 37 30 3 3 
VI (14E/NAf) 7.8 20 10 70 24.2 35 15 50 , 27.3 35 40 2 5 
a 
Total manufacturing (% of total GDP). 
b~anufacturing of basic materials (Z of total manufacturing value added). 
C Manufacturing of machinery and equipment (Z of total manufacturing value added). 
d~anufacturing of (non-durable) consumer goods (Z of total manufacturing value added). 
NOTE: In Regions I, 11, and 111, basic materials also include mining of non-energy products but exclude 
manufacturing of petroleum and coal products. 
SOURCES: United Nations (1977b)j United Nations (1977a) United Nations (1977~). 
TABLE 1 2  Energy consumption in manufacturing. 
- 
Base 
Year Eigh Scenario Low Scenario 
Region 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
I (NA) 
Manufacturing energy usea (Cwyr/yr) 700 1,189 1,701 984 1,186 
X o f  f inal  energyb (37) (45) (46) (44) 1451 
. . -. 
Manufacturing energy use (GWyr/yr) 699 1,350 2,369 1,216 1,623 
% of  final energy (55) (57) (58) (56) (55) 
Electricity (GWyr/yr) 83 23 7. 564 196 336 
111 (WE/JANZ) 
Marmfacturing energy use (GWyr/yr) 731 1,385 2,011 1,052 1,298 
t o f  f inal  energy (46) r4r46J (461 (441 (43) 
E l e c t r i c i t y  (GWyr/yr) 113 267 477 197 277 
N (LA) 
Manufacturing energy use ( G e r / y r )  106 438 1,102 293 628 
I of f inal  energy (42 )  (441 (421 (40) 138) 
E l e c t r i c i t y  ( O i / y r )  15 72 235 49 133 
v (Af/SEA) 
Manufacturing e n e r q  use ( G e r / y r )  144 585 1,615 395 774 
t o f  final energy (571 (55) (51 1 (49) (41 
E l e c t r i c i t y  (Gdyrpyr) 16  8a 336 59 156 
vr (HE/NAT) 
Manufacturing energy use ( G e r / y r )  3 1  262 733 203 346 
% of  final energ (29) (45) (45) (471 (40) 
Electricity (G@r/yr) 4 5 3 180 41 85 
a Manufacturing energy use is f i n a l  energy of al l  M e s  (including coke and 
feedstocks) used in 'he manufacturing sector.  
b* of f i n a l  energy is manufacturing energy as a percent  of cormaercial f i n a l  
energy. 
C E l e c t r i c i t y  is e l e c t r i c i t y  used in the  manufacturing sector .  
TABLE 1 3  Average f ina l  energy intensiveness of manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s  
(excluding feedstocks and coke). 
Energy Intensiveness  Reduction 
Eigh Scenario Dw To 
( k r i h / $ V ~ )  Relative St ruc tu ra l  
Regi on 1975 2030 Decrease ( % I  Change (a) 
I (NA) 12.3 7.0 43 6 
11 (SU/EE) 13.9 6.4 54 1 
I11 (WE/yTANZ) 5.7 3.6 37 4 
IX (LA) 8.6 5.5 36 3 
V (=/SEA) 19.6 12.6 36 -2 
VI (XE/NAf) 12.2 6.1 50 -7 
In  our s p e c i f i c  context ,  " indust ry"  denotes four  sec to rs :  
ag r i cu l t u r e ,  mining, cons t ruct ion ,  and manufacturing. Energy 
use f o r  each of those s e c t o r s  is projec ted  a s  a product of t h e i r  
value added and t h e  energy use per-capi ta  u n i t  of value added-- 
t h e i r  energy i n t e n s i t y  which is determined f o r  s p e c i f i c  uses of 
motor f u e l s  and e l e c t r i c i t y  a s  w e l l  a s  thermal uses,  f o r  which 
energy can be provided by various energy forms. The f i r s t  two 
coe f f i c i en t s  a r e  given i n  terms of f i n a l  energy, t h e  l a s t  i n  terms 
of use fu l  energy. To obta in  an o v e r a l l  f i n a l  energy i n t ens ivenes s  
then,  an average end-use e f f i c i e n c y  f o r  f o s s i l  f u e l s  r e l a t i v e  t o  
e l e c t r i c i t y  is defined,  and various f a c t o r s  cap tu r ing  d i f f e r ences  
i n  economic s t r u c t u r e s  a s  w e l l  a s  r e f l e c t i n g  technologica l  p a t t e r n s  
a r e  taken i n t o  considera t ion .  
Manufacturing keeps i ts  predominant ro le :  i n  1975 it accounted 
f o r  90 t o  97% of t he  i n d u s t r i a l  energy consumption i n  a l l  regions  
except t h e  Middle East  and North Africa where, due t o  t h e  domi- 
nance of hydrocarbons production, manufacturing's share  reached 
only 62%. In  our  scenar ios ,  t ak ing  i n t o  account t h e  assumed 
s t r u c t u r a l  economic changes ( T a b l e  l l ) ,  manufacturing's share  i n  
i n d u s t r i a l  energy consumption v a r i e s  between 76 and 90% i n  a l l  
regions.  
In our  p ro jec t ions  of energy demand f o r  manufacturing, sum- 
marized i n  Table 1 2 ,  we incorporaeed s u b s t a n t i a l  conservation 
measures. The in t roduct ion  of new technologies ,  b e t t e r  p r a c t i c e s ,  
increased use of cogeneration, and e f f i c i e n c y  improvements should 
r e s u l t  i n  an energy i n t e n s i t y  reduced r e l a t i v e  t o  1975 by 35-55s 
i n  d i f f e r e n t  world regions ( the  use of coke i n  t h e  steel i ndus t ry  
and feedstocks a r e  excluded) (Tab le  13) .  The developed regions 
show a g r e a t e r  reduct ion than t h e  developing regions ,  where, ex- 
cept  f o r  Lat in  America, s t r u c t u r a l  change tends t o  increase  t h e  
energy i n t e n s i t y .  
AgricuZturaZ a c t i v i t i e s  a r e  p ro jec ted  t o  increase  by a 
f a c t o r  of 2.2 t o  2.5 i n  developed coun t r i e s  and by a f a c t o r  of 
3.7 t o  4 . 5  i n  developing na t ions .  This growth is expected t o  
be joined by a ten-fold inc rease  of t h e  energy i n t e n s i t y  of 
a g r i c u l t u r e  i n  t h e  developing coun t r i es .  
The sur face  of a rab le  land in  t h e  developing regions cannot 
be much expanded and thus  an improvement i n  production depends 
l a rqc ly  on a growing use o f  f e r t i l i z e r s * ,  i r r i g a t i o n  and mechani- 
za t ion .  F ina l  energy use i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  is t he r e fo re  es t imated  
t o  inc rease  by a f a c t o r  of 45 t o  37 i n  t h e  High and Low cases  
respec t ive ly .  Its share o f  t h e  t o t a l  i n d u s t r i a l  energy amounts 
t o  3 t o  5% (1975: 1 t o  4 % )  except  f o r  South and E a s t  Asia and 
most of Africa where it reaches 10% f o r  the  High and 15% f o r  t h e  
Low case. 
What Forms of Energy A r e  Required? 
It is important t o  note t h a t  various a c t i v i t i e s  requi re  not  only 
energy but  a very s p e c i f i c  form of energy f o r  which is  impossible 
o r  a t  l e a s t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s u b s t i t u t e  (e .g . ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  f o r  s t a t i o n -  
ary motive power, o r  motor f u e l s  f o r  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ) .  Therefore,  
energy demand i s  not  only a ques t ion  of how much but  of how much 
of what? 
*The energy needed for t ine  production of f e r t i l i z e r s  rs counted in  the basic 
materials manufacturing sector .  
In general ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  is demand-drlven i n  our  ana lys i s .  
"Essent ia l  e l e c t r i c "  uses such as aluminum production, l i g h t i n g ,  
motive power i n  indust ry ,  and computers w i l l  grow a t  a r a t e  com- 
parable t o  t h e  r e l a t ed  s e c t o r a l  a c t i v i t i e s .  E l e c t r i c i t y  w i l l  a t  
the same t i m e  moderately e n t e r  t he  heat  market. In  p a r t i c u l a r  
i n  t he  developing regions it could supply i n  2030 7% of t he  hea t  
(and cooling)  requirements (today 1 % ) .  With regard t o  i n d u s t r i a l  
heat ,  between 4-105 would be supplied by e l e c t r i c i t y .  F ina l ly ,  
i n  t h e  t r anspo r t  s ec to r  e l e c t r i c  use is expected t o  increase  i n  
a l l  regions due t o  increas ing e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n  of railways and 
mass t r a n s i t  systems and a c e r t a i n  s h i f t  t o  electric c a r s  f o r  
urban t r ave l .  In  developed coun t r i e s  with t h e  exception of North 
America e l e c t r i c i t y  could cover t hus  4-9s of t he  t r anspo r t  needs. 
In  North America and the  developing regions 1-25 could be reached. 
Globally seen, e l e c t r i c i t y  growth r a t e s  are assumed t o  drop 
i n  most regions t o  one ha l f  of t he  present  values mainly due t o  
s a tu r a t i on  reached i n  many developed countr ies .  However, elec- 
t r i c i t y  growth would--worldwide--still be a f a c t o r  of 1.4 higher  
than o v e r a l l  energy growth, leading t o  a required capaci ty  o f  
6320 and 9845 GW(e) i n  2030 (1975: 1600 (W(e)) .  
L i q u i d  fueZ8 i n  both scenar ios  w i l l  have t o  be used p r imar i l y  
f o r  t r anspo r t  and feedstocks--in some regions almost exclus ively .  
Nonessential uses w i l l  be inc reas ing ly  covered by o t h e r  f ue l s .  This  
s h i f t  i s  assumed t o  be induced by t h e  r i s i n g  p r i c e s  of crude o i l  
(placed a t  21 U.S. d o l l a r s  (1975)/bbl and 19  U . S .  d o l l a r s  (1975)/bbl  
f o r  t he  marker crude i n  1990 f o r  t h e  nigh and Low scenarios respec- 
t i v e l y ) ,  but accomplished judgmentally i n  our analys is .  
However, t h e  demand f o r  l i q u i d s  still continues t o  grow: 
1.6-2.4s worldwide, 1975-2030, reaching i n  2030 i n  terms of f i n a l  
energy 6 . 6 9  TWyr/yr i n  t h e  Low and 10.36 TWyr/yr i n  t h e  High 
scenarios.  Es sen t i a l  uses determine respec t ive ly  88 and 92% of 
t h i s  demand. 
S o f t  so2ar t e c h n o Z o g i e s ,  t h a t  is  small-scale uses,  might con- 
t r i b u t e  some s i g n i f i c a n t  percentages. In  t h e  Western developed 
regions we assumd t h a t  through aggressive p o l i c i e s  50% (30% i n  
o the r  developed a reas )  o f  a l l  post-1975 single-family c e n t r a l l y  
heated homes and low-rise s e rv i ce  s e c t o r  bu i ld ings  w i l l  be equipped 
with s o l a r  systems requ i r ing  backup f o r  30-50% of t he  t i m e  (see 
a l s o  t he  s ec t i on  on s o l a r  i n  Chapter 3 ) .  Thus, i n  North America, 
f o r  ins tance ,  14% of t he  r e s i d e n t i a l  space heat ing  and 28% of  
water heat ing  could be of s o l a r  o r i g i n  (6-75 f o r  water and space 
heat ing  i n  t h e  se rv ice  s e c t o r ) .  I n  North America and t h e  o t h e r  
developed market economies 3% of t h e  i ndus t ry ' s  process hea t  
demand and 10% of i t s  space hea t  demand might be provided by s o l a r  
i n  2030. 
Penet ra t ion  of s o l a r  space and water heat ing  i n  developing 
countr ies  is  assumed t o  be l a t e r  and slower than i n  developed 
regions.  Moreover, heat ing  demand i n  developing regions is 
low due t o  c l ima t i c  condl t lons .  S t i l l ,  some 14% of t he  
heat  demand i n  t he  household/service s e c t o r s  of those regions 
might be covered by s o l a r .  In  t h e  indus t ry  s e c t o r  4 %  of t he  hea t  
demand might be provided by s o l a r  (30% of low temperature steam/ 
hot  water demand and 10% of t he  higher  temperature steam demand 
with 20% back-up by f o s s i l  f u e l s ) .  
The remainder of t he  energy requirements which a r e  not  sup- 
p l i ed  by e l e c t r i c i t y ,  d i s t r i c t  hea t ,  combined cycle ,  l i q u i d  f u e l s  
TABLE 1 4  Assumed penetrations of renewable sources of energy, regions IY (LA) and V ( A f / S E A ) .  
Projected Penetration of Renewablesa 
(P of Useful Heat Demands) 
Demand Sector Nature of Demand 2000 2030 
Region I V  
- 
Region V Regions I V  and V 
fiouseholds 
C i t i e s  Cooking, space and water heating 0.40 0.45 
Towns b Cooking, space and water heating 0.60 0.70 
vi l lagesC Cooking, space and water heating 0.75 0.85 
Service Sector  
C i t i e s  Space and water heating 
Towns Space and water heating 
Manufacturing 
Low temperature s t e a d h o t  water 0.40 0.80 
High temperature steam 0.30 0.60 
Furnace hea t  0.06 0.12 
a Projected penetrat ions assume aggressive pol ic ies .  
b Towns a r e  urban agglomerations with l e s s  than 100,000 inhabi tants .  
C Villages include a l l  r u r a l  households. 
SOURCE: Khan (1980) . 
o r  s o l a r  systems a r e  assumed t o  be provided by interchangeable 
f o s s i l  f u e l s  comprising coa l ,  o i l ,  gas,  biogas, charcoal/wood, 
animal wastes,  e t c .  In  1975 48% of t he  f i n a l  energy was m e t  by 
those subs t i t u t ab l e  f o s s i l  f u e l s  i n  t he  developed regions and 
45% i n  the  developing regions. I n  our  scenarios t h e i r  share  would 
be reduced t o  27-29% by 2030. 
In North America coal is abundant and i ts r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  low. 
Therefore w e  assumed t h a t  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  f o s s i l  sources would meet 
25 t o  30% of t h e  indus t ry ' s  energy r equ i r emn t s  by 2030. Gas in-  
c reas ingly  replaces  l i qu id  fue l s :  it i s  more abundant than o i l  
and p r ices ,  t he r e fo re ,  rise more slowly. 
The c e n t r a l l y  planned developed countr ies  dramat ica l ly  s h i f t  
away from o i l  a s  a heat  source. Gas, and t o  some e x t e n t  combined 
cycle and d i s t r i c t  heat  systems, provide t he  major share  of the  
heat  requirements i n  both indus t ry  and household/commercial 
sec to rs .  Coal might s h i f t  towards an increased use f o r  e l e c t r i c i t y  
o r  combined hea t  and power production. 
The remaining developed world i s  less endowed wi th  resources.  
Coal is r e l a t i v e l y  p l e n t i f u l  and t he r e fo re  d i r e c t  coa l  use i n  in- 
dus t ry  is projec ted  t o  grow slowly (20% of the  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  de- 
mand i n  2030 i n  t h e  High scenar io  compared t o  12% i n  1975). Off- 
shore f inds  and good supply a v a i l a b i l i t y  of gas w i l l  inc rease  its 
ro l e  and con t r ibu te  t o  reduce t h e  share  of o i l  f o r  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  
uses  from 59% i n  1975 t o  23-265 i n  2030. 
Because o f  economic considera t ions ,  Latin America, Afr ica ,  
and South and Eas t  Asia a r e  assumed t o  pursue aggressive p o l i c i e s  
t o  save f o s s i l  f u e l s  by making an extens ive  use of renewable 
sources. Commercial charcoal/wmd, a g r i c u l t u r a l  wastes and bio- 
gas may make i n t e r e s t i n g  con t r ibu t ions  (Table 14). 
Latin America, i n  view of i ts  s u b s t a n t i a l  hydrocarbon re- 
sources fwi l l  keep i ts  high share  o f  o i l  use i n  t h e  s u b s t i t u t a b l e  
f o s s i l  market with wood con t r i bu t i ng  most of t he  remainder. Afr ica  
and South and Eas t  Asia, i n  c o n t r a s t ,  have s i g n i f i c a n t  c o a l  and 
t o  a lesser e x t e n t  gas resources.  Coal, wood, and gas the re fore  
can be expected t o  provide t h e  bulk of t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  and urban 
subs t i t u t ab l e  needs, whereas biogas could play an important r o l e  
i n  meeting t h e  commercial requirements o f  r u r a l  households. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In a f i n a l  s t e p  a l l  these  d e t a i l e d  s e c t o r a l  p ro jec t ions  were 
aggregated i n t o  two regional  and g lobal  demand scenar ios  reaching 
35.7 TWyr/yr o f  primary energy i n  t h e  High case and 22.4 TWyr/yr 
i n  t he  Low case  ( o r  22.83 and 14.57 TWyr/yr of f i n a l  energy) .  
The values f o r  t h e  individual  regions and t he  respec t ive  growth 
r a t e s  a r e  summarized i n  Tables 15 and 16. (What types of energy 
a r e  needed i s  shown i n  Figure 15) . 
In  terms of pe r  c a p i t a  consumption some improvement is made. 
A s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Table 17, t he  developing regions c lo se  somewhat 
t he  e x i s t i n g  gap between them and t he  developed regions: today 's  
f a c t o r  of 44 ( ! )  between t h e  poores t  and r i c h e s t  region i s  reduced 
t o  a f a c t o r  of 13 i n  t he  High s cena r io  and t o  25 i n  t h e  Low sce- 
nar io .  According t o  cur ren t  North-South comparisons, t h e  Low 
scenar io  appears t o  be a much less s t a b l e  case than t h e  High sce- 
nario: some dangerously low consumption values i n  some develop- 
ing regions st i l l  p e r s i s t .  
TABLE 15 Summary of scenario energy projections: f i na l  energy. 
A. Final Energy f o r  1950 and 1975 and Project ions to 2030 (flryr/yr) 
H i s to r i ca l  High Scenario Law Scenario 
Region 1950 1975 2M?O 2030 2000 2030 
I (mi )  0.96 1.81 
11 (SU/EEI 0.36 1.28 
111 (WE/JANZ) 0.55 1.59 
N (LA) 0.05 0.26 
V (Af /SEA)  0.05 0.25 
VI Wmf) 0.01 0.11 
V l T  (C/mAl 0.03 0.39 
m r l d  2.01 5.74 
8. Final Energy Grovth Ratas for 1950-1975 and Pro jec t ions . to  2030 f%/yr) 
His tor ica l  Ugh Scenario Low Scenario 
1950- 1975- 2000- 1975- 2000- 
Region 1975 Zoo0 2030 2000 2030 
I (mi )  2.7 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 
I1 (SU/EE) 5.2 2.5 1.8 2.2 1.0 
I11 (WE/JANZ) 4.3 2.6 1.2 1.7 0.7 
N (LA) 6.8 5.6 3.3 4.3 2.8 
V (Af/SEA) 6.7 5.9 3.7 4.7 2.9 
VI (MEm) 10.4 7 .O 3.5 5.8 2.3 
VII (C/C?A) 10.8 4.7 3.2 3.1 2.1 
World 4.3 3 -0 2.2 2.1 1.4 
NOTES: These da ta  f o r  f i n a l  energy include nonenerqy feedstocks but  exclude 
noncommercial enerqy such a s  wood, agr i cu l tu re  and animal waste. 
Estimates of h i s t o r i c a l  final energy are taken from Chant (1980). 
Data and world t o t a l s  are rounded; t o t a l s  may appear t o  not add exact ly .  
G r o w t h  rates were ca lcn la ted  using non-rounded data and t3en rounded t o  one 
decimal place;  these  r a t e s  may therefore  appear t o  not  apply exac t ly  in ?art 
A of the  t ab le .  
TABLE 16 Sununary of  scenar io  energy p ro jec t ions :  primary energy. 
A. Primary Energy f o r  1950 and 1975 and Projec t ions  t o  2030 L'IWyr/yr) 
His tor ica l  High Scenario Low Scenaxio 
Region 1950 1975 2OCO ' 2030 2000 2030 
World 2.39 8.21a 16.8 35.7 13.6 22.4 
8. Primary Energy Growth Rates f o r  1950-1975 and Project ions t o  2030 (%/yr) 
His to r i ca l  High S c ~ a r i o  Low Scenario 
1950 1975- 2000- 1975- 2000- 
Region 1975 2 0 0 0  2030 2000 2030 
I (WL) 3.4 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.9 
11 (SJ/EE) 6.1 2.8 2.3 2.4 1.4 
I11 (WE/JANZ) 5 .O 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.0 
N (LA) ' 7 .1  5.7 3.4 4.3 2.9 
V (Af/SEA) 7.1 6.1 4.0 4.8 3.1 
V I  (ME/NAfl 10.7 7.5 3.9 6.2 2.6 
V I I  (C/CPA) ll.1 4.7 3.8 3.1 2.9 
World 5.1 2.9 2.5 2.0 1.7 
a ~ r i m a r y  energy f o r  t h e  world for 1975 includes 0.21 TWyr f o r  bunkers. 
NOTE: See notes t o  Table 15. 
Low Sun#rlo 
ZWO 
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FIGURE 15 Global energy demand pro jec t ions ,  1975-2030. FE = t o t a l  f i n a l  energy use;  PE = t o t a l  
primary energy use;  u n i t s :  TWyr/yr. 
TABLE 17 Per capita final (commercial) energy consumption, two scenarios 
1975 t o  2030 (kWyr/yr,cap). 
-- - 
B a s e  
Y e a r  High Scenario Low Scenario 
Region 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
I ow 7.89 9.25 11-63 7.95 8.37 
11 (SU/EE) 3.52 5.47 8.57 4.98 6.15 
111 (WE/JANZ) 2.84 4.46 5.70 3.52 3.90 
N (LA) 0.80 1.75 3.31 1.28 2 -08 
V (Af/SE;L) 0.18 0.42 0.89 0.32 0.53 
V I  (ME/NAf) 0.80 2.34 4.64 1.76 2.46 
VII (C/CPA) 0.43 0.93 1.87 0.64 0.93 
World 1.46 1.96 2.86 1.58 1.83 
NOTE: The figures are average rates  of final energy use, averaged over t5e 
population and the year. The f igures for Regions I through VII resu l t  from 
the many assumptions and calculations f o r  each of  the scenarios, usang the 
MElXE-2 model; the figures for Region VII are based on SIMCRED model runs. 
According t o  t h e  high conservat ion p ro jec t ions ,  energy in- 
t e n s i t y  w i l l  be reduced i n  a l l  developed regions;  but  l e s s  so  i n  
Western Europe, I s r a e l ,  Japan, Oceania, and South Afr ica  (Region 
VII) whose i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  is less energy in tens ive  on account o f  
l oca l  resource scarceness than those  i n  the  remaining developed 
world. Developing regions,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  can be expected t o  in- 
crease  t h e  energy i n t e n s i t y  of t h e i r  economies s l i g h t l y ,  i n  view 
of t h e  projec ted  s t r u c t u r a l  economic changes, i .e . ,  a s t ronger  
emphasis on i ndus t r i e s  and an increased energy i n t e n s i t y  of 
ag r i cu l t u r e .  
This t r end  i s  very much r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  devehopment of 
energy d e n s i t i e s ,  an i nd i ca to r  charac te r i z ing  man-made environ- 
ments. Given such mate r ia l ly  def ined environments t h e  s o c i a l  
and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  problems a r e  l a r g e l y  dependent on how many 
people have t o  arrange themselves within such an environment and 
share t h e  p ro jec ted  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  The ma te r i a l  f a c t o r  of 10 
which masks t h e  d i f fe rences  i n  average energy d e n s i t i e s  between 
developing and developed regions i n  1975 i s  reduced t o  2 .  The 
s i t u a t i o n  is reversed i n  r u r a l  a r ea s .  There t h e  energy dens i ty  
increased by a f a c t o r  of 10 (0.01 t o  0 . 1 2  w/mZ) i n  developing 
regions and decrease s l i g h t l y  i n  developed regions (0.08 t o  0.05 
~ / m 2 ) .  Taking a l l  changes toge ther ,  one can expect  worldwide 
growth of energy consumption t o  be less s t rong ly  coupled t o  
economic growth than today (Table 18). 
This is  i n  l i n e  with t h e  scenar io  p ro jec t ions  of p r i ce  in- 
creases  o f  a f a c t o r  of 2 . 4  t o  3 .  The impact on t h e  economies w i l l  
be very s i g n i f i c a n t ,  a s  i s  shown i n  Table 1 9 ,  ar.d p a r t i c u l a r l y  
so  i n  developing regions.  There, t h e  share of GDP of payments 
f o r  energy might t r i p l e .  Thus, i s s u e s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  prospects  
of world t r ade  and t he  balance of payments w i l l  inc reas ing ly  dominate 
the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  energy scene. 
*With the exception of the centrally planned economies of  Asia; there, energy 
densities are comparable to  those of  developed regions, due t o  an average popu- 
lation density which i s  f ive times higher than the world average. 
TABLE 18 Final energy-GDP elasticities, Ef, 1950-2030. 
A. nigh scenario 
Historical 
1950- 1975- 1985- 2000- 2015- 
1975 1985 2000 2015 2030 Region 
0.84 0.31 0.43 0.53 0.48 I (NA) 
0.68 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.53 I1 (SU/EE) 
0.84 0.77 0.65 0.58 0.51 I11 (WE/JANZ) 
1.21 1.07 1.01 0.97 0.90 ' rv (LA) 
1.42 1.20 1.- 1.05 1.01 V (M/SEAI 
1.17 1.12 1.07 0.95 0.81 vx (MSFULf) 
1.53 1.10 1.02 1-02 0.96 VII (C/CPA) 
0.87 0.69 0.73 0.78 0.77 World 
B. Cow Scenario 
Historical 
1950- 1975- 1985- 2000 -  2015- 
1975 1985 ZOM) 2015 2030 Region 
0.84 0.24 0.38 0.53 0.46 I (rn) 
0.68 0.54 0.57 0.50 0.41 XI tsa/EE) 
0.84 0.67 0.64 0.60 0.49 111 (w'E/JW) 
1.21 - 1.3.0 1.03 0.95 0.88 N (tA) 
1.42 1.19 1.12 1.14 1.06 V (&f/SEAl 
V I  (PIEF1Af) 1.17 1.21 1.11 1.01 0.93 
=I (C/CPA) 1.53 1.02 0.98 0.99 0.90 
World 0.87 0.64 0.73 0.79 0.74 
NOTE: Historical values were computed by linear regression on logarithmic 
transformation of the equation &low using five-yearly data (see Chant, 1980). 
Values for the projection period result fromthe scenario data. 
Elasticity E is defined by the following relationship: 
where ti and t2 are two points in time, E is energy consumption measured in 
physlcal units, and GDP is gross domestic product measured in real noninflated 
monetary units. This elasticity can be calculated with respect to primary 
energy, E~~ or to final energy, ~ f .  Numerical differences between sp and &f 
can be due to changing energy conversion efficiencies or fuel mixes. 

ENERGY OPTIONS AND RESOURCES: 
T H E I R  SYSTEMS I M P L I C A T I  ONS 
THE SETTING 
In  t he  previous chapter ,  t he  fu tu r e  requirements f o r  energy w e r e  
i den t i f i ed .  W e  concluded t h a t  it is prudent t o  assume an inc rease  
i n  primary energy demand by a f a c t o r  of roughly 3-5, over t h e  next  
ha l f  century  o r  so. This presupposes t h a t  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  
nat ions  a l ready  now i n i t i a t e  s e r i ous  e f f o r t s  t o  reduce t h e  energy 
i n t e n s i t y  of t h e i r  economies and i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s .  
Obviously, these  l a r g e r  g loba l  energy requirements pre- 
suppose a very s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f o r t  on t h e  supply s i d e .  There 
seem t o  be severa l  ways and oppor tun i t i e s  t o  meet t h i s  demand; 
ye t ,  a s  t h e  ana ly s i s  w i l l  show, a l l  opt ions  w i l l  have t o  be r e l i e d  
upon i n  concer t .  
In  t h i s  paper,  a c l e a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  is made between technol- 
ogies  r e ly ing  on sources of energy t h a t ,  i n  p r i nc ip l e ,  a r e  re- 
newable, such a s  hydropower, wind, t i d a l  energy, e t c . ,  and tech- 
nologies  based on resources t h a t  r epresen t  a one-time endowment 
t o  mankind, accumulated over very long t i m e  per iods ,  such a s  
f o s s i l  resources o r  uranium. 
Many f e e l  t h a t  t he  energy supply system of t h e  fu tu r e  should 
r e l y  ex tens ive ly ,  i,f no t  exc lus ive ly ,  on renewable sources (see, 
e.g. Lovins 1 9 7 7 ) .  For, a t  f i r s t  glance renewables appear t o  be 
c lean,  easy t o  handle,  and f l e x i b l e .  It  w i l l  be shown t h a t  a 
t r u l y  large-sca le  e x p l o i t a t i o n  of renewables would have severe 
impl ica t ions  and, due t o  t h e  very c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t he se  sources,  
would g r e a t l y  l i m i t  t h e i r  po t en t i a l .  Nonrenewable technologies ,  
on t he  o t h e r  hand, do no t  d i v e r t  p a r t  of t he  flow of a na tu r a l  
cycle b u t  involve e x p l o i t a t i o n  of energy depos i t s  t h a t  a r e  s to red  
by nature .  
While na tu re  has,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  provided us with very l a rge  
amounts of energy resources ,  it is c r u c i a l  t o  assess  whether and 
under what c o n s t r a i n t s  they a r e  m3de access ib le .  A methodology 
(WEYiM) developed i n  t h e  pa s t  years  permits assessment of the  
systems implicat ions of resource ex t r ac t i on ,  focusing e x p l i c i t l y  
on i t s  impacts on o ther  resources.  WELMM is a useful  means f o r  
comparing energy technologies from a resources po in t  of view. 
Only a few of the  renewable and nonrenewable technologies 
a r e  capable of providing t r u l y  l a rge  amounts of energy over ex- 
tended periods.  T a b l e  20 summarizes f i v e  such opt ions .  Two of 
them, dry geothermal energy and fus ion energy, a r e  s t i l l  not  
mastered technologica l ly ,  and t h e i r  economics a r e  l i t t l e  i f  a t  
a l l  understood. Even i f  a geothermal technology w e r e  ava i l ab le  
a t  acceptable c o s t ,  t he  harves t ing  of the  e a r t h ' s  g rad ien t ,  in- 
volving considerable heat  exchange arrangements deep underground, 
would e n t a i l  severe ecologica l  d is turbances  and mechanical im- 
pacts  on t he  ground, such a s  a r e  known from deep mining opera t ions .  
I t  is  t he  l e a s t  known option among the  f i ve .  
The po t en t i a l  technology and impacts of nuclear  fus ion,  on 
t he  o the r  hand, a r e  much b e t t e r  understood, but  demonstration 
of i t s  commercial f e a s i b i l i t y  i s  genera l ly  not  expected before 
2010-2020. 
While fus ion and dry geothermal may be important i n  t he  
long run, no important cont r ibut ion  t o  the  energy supply can be 
expected from them over the  next  50 years  o r  so. Three main 
supply technologies  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w i l l  then have t o  be ava i l ab l e  
t o  support most of t h e  world 's  energy needs: a soph i s t i c a t ed  
f o s s i l  technology making use of f o s s i l  resources i n  a manner 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of today; nuclear  breeding; 
and, t o  a lesser e x t e n t ,  s o l a r  energy i n  various forms. Theo- 
r e t i c a l l y ,  each of them is by i t s e l f  capable of meeting t h e  
world 's  energy demand; t he  o the r  technologies known t o  us cannot 
do so. 
TABLE 20 Options for  "unlimited energy supply". 
Resource 
Options ('IWyr) Technological Maturity Side e f f e c t s  
Fossil  -3 x 10' Mature a t  present scale;  Unfavorable working 
t o  be developed for  conditions; land require- 
large scale  coal ments; C02 waste and 
other pollution 
Fission (breeder) 3 x 10' Suff ic ient  fo r  power Storage of f i ss ion  products; 
plants;  not yet  suff i -  emission of radionuclides 
c i en t  fo r  large-scale 
fuel  cycle 
Solar m To be developed fo r  Land and material require- 
large scale ments; climatic disturbance? 
storage and transportation 
Fusion (D-T) 3 x lo5 To be developed Storage of activated material;  
emission of radionuclides 
Geothermal -lo4 To be developed Storage of waste? 
( ? ? I )  emission of pollutants? 
earthquakes? 
THE POTENTIAL OF RENEWABLE SOURCES 
Renewables i n  the  Past--and i n  t he  Future? 
The use of renewable energy sources i s  nothing new. Indeed, f o r  
thousands of years  and u n t i l  very recen t ly ,  man has exc lus ive ly  
r e l i e d  on renewables f o r  h i s  energy supply. Wood, farm wastes, 
wind power and water mills were w e l l  su i t ed  t o  support societies 
t h a t  were l a rge ly  character ized  by low population d e n s i t i e s  and 
an extens ive  mode of a g r i c u l t u r a l  c u l t i v a t i o n .  
The bas ic  l im i t a t i ons  on t h e  use of renewable sources became 
apparant wi th  t he  coming of t h e  g r e a t  c l a s s i c a l  c i v i l i z a t i o n s .  
Building c i v i l i z a t i o n  cen t e r s  l i k e  anc ien t  Rome l e d  t o  demand 
d e n s i t i e s  impossible t o  meet by e n e r q  der ived from l o c a l  wood. 
Going f u r t h e r  a f i e l d  was d i f f i c u l t  l o g i s t i c a l l y ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
with respec t  t o  expensive t r anspor ta t ion .  A s o l u t i o n  was found 
i n  t h e  u t i l i z a t i o n  of charcoal ,  " inventedn many t i m e s ,  which re- 
presents  t h e  prototype of energy conversion technology. Its 
drawbacks were increas ing de fo re s t a t i on  e f f e c t s .  
A s i m i l a r  crisis occurred i n  Europe i n  t h e  l a t e  18th and 
t h e  e a r l y  19th cen tu r ies .  Improved a g r i c u l t u r a l  techniques 
provided enough food t o  support a  r ap id ly  growing population 
t h a t ,  en t i ced  by e a r l y  i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n ,  inc reas ing ly  l i ved  
i n  urban agglomerations. The change i n  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  l e d  t o  
higher  demand d e n s i t i e s ,  and wood and t h e  o t h e r  t r a d i t i o n a l  forms 
of energy were no longer s u f f i c i e n t .  Coal and railway t r anspo r t  
helped solve  t he  c r i s i s  i n  Europe, bu t  foreshadowed economic 
interdependence, t h e  t r end  towards s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ,  and t h e  in- 
c reas ing  energy in tens iveness  of our  modern system. 
Even today, s eve ra l  coun t r i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  world regions with 
a  f a s t  population growth ( Ind ia ,  Africa,  and even La t in  America) 
undergo a  comparable experience. For a  g r e a t  number of t he  wor ld ' s  
populat ion,  t h e  r e a l  energy crisis of today i s  no t  a  shortage i n  
o i l  supply but  i n  firewood. 
I t  would be wrong t o  view these  developments a s  demonstrating 
a  lack  of compat ib i l i ty  between modern energy-intensive s o c i e t i e s  
and d i f f u s e  renewable energy sources.  Renewables w i l l  and should 
inc reas ing ly  continue t o  provide a  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  and a poss ib ly  
even s u b s t a n t i a l ,  share  of our  energy supply: t h e i r  s p e c i f i c  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  make them an e x c e l l e n t  emergency supply system 
i n  t i m e s  of crisis,  which could add t o  making t he  growing i n t e r -  
depencence more pa l a t ab l e  and acceptable.  
But t he  main problems i n  using renewables st i l l  remain. 
Their  low d e n s i t i e s  requ i re  b ig  investments i n  land and i n  energy 
harves t ing  equipment. The amounts t o  be suppl ied  a r e  t yp i ca l l y  
l i m i t e d  by t he  na tu r a l  cyc l e s  they a r e  derived from, f o r  t h e  
ha rves t ing  of power must under no circumstances des t roy  t he  system 
concerned. Furthermore, t h e r e  is t he  ques t ion  of c o s t .  One would 
expect  renewables t o  be i n  a t  l e a s t  t h e  same economic bal lpark  
a s  o t h e r  forms of energy supply. P o l i t i c a l ,  eco log ica l ,  and o the r  
cons idera t ions  might permit somewhat higher  c o s t s  but  only within 
s ens ib l e  l i m i t s .  
Energy Flows 
A s  mentioned, renewables are sources of  energy t h a t  is d ive r t ed  
from n a t u r a l  power flows i n  t h e  e a r t h ' s  atmosphere and hydrosphere,  
the  bedrock of t h e  e a r t h  sur face ,  and the biosphere.  The sources 
feed t h e s e  systems (Hubbert 1971), a s  i s  i n d i c a t e d  i n  Figure 16 ,  
by s u n l i g h t ,  p lanetary  motion, and geothermal energy. 
Sunlight a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e  upper l a y e r s  of t h e  atmosphere is 
t h e  dominating inflow, providing 178,000 TWyr/yr; i ts ext ra-  
t e r r e s t r i a l  dens i ty  amounts t o  1.35 k~/m2,  measured i n  perpendic- 
u l a r  d i r e c t i o n  t o  t h e  sun. The respec t ive  va lues  on t h e  e a r t h  
d i f f e r  widely: yea r ly  averages i n  c e n t r a l  Sahara areas may be 
250 w/m2 with up t o  4000 hours  of sunshine p e r  year ;  d e n s i t i e s  
i n  c e n t r a l  Europe average about 100 ~ / m 2  with 1500 hours p e r  
year of d i r e c t  i n s o l a t i o n .  
Th i r ty  percent  of t h e  sun l igh t  is r e f l e c t e d  back i n t o  space.  
Of t h e  remaining 705, 83,000 TWyr/yr is i n  the form of s e n s i b l e  
h e a t  of  a i r  and water ,  and 41,000 TWyr/yr a s  l a t e n t  h e a t  from 
evaporat ion,  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h a t  which is  r e l eased  upon condensation. 
The absorbed s o l a r  h e a t  f i n a l l y  leaves  t h e  e a r t h  i n  t h e  form of 
i n f r a r e d  r a d i a t i o n .  
FIGURE 76 Energy flows through the  environment (power l e v e l s  
i n  TWyr/yr). I n  many of the  numerical p resen ta t ions  e x t r a  s ig-  
n i f i c a n t  f i g u r e s  beyond what is  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  v a l i d  are l i s t e d .  
This is done t o  make a r i t h m e t i c  i d e n t i t i e s  va l id .  
Sunlight powers severa l  secondary systems, i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
t he  cl imate system and t h e  biosphere.  Wind, waves, and t he  k i n e t i c  
energy of ocean cu r r en t s  d i s s i p a t e  roughly 370 TWyr/yx, and 
t he  cont inenta l  runoff ,  v ia  f r i c t i o n  hea t  i s  some 5 TWyr/yr. 
Biomatter converts  some 100 TWyr/yr ( ag r i cu l t u r e  draws 2 . 5  TWyr/yr 
from t h a t  system) . 
Geothermal e n e r g y  provides 35 TWyr/yr v i a  hea t  conduction 
t o  t he  atmosphere. Only 1% of t h i s  amount comes by way of vol- 
canoes o r  a c t i v e  geothermal f i e l d s .  
F ina l ly ,  3 TWyr/yr of k i n e t i c  energy a r e  d i s s ipa t ed  i n  t h e  
t i d a l  movements caused by p l a n e t a r y  m o t i o n .  The energy from 
these  sources t h a t  i s  within  man's reach i s  2 5 , 0 0 0  TWyr/yr i n  
t he  form of sun l igh t ,  some 3000 TWyr/yr i n  t he  form of heat  s t o r e d  
i n  t h e  oceans, a s  w e l l  a s  some 150 TWyr/yr i n  the  form of wind 
a t  access ib le  he ights  above t h e  con t inen t s ,  biomatter ,  c o n t i n e n t a l  
run-off,  and w e t  geothermal sources. 
These f i gu re s  seem high. Harvesting these  energ ies  might, 
however, i n t e r f e r e  with some s e n s i t i v e  couplings between the  
na tu r a l  energy flows. Therefore, any s i g n i f i c a n t  amount of 
mechanical energy obtained from ocean c u r r e n t s  might s e r i dus ly  
impact on t h e  c l imate  blocking t h e  much l a r g e r  regu la r  hea t  t r ans -  
f e r  of t h e  ocean. Ins tead,  the r a t i o  of t h e  k i n e t i c  energy 
harvested ( 0 . 2  TWyr/yr) and t h e  hea t  t ranspor ted  is 1:10,000.  
The case of wind power is less dramatic. With a k i n e t i c  
energy p o t e n t i a l  of 350 TWyr/yr, t h e  respec t ive  r a t i o  is  on t h e  
order  of 1 : 2 5 .  
I t  is i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  compare t h e  changes i n  physical  power 
flows due t o  present  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r ac t i c e s .  A y i e l d  of 2.5 TWyr/yr 
of use fu l  products i s  contras ted  by changes i n  t h e  albedo and 
evaporat ion r a t e s  on t h e  order  of 25-100 TWyr/yr. It can be 
es t imated  t h a t  a d ive rs ion  of about 10 TNyr/yr would heavi ly  
a f f e c t  a l l  t h e  eco log ica l  systems of t h e  globe unless  it is 
balanced by an a r t i f i c i a l  s t imula t ion  of biomass growth--of the  
same magnitude and i n  s e l ec t ed  loca t ions .  
The Technical P o t e n t i a l  
The optimal source of energy would be charac te r i zed  by a high 
power dens i ty ,  continuous a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  and easy conve r t ab i l i t y  
i n t o  a l l  forms of use fu l  energy required  by t he  consumer. Re- 
newable sources d i sp l ay  many d i f f e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  these  
r e spec t s  a s  i s  shown i n  Table 21. 
Group I denotes d i r e c t  i n so l a t i on  and i t s  uses.  This source,  
which w i l l  be discussed i n  more depth a t  t h e  end of t h i s  sec t ion ,  
has a very s u b s t a n t i a l ,  and f o r  p r a c t i c a l  purposes, "unlimited" 
p o t e n t i a l  of 2 5 , 0 0 0  TWyr/yr reaching t he  su r face  of t h e  ea r th .  
Group I1 is  a summary of t h e  i n d i r e c t  power flows induced 
by s o l a r  r ad ia t ion .  So l a r  r ad i a t i on  is converted i n t o  biomass  
a t  a r a t e  of 100 TWyr/yr. Approximately 30% of t h i s  energy i s  
transformed i n t o  wood. Cul t iva ted  land provides 10 TWyr/yr of 
biomass (0.4 TWyr/yr is food; t h e  remainder goes i n t o  uses such 
a s  f i b e r  production and animal food) .  Should w e  be prepared t o  
c u l t i v a t e  a l l  of t h e  con t inen t s  and i s l ands  a t  t h e  maximum in- 
t e n s i t y  poss ib le ,  given the need t o  prevent unacceptable s o i l  
degradat ion,  then some 25 TWyr/yr could be obtained.  I f  one 
deducts t h e  amount of biomass needed t o  feed a population twice 
t h a t  of today, a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  amounts serving o ther  nonfuel 
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purposes ( including recondit ioning of t he  s o i l ) ,  some 6 TWyr/yr 
of biomass might be ava i l ab le  f o r  f u e l  purposes, a f t e r  conversion 
i n t o  high-grade energy forms equivalent  t o  high-qual i ty coa l  o r  
ref ined o i l  products. 
5 TWyr/yr mechanical energy a r e  ava i l ab l e  i n  t he  form of 
hydropower.  However, approximately 2 TWyr/yr of t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  
is inaccess ib le ,  due t o  ecologica l  reasons (preservat ion  of 
ecologica l  systems of r i v e r s ,  minimum speed of water  flow, e t c . )  
o r  physical  reasons ( f i n i t e  s i z e  of t echn ica l  devices; d ispersed  
supply a t  heads, e tc . )  even i n  advanced programs such a s  t he  
Tennessee Valley Authority Pro jec t .  Thus, inc luding g l a c i e r  
power, some 3 TWyr/yr could perhaps be technologica l ly  acce s s ib l e .  
Wind has  a s u b s t a n t i a l  physica l  p o t e n t i a l .  However, a l a r g e  
share  is inaccess ib le  a s  it occurs i n  a r ea s  (high mountains, 
po l a r  regions)  o r  he ights  where harves t ing  would be p r a c t i c a l l y  
impossible. I f  one ignores t he  smal ler  con t r ibu t ions  i n  t h e  
cont inents  i n t e r i o r s ,  but  assumes t h a t  a22 wind power en t e r i ng  
on t h e  coas t s  a t  he ights  up t o  200 m could be captured,  one 
obtains an estimate of  3 TWyr/yr. 
A con t r ibu t ion  of energy from ocean c u r r e n t s  o r  wave powep 
is  not  expected. The k i n e t i c  energy of c u r r e n t s  is 0.2 TWyr/yr 
and any s i g n i f i c a n t  harves t ing  would severe ly  impact t h e  cl imat-  
o log i ca l  system. With regard t o  wave power, no technology i s  y e t  
foreseen t h a t  could e f f i c i e n t l y  convert  energy both of waves 3 m 
i n  h&~ht  and waves 30 m i n  W h t ;  t h e  l a t t e r  a r e  t yp i ca l  of 
almost a l l  coas t s  with a s i g n i f i c a n t  wave power po t en t i a l .  
Other than Group 11, Group I11 does not  r e f e r  t o  power flows 
but  t o  temperature d i f fe rences  between na tu r a l  hea t  r e se rvo i r s  
maintained by s o l a r  r ad ia t ion .  
The hea t  s t o r ed  i n  w a t e r ,  s o i l ,  and a i r  can be made acces- 
s i b l e  through hea t  pumps. Operation of hea t  pumps requ i res  ex- 
t e r n a l  supp l ies  of "high-quality" mechanical energy. I n  the 
l i g h t s  o f  o v e r a l l  e f f i c i ency  considera t ions ,  hea t  pumps may above 
a l l  be viewed as devices t h a t  conserve energy: a small amount o f  
high-qual i ty energy such a s  e l e c t r i c i t y  is used i n  o rder  t o  process  
energy produced by o the r  sources a t  a r e l a t i v e l y  lower e f f i c i ency .  
The ocean thermal energy  c o n v e r s i o n  scheme (OTEC) makes use 
of t h e  temperature d i f fe rence  between the  su r face  l aye r s  of t h e  
oceans and t h e  deep sea.  With t h e  systems sug e s t e d  i n  t h e  
recen t  l i t e r a t u r e  (ASA 1975c) 0.25 wat ts  per m j  of t r o p i c a l  ocean 
sur face  could be obtained,  which corresponds t o  a t echn ica l  
p o t e n t i a l  of 22 TWyr/yr. However, ha rves t ing  t h i s  amount would 
l e ad  t o  a t r a n s f e r  of 720 TWyr/yr of l a t e n t  atmospheric hea t  
i n t o  t h e  system of ocean cu r r en t s  t r anspor t ing  3000 TWyr/yr from 
t h e  t r o p i c a l  regions  t o  t h e  p o l a r  regions.  Within a few decades 
t he  temperature g r ad i en t s in  t h e  oceans would obviously be changed. 
Exploi t ing t he  na tu r a l  hea t  flows between t h e  upper l aye r s  of t h e  
oceans and t h e  deep s e a  would reduce the  OTEC p o t e n t i a l  t o  merely 
1 TWyr/yr (Wick and Schmitt  1977). Only such modes of OTEC could 
s t r i c t l y  be considered a s  renewable  technologies .  
Our es t imates  consider  t h e  1 TWyr/yr p o t e n t i a l .  The heat 
source tapped by OTEC is of a very low q u a l i t y  only,  and would 
t he r e fo re  requ i re  an extremely large-sca le  deployment of f a c i l i -  
t ies ,  making even an e l e c t r i c i t y  generat ion of 1 TMyr/yr a g igan t ic  
undertaking. I n  view of t he  s u b s t a n t i a l  technologica l  problems 
and of t he  poss ib ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  s i de - e f f ec t s ,  which a r e  only 
poorly  understood, we have assumed t h a t  i t  would be prudent  t o  
cons ide r  t h i s  va lue  t o  remain an upper l i m i t  f o r  t h e  nex t  30 
yea r s .  
The same dichotomy, between a l a r g e  h e a t  s t o r a g e  and a com- 
p a r a t i v e l y  smal l  f low, c h a r a c t e r i z e s  g e o t h e r m a l  e n e r g y  (Group I V ) .  
The c a s e  of d ry  geothermal energy,  t h a t  is, h e a t  s t o r e d  i n  t h e  
e a r t h  c r u s t ,  r e q u i r e s  a technology n o t  y e t  conceived.  Our e s t i -  
mate o f  w e t  geothermal sou rces  i s  based on two s t u d i e s  made i n  
t h e  U.S.A. (Geothermal Resource Group 1979; Armstead 1978) .  From 
t h o s e  s t a t i s t i c s  w e  have i n f e r r e d  a p o t e n t i a l  o f  2 TWyr/yr f o r  
t h e  world. 
Group V c o n s i d e r s  t h e  energy provided by p l a n e t a r y  motion. 
3 TWyr/yr i s  d i s s i p a t e d  i n  t h e  form o f  t i d a l  energy.  But on ly  a 
very smal l  percen tage  o f  t h i s  energy can be c o l l e c t e d  i n  p r a c t i c e .  
Only i n  very few l o c a t i o n s  a r e  t h e  t i d a l  l e v e l s  h igh  enough, and 
s u i t a b l e  b a s i n s  f o r  i n t e r m e d i a t e  s t o r a g e  c o n s t i t u t e  a f u r t h e r  
c o n s t r a i n t .  An o v e r a l l  p o t e n t i a l  o f  n o t  more t han  0.04 TWyr/yr 
w i t h i n  50 y e a r s  seems r e a l i z a b l e .  
Table 22  adds up t h e  t e c h n i c a l  p o t e n t i a l s  of  renewable 
sou rces  t o  an impress ive  15 TWyr/yr, which i s  t w i c e  t h e  wor ld ' s  
energy consumption i n  1975. Note t h a t  t h e  foregoing  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
of renewable sou rces  merely c o n c e n t r a t e d  on p h y s i c a l  a s p e c t s ,  
l e a v i n g  a s i d e  t h e  economics and uses  o f  renewables. 
Indeed,  t h e  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  renewable sou rces  v a r i e s  g r e a t l y ,  
depending o n  t h e  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i n  which they  a r e  t o  be  embedded. 
Thus, i n  less developed s o c i e t i e s ,  s t a n d a r d s  of "cont inuous"  a v a i l -  
a b i l i t y  and "easy" c o n v e r t a b i l i t y  can be o f  l i t t l e  importance i f  t h e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  is  mostly n o n a v a i l a b i l i t y  o r  n o n a p p l i c a b i l i t y .  Eco- 
nomic c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  w i l l  seldom c o n s t r a i n  t h e  use  o f  noncommercial 
TABLE 22 Technical potential (as secondary energy) of renewable resources. 
Power 
~ r p e  (TWyr/yr) Comment 
Biomass 6 Requires cult ivation of vi r tual ly  a l l  of the 
productive land of the world. 
Hydropower 3 A high-quality product, equal t o  three times 
as  much fuel. Includes minor potential  from 
glaciers. 
Wind 3 Eigh-quality energy but u t i l i za t ion  must deal 
with d i f f i cu l t i e s  of energy storage. 
Waves and 0.005 Minor quanti t ies are available, but they do 
ocean currents not add up to  anyt!!ing significant.  
OTEC 1 Potential is greater if ocean heat can be 
diverted on a glgantic scale. S t i l l  specu- 
la t ive .  
Geothermal 2 Much more stored heat is available for 
(wet) "mining" but technology is not available. 
Tidal 0.04 Very localized potential. 
Total GI5 
f u e l s  s ince ,  i n  t h e  near t e r m ,  a l t e r n a t i v e s  w i l l  not  be acces s ib l e  
t o  these  countr ies  lacking a wide transmission i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  
Such considerat ions are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of a user-oriented approach, 
according t o  which t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  and disposal  of energy should be  
adjus ted  t o  t he  u se r ' s  needs and purposes (Table 23). 
A. Khan (1980) has  est imated the po ten t i a l  con t r ibu t ion  of 
renewable energy i n  t h e  world 's  developing regions (excepting 
China).  Under t he  inc lus ion of urban users ,  he a r r i v e s  a t  a re- 
newable~ '  share  i n  2030 of 0.7-1.1 TWyr/yr of f i n a l  energy; t h e  
assumed t o t a l  f i n a l  energy demand is  4.41-7.05 TWyr/yr f o r  a 
population of 4.7 b i l l i o n .  Scaled up p ropor t iona l ly  t o  include 
China, the  est imated use of renewables i n  developing regions is ex- 
pected to be atm.st1.35 TWyr/yr, i n  terms of what seems s o c i a l l y  
and p r a c t i c a l l y  achievable.  By f a r  t h e  l a r g e s t  sha re  of 1.15 TWyr/yr 
comes from biomass (firewood, straw, biogas,  dung, e tc . ) ,  mainly 
i n  t h e  form of charcoal.  User-collected e l e c t r i c i t y  from wind 
and hydropower could reach 0.1 TWyr/yr. Direct s o l a r  energy, 
suppl ied  l o c a l l y ,  i s  less important (0.01 TWyr/yr of hea t )  than 
might be expected: t he  demand f o r  comfort hea t ing  is low, and 
s o l a r  cooling has f a i l e d  t o  gain acceptance i n  s p i t e  of repeated 
attempts a t  introducing it i n  these  regions.  
TABLE 23 User-oriented supplies of renewable resources 
Quantity 
Technoloqy m e  Agplication Energy F o m  (TWyr/Yr) 
Biomass Subsistence fuela Charcoal, biogas -1 
Small-scale 
industry Charcoal, biogas -0.15 
Forest products Industrial fuel 0.8 
Hydroelectricity Rural electricity Electricity -0.05 
Wind Rural electricity Electrical equivalent -0.05 
Insolation Domestic and Low-to-medium quality 
industrial heating heat 2.2 
Self-generated 
electricity 
(cogeaerated) Electricity 0.08 
Totals by Source w u e  (Tdyr/yr)  Totals bv Anplication Cateqor: (TWyr/yr) 
Biomass 1.95 Secondary industrial solid 
Eydroelectricity 0.05 fuel 0.8 
Wind 0.05 Other secondary fuel 1.15 
Insolation 2.28 Electricity or equivalent 0.18 
C d o r t  and process heat 2.2 
Total 4.33 Total 4.33 
a Although charcoal is the dsminant secondary form. the "biomassn total for 
subsistence fuel also includes the more versatile form, biogas, as well as 
miscellaneous uses of wood, straw, and c m p  residues as fuel. 
Highly industrialized r eg ions ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  a r e  characterized 
by a very  high degree  o f  u rban iza t ion  and a dense i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  
Continuous a v a i l a b i l i t y  and easy c o n v e r t a b i l i t y  a r e  impor tan t .  
However, a  t i g h t l y  k n i t  network between sou rces  and a g r e a t  
v a r i e t y  o f  o p t i o n s  a v a i l a b l e  e a s e  t h e s e  requirements :  g r i d s  
p rov ide  r e l a t i v e l y  s imple  backup systems and h e l p  t o  embed i n t e r -  
m i t t e n t  sou rces  of supply .  But they  a l s o  make a l t e r n a t i v e s  
a c c e s s i b l e ,  and t h e r e f o r e  economics r a p i d l y  become a c o n s t r a i n i n g  
f a c t o r .  High demand d e n s i t i e s  due t o  e x t e n s i v e  u r b a n i z a t i o n  re- 
q u i r e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f o r t  o f  commercial c o l l e c t i o n  and concen- 
t r a t i o n  o f  energy,  r educ ing  s h a r p l y  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a user- 
o r i e n t e d  approach. A s  Figure  17 i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  d e n s i t i e s  o f  
most renewable o p t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  below t h o s e  o f  p r e s e n t  
urban demand. 
Th i s  is borne o u t  by a r e c e n t  c a s e  s t u d y ,  sponsored by t h e  
U.S. Department o f  Energy (1978) on t h e  ways i n  which C a l i f o r n i a  
cou ld  be brought  t o  use  a maximum of  d i s t r i b u t e d  energy forms. 
I t  w a s  concluded t h a t  under C a l i f o r n i a ' s  ve ry  f a v o r a b l e  condi-  
t i o n s  and w i t h  a v e r y  unusual  conse rva t ion  e f f o r t  ( f i n a l  energy  
demand i n  2025 does  n o t  exceed t o d a y ' s  v a l u e ) ,  induced by a four-  
f o l d  energy p r i c e  i n c r e a s e ,  C a l i f o r n i a  cou ld  become n e a r l y  energy  
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  by 2025 by bas ing  i ts supply a lmost  e x c l u s i v e l y  
on renewable sou rces .  
Most of  t h i s  energy produced, however, r e q u i r e s  c e n t r a l i z e d  
p roces s ing  and commercial d i s t r i b u t i o n .  D i r e c t  s o l a r  energy o n l y  
is a p p l i e d  i n  a u s e r - o r i e n t e d  mode; and, whenever t h i s  is p o s s i b l e ,  
d i r e c t  s o l a r  i s  a l s o  used f o r  cogenera t ion  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y .  
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Assuming 1/3 of that electricity to be consumed by the producer, 
California would need 0.052 TWyr/yr of solar heat and 0.002 TWyr/yr 
of electricity that would be obtained in ways other than by the 
regular electricity grid. 
From those figures we have inferred for the industrialized 
regions by 2030 a maximum consumption of 2.2 TWyr/yr of direct 
solar heat and 0.08 TWyr/yr of electricity in a user-oriented 
mode. I To these contributions for both developed and developing 
regions, another source must be added. If most of the wood scrap 
generated by the lumber and paper industry should be used for 
energy purposes, this industry could become more or less energy 
self-sufficient. Assuming a growing efficiency in energy use 
in that industry to match increasing per-capita demands, we 
estimated tkat 0.8 TWyr/yr could be provided. This value, how- 
ever, corresponds to a harvest of perhaps 2.4 TWyr/yr of energy 
equivalent in the form of nonfuel use of wood, which certainly is 
close to the maximum limits of a possible annual forest harvest. 
In summary, the worldwide potential for a user-oriented 
consumption of renewable energy is up to some 4-5 TWyr/yr (Table 
23). We do not believe that this figure can be exceeded, but 
there are many possibilities, and perhaps also certain probabili- 
ties, for shortfalls to arise. Note that with the price of 
photoelectric cells approaching a roughly commercial level the 
use of direct solar energy might be significantly higher. 
Costs  of renewable sources vary greatly, and are character- 
ized by grave uncertainties. If used on a large scale beyond 
a locally practical level, these sources require storage, backup, 
transportation and distribution. Moreover, they are generally 
land-intensive and lead to noneconomic costs to be compensated 
by, for example, royalties payments. On the other hand, fuel 
costs are nil, and only operation and maintenance costs add to 
the capital cost of the basic installations. At the same time, 
considerations of balance of payments might provide an incentive, 
and noneconomic factors, such as safety of supply, etc. offer a 
commercially judgable bonus by lessening, for instance, the 
economic burden of introducing and maintaining an emergency 
storage system. 
Table 24 gives some estimates of the investment costs 
relative to the yearly energy output, which may serve as a yard- 
stick for comparing electricity generating technologies. The 
examples chosen are considered typical cases. No storage and 
transmission costs were included. Most renewable options appear 
quite competitive. 
In Table 25 two different costing standards are applied to 
technologies that provide material energy carriers for local 
consumption, depending on whether investment or operating charges 
are dominant. Firewood, biogas and wet geothermal compare 
favorably with the retail price of light fuel oil. Heat pumps 
are competitive where cheap electricity and groundwater is avail- 
able. The cost of solar panels would have to be reduced sig- 
nificantly. 
All the figures given are very rough estimates under gener- 
ally favorable conditions to be used for reference purposes only. 
Present literature contains a wide range of values, both higher 
and lower than the ones used here. However, considering that we 
can expect highly favorable economic conditions in some regions 
TABLE 24 Electricity from renewable sources: examples of capital costs and contribution to electrical costs. 
Contribution of 
Capital Cost 
Investment Assumed to Electricity 
Plant Costs ~ u t y  cycle costb (u.s. 
Technology Capacity (1975$/MW(e) l a  (hr/yr) cents/kW per hr) Technical Status , 
llydroelectricity 
Iiigh head 250 MW(e) 800 4,000 2.0 
Low head 250 MW(e) 1,400 4,0@-3 3.4 
Tidal Power 
Wind 
Mature, 
deployed 
Under design, experience 
with large pilot plants 
Some commercial ex- 
perience, projects, 
studies under way 
OTEC 100 MW(e) 650 6,500 1.0 Studies 
For comparison 
Direct solarC 100 MW(e) 3.000 6.000 5 
Oil-f ired 
(including oil well 300 MW(e) 650 4,000 3.0 Mature, deployed 
and transport) 
a These cost levels refer to layouts used to estimate technical potentials. The layouts were evaluated for Cost 
as though each technology were mat1,Ire. No storage or transportation systems are included. 
b~valuated using 108 fired capital charge. 
C HcliosLats at 2 x U.S. Department of Energy cost targets3 includes 9 to 12 hours of energy storage1 southwestern 
UniLed SLates. 
SOURCES: Based on data from ASA (1975b. 1975c, 1975d). 
a 
TABLE 25 Cost levels for favorable cases: heat from renewable sgurces. 
Fuel Costs (FC) or 
lor Capital Charge 
Investment costs on Inveetments (CCI) 
1975$/kW of (1978$/bbl Assumed Load 
Technology Average Power equivalent) Factor (hr/yr) Remarks/Technical Status 
Fuelwood : 180 5 to 24 (FC) Rotation of land, Institutional changes, 
plantation, im- continuous technically feasible 
proved forest 
Biogas: 480 15 (PC) Continuous Without labor costs during 
farm wastes operation 
Wet geothermal 100 7 (PC) 6,000 Geyser fields, Iceland; 
cost of delivered hot water 
as fuel equivalent 
riot dry rocks, geo- 400 extraction 28 (CCI) 2,500 Feasibility study I Ln 
thermal anomalies (+)1,000 (distribution) ~n I 
tleat pumps: 2,100 (high estimate) 42 (CCI) 1,700 One third of heat supplied 
electric scllemes 800 (low estimate) 10 (CCI) by electricity if water is 
available as a heat source 
Solar panels: 7,500 150 (CCI) 1,700 b 500 fossil fuel backup 
residential 
heating 
For con~parison 
Light fuel oil 100-200 20 (FC) Negligible Retail price (1976) 
storage costs 
70 (FC) 1,700 Cost of delivered hot water 
from district heating system, 
as fuel equivalent 
a 
The cost levels refer approximately to those layouts which were chosen to estimate the technical potentials in 
Table 22. They are not meant to represent expert opinions about achievable costs for the most favorable 
competitive circumstance. 
b 
For Central Europe. 
SOUNCEr Based on data from ASA (1975a and dl. 
and forbidding ones i n  o the rs ,  t he  economic f ac to r s  w i l l  lead t o  
a  bandwidth of poss ib le  uses of a  s p e c i f i c  technology t h a t  i s  very  
c lose  t o  ne i t he r  a  maximum use nor t o  no use a t  a l l .  
W. Sassin and B. Spinrad (Energy Systems Program Group of 
IIASA 1981) have attempted, i n  a  judgmental way, and assuming 
genera l ly  favorable condit ions,  t o  synthes ize  these  considera t ions  
i n t o  es t imates  of t he  renewables p o t e n t i a l  p r a c t i c a l l y  r e a l i z a b l e  
within the next 50 years.  The ac tua l  values a r e  sunnnarized i n  
Table 26  and compared t o  t h e  t echn ica l  po t en t i a l .  
The technica l  p o t e n t i a l  of biomass was est imated t o  be 
6 TWyr/yr. Subtract ing t h e  user-oriented con t r ibu t ions ,  4.05 
TWyr/yr remains f o r  commercial processes.  
W e  can expect t h a t  t h e  0.8 TWyr/yr gathered and used by 
the  lumber and paper indust ry  w i l l  be f u l l y  consumed. In  con- 
t r a s t ,  w e  judge t h a t  only s l i g h t l y  more than 3/4 of the user- 
o r i en t ed  p o t e n t i a l  of wood i n  the developing na t ions  w i l l  be 
r ea l i z ed  due t o  the  mismatch between supply and demand d i s t r i bu -  
t i on :  most of t he  demand is generated i n  South E a s t  Asia, where- 
a s  t he  l a r g e s t  resources a r e  found i n  Afr ica .  
The commercial exp lo i t a t i on  of biomass i s  const ra ined by 
competit ive land use and economics. The p r i o r i t y  of energy 
production from biomass i n  a  world of 8 b i l l i o n  people w i l l  be 
second priority--and food production f i r s t - - so  t h a t  probably 
not  more than 50% of t h e  crops an t i c ipa t ed  w i l l  be ava i l ab le .  
The high t ranspor ta t ion  c o s t s  of charcoal i nd i ca t e  t he  necess i ty  
t o  produce a  liquid--whose conversion i s  less e f f i c i e n t  however 
(30% ins tead  of 50%) .  Against t h i s  background, poss ib le  com- 
mercial  use of biomass w i l l  not  exceed 3.1 TWyr/yr, r e s u l t i n g  i n  
a  p r a c t i c a l l y  r e a l i z a b l e  p o t e n t i a l  of s l i g h t l y  less than 5  TWyr/yr 
of secondary energy. 
Urban was te  is a  r e s idua l  form of biomass t h a t  can be used 
f o r  organic and inorganic purposes. Some 0.3 TWyr/yr might be- 
come ava i l ab l e  from t h i s  source. 
The t echn ica l  p o t e n t i a l  of hydropower i s  es t imated  t o  be 
reduced t o  50% i n  p r ac t i c e ,  because of competit ive uses (irri- 
ga t ion ,  preservat ion  o f  eco log ica l  values,  navigat ion)  a s  w e l l  
a s  t e chn i ca l  and s o c i a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s .  With t h e  economics assumed 
t o  be favorable,  some 1.5 TWyr/yr should be r ea l i z ab l e .  
Economic and aesthetic cons idera t ions  a s  w e l l  as land use 
a r e  t he  f a c t o r s  cons t ra in ing  the use of wind power.  Furthermore, 
t h i s  i n t e rmi t t en t  energy source must be in tegra ted  i n t o  a  system 
with a  major s torage  capaci ty  and a  s u f f i c i e n t  thermal baseload. 
Thus, even i f  dispersed uses of wind f o r  water pumping and very 
small-scale  e l e c t r i c i t y  uses a r e  included, it would no t  be reason- 
ab le  t o  expect more than 1  TWyr/yr t o  be rea l i zed .  
A r b i t r a r i l y ,  t he  r e a l i z a b l e  p o t e n t i a l  of w e t  geothermal energy  
i s  est imated t o  be ha l f  t h e  t echn ica l  p o t e n t i a l .  The mismatch 
between resources and use rs  a s  w e l l  a s  eco log ica l  cons t r a in t s  
( po l l u t i on )  a r e  considered t o  be t h e  most r e s t r a i n i n g  f ac to r s .  
One ha l f  of t he  est imated 1.0 TWyr/yr is expected t o  be used a s  
low-temperature hea t ,  while t h e  o t h e r  ha l f  i s  assumed t o  be used 
f o r  generat ing e l e c t r i c i t y  a t  a  20% conversion e f f i c i ency .  
Local s o t a r  energy  is mostly const ra ined by i t s  low economics. 
Out of a  2 . 2  TWyr/yr p o t e n t i a l ,  only s l i g h t l y  more than 4 0 %  (ap- 
proximately 0 .9  TWyr/yr) would be r ea l i z ed ,  a l l  of which is used 
i n  t he  form of low-temperature hea t .  
TABLE 26 Comparison of technical and realizable potential. 
Technical Realizable 
Potential Potential 
source (TWyr/yr (lwyr/yr) Constraint Comment 
Biomass 6 5.1 Land use 
Wind 
Geothermal (wet) 2 
Partial mismatch between sources and 
customers. The only renewable source 
of reduced carbon. 
1.5 Ecological, social nigh quality product (electricity). 
Very small fraction available from 
self-collected sources. 
1.0 Land use, economics tligh-quality product (electricity), but 
must be used mostly in conjunction with 
grids or hydro. Small fraction could 
be self-collected (for water pumping). I cn 
4 
0.6 Resource uncertainty Relatively low-temperature heat. Best I 
used for comfort and process heat, but 
convertible to electricity at i20% 
efficiency. 
a Direct solar heat Enormous 0.9 Economics Only self-collected applications counted; 
mostly hot water in sunny locations. 
0.5 Economics, market Still speculative. 
penetration 
Tides, ocean 0.04 0 Computational Amount available insignificant compared 
currents, and 0.005 with uncertainties of other estimates. 
waves 
Total 115 i 9.6 
a 
Not included in Table 22. For general discussion see this chapter's section 
on the Solar Option. 
For phys i ca l  and t e c h n i c a l  r ea sons ,  Uaucs, tides and ocean c u r r e n t s  
cannot be expected t o  provide any g l o b a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  amounts 
o f  energy.  OTEC technology and economy a r e  s t i l l  l i t t l e  under- 
s tood  s o  t h a t  an assumed 0.5 TWyr/yr seems and ample p o t e n t i a l .  
Conclusion 
Renewable energy sou rces  could  a l t o g e t h e r  c o n t r i b u t e  perhaps up 
t o  9 . 6  TWyr/yr t o  t h e  w o r l d ' s  energy supply i n  t h e  form of 
secondary energy.  I n  terms o f  primary energy,  t h i s  is  t h e  equi-  
v a l e n t  o f  14-15 TWyr/yr o f  f o s s i l  f u e l  o r  15 TWyr/yr o f  nuc l ea r  
power, f o r  example; a comparable mix o f  secondary energy  is il- 
l u s t r a t e d  i n  Table 27. 
However, t h i s  energy does  n o t  come from a s imple  source .  
Seve ra l  t echno log ie s ,  very d i f f e r e n t  i n  scope and c h a r a c t e r ,  w i l l  
have t o  be developed and deployed,  which r e q u i r e s  a h o s t  of  ad- 
d i t i o n a l  e f f o r t s  o f  RED, commerc ia l iza t ion ,  and market ing.  
This  e n t e r p r i s e  would mean a n  a l l  o u t  e f f o r t ,  on t h e  border-  
l i n e  of what seems f e a s i b l e .  I n  Table  28 w e  compare our r e s u l t s  
wi th  t h e  C a l i f o r n i a  s tudy  (U.S. Department of  Energy 1978) men- 
t i oned  above and w i t h  a s t u d y  made by Revel le  (1979) .  I n  C a l i -  
f o r n i a ' s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and ex t remely  f avo rab le  c o n t e x t ,  an out-  
p u t  energy d e n s i t y  of 0 .3  V7/mZ i s  achieved,  t r a d e d  o f f  a g a i n s t  
t h e  use  o f  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  t h e  u s e a b l e  l and  (100% commercial f o r e s t s  
and a g r i c u l t u r a l  l and  p l u s  50% o f  noncommercial woods, b rush ,  
and g r a s s  l a n d ) .  R e v e l l e ' s  s t u d y  relies on a less s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
technology: i t s  r e s u l t  is a d e n s i t y  of 0.09 ~ / m 2 ,  which i s  a l s o  
con t ingen t  on an a lmost  t o t a l  c o m i t m e n t  of  l and  use .  Thus t h e  
va lue  of  1 ~ / m 2  y i e l d  d e n s i t y  f o r  t h e  world t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e s  
o u r  s t u d y  demands an  enormous l a n d  use  a s  w e l l  a s  s u b s t a n t i a l  
t e chno log ica l  advancements. A b i g  s t e p  towards a world  c u l t i -  
va t ed  l i k e  a garden would Be t aken  i f  e x i s t i n g  e q u i l i b r i a  
were supplemented o r  r e p l a c e d  by new e q u i l i b r i a  t h a t  have t o  be 
c o n t r o l l e d  o r  be c o n t r o l l a b l e  by man. 
Moreover, renewable s o u r c e s  ha rves t ed  a t  0.1 w/m2 could  
s u s t a i n  a popu la t ion  wi th  100 persons/km2 consuming 1 kWyr/yr 
each.  But enhanced u r b a n i z a t i o n  and much h i g h e r  consumption 
d e n s i t i e s  must be  expec ted .  The i d e a  t o  conceive systems t h a t  
predominantly o r  even e x c l u s i v e l y  r e l y  on renewables misses t h e  
p o i n t .  
TABLE 27  Realizable potential of renewables, by energy form. 
Energy Form Quantity (TKyr/:Jr) 
Coal equivalent (solid fuel) 1.8 
Electricity 3.2 
Gaseous fuel 0.2 
Beat 1.4 
(Unprocessed primary fuel) 3.0 
Total 29.6 
TABLE 28 Renewable energy supply: a corparison of limiting cases. 
Rural Developing World 
Case California (in 2025)~ (in 2025)~ Possible World in 2030 
population in territory 38.6 X lo6 3,250 X lo6= 8,000 x lo6 
(year 2025 or 2030) 
Inllabi table area of 0.4 
territory (lo6 knt2 
Yield from renewable 0.13 
resources ('IWyr/yr) 
Land use implications 100% of comerical All forests plus wastes Nearly total land dedica- 
forests and agricultural from doubled agricultural tion or dedication of a 
land plus 50% of non- yields plus hydro, wind, major part plus advanced 
comercial woods, brush solar heat technology for all available 
and grassland; wind, sources 
solar, hydro, geothermal I 
~opulation density 97 
(inhabitants per km) 
Energy supply density 0.3 0.09 SO. 11 
a 
U S m E  (1978). 
b~ased on data from Revelle (1979). 
C 
Excluding urban population in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants in same territory. 
d~xcluding ocean based sources. 
In t roduc ing  renewable sources  on t h e  s c a l e  contemplated 
he re  n e c e s s i t a t e s  development of new i n f r a s t r u c t u r e s .  From a 
market p e n e t r a t i o n  p o i n t  of  view, most renewable technologies--  
no t  c o n s i d e r i n g  perhaps biomass, which o n l y  must r e t a i n  i t s  
p r e s e n t  share--wil l  t h e r e f o r e  encounte r  severe problems. In-  
s t i t u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, might t e n d  t o  slow down 
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of such technologies .  Land use  a l l o c a t i o n ,  
t h e  e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  l o c a t i o n  of OTEC, p o s s i b l e  c o n t i n e n t a l  im-  
p a c t s  o f  l a r g e - s c a l e  wind use  and e c o l o g i c a l  and c l i m a t o l o g i c a l  
c o n s t r a i n t s  presuppose a new set o f  bo th  n a t i o n a l  and i n t e r n a -  
t i o n a l  i n s t rumen t s  i nvo lv ing  perhaps  even  g l o b a l - s o c i o p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i o n .  
I n  summary, renewables a r e  an impor tan t  supplement to  t h e  
w o r l d ' s  energy supply  o f  tomorrow. They must be  t r e a t e d  s e r i o u s l y ,  
and s e n s i b l e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  t h e i r  employment must b e  grasped  
even i f  t hey  can o n l y  meet a l i m i t e d  f r a c t i o n  of t h e  energy needs.  
But it would i n  any c a s e  be u n r e a l i s t i c  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e i r  
l a r g e - s c a l e  use  a s  " s o f t " .  The e c o l o g i c a l ,  economic, and soc io-  
p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  of t h e  deployment o f  renewables make t h e i r  
use an under tak ing  a t  l e a s t  as d i f f i c u l t  a s  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
of n u c l e a r  energy i n t o  a system s o  f a r  based on  t h e  e x p l o i t a -  
t i o n  o f  f o s s i l  f u e l s .  
THE FOSSIL OPTION: HYDROCARBONS 
E s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  World 's  Conventional  O i l  Resources 
O i l  i s  t h e  main energy source  today meeting s l i g h t l y  l e s s  t h a n  
h a l f  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  t o t a l  demand o f  8TW y r / y r .  Large amounts 
o f  o i l  w i l l  a l s o  be needed i n  t h e  f u t u r e ,  which means t h a t  t h e  
problem o f  o i l  s u p p l i e s  w i l l  remain a t  t h e  f o r e f r o n t  o f  t h e  
more g e n e r a l  energy problem. Obta in ing  an assessment  o f  t h e  
o i l  a c t u a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  has  been a major focus  of t h e  Energy 
System Program, t h e r e f o r e .  
About 25 e s t i m a t e s  of  u l t i m a t e  world  o i l  r e s e r v e s  have 
been compiled ove r  t h e  l a s t  35 y e a r s ,  some o f  which were made 
by t h e  same person o r  r e f e r  t o  each  o t h e r ;  a l t o g e t h e r ,  t h e r e  
might be  some 12 independent  e s t i m a t e s .  I t  is i n t e r e s t i n g  
t o  n o t e  a g e n e r a l  upward tendency i n  t h e s e  e s t i m a t e s ,  which 
dropped i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  t h e  1970s, and converged i n  1975- 
76 around Moody's e s t i m a t e  of 277 b i l l i o n  t o n s  o f  o i l .  
Under a r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t  sponsored by t h e  World Energy 
Conference and l e d  by P. D e s p r a i r i e s  (1977) a Delphi s tudy  
was conducted on t h e  b a s i s  o f  r e p l i e s  t o  a q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
r e t u r n e d  by some 30 world e x p e r t s .  F igu re  18 compares t h e  
Delphi r e s u l t s  t o  o t h e r  estimates. Under t h e  assumption t h a t  
by 2000 produc t ion  c o s t  should n o t  exceed US$ 20 (1976) p e r  
b a r r e l ,  90% o f  t h e  e x p e r t s  thought  t h a t  more t h a n  225 b i l l i o n  
t o n s  o f  o i l  should  s t i l l  be a v a i l a b l e .  25% o f  t h e  e x p e r t s  
pu t  t h e  f i g u r e  above 225 b i l l i o n  t o n s .  P. D e s p r a i r i e s  i n  h i s  
1977 a n a l y s i s ,  p o i n t s  t o  a f i g u r e  o f  300 b i l l i o n  t o n s  o f  
u l t i m a t e l y  r ecove rab le  o i l  r e s e r v e s .  Th i s  presupposes  an  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  recovery  rate from 25% t o  40%. By way o f  
"eeuca ted  guesses" ,  36% of  t h i s  o i l  may be e s t i m a t e d  t o  be  
produced a t  less t han  us$S /ba r r e l ,  2 6 %  i n  t h e  range o f  US$5- 
US$12 p e r  b a r r e l ,  and 38% a t  more t h a n  US$12. 
109 ton 109 bbt 
Regional characteristics of these resources vary strongly 
even within the North American Continent, the most densely 
explored area in the world. Still average values can be 
derived. They are outlined in Table 29 and compared to estimates 
of the proven reserves [Desprairies 1977; International Petroleum 
Encyclopedia 1978; Grossling 1976)  in the seven IIASA world 
regions. Drilling density, total number of wells, and prospective 
sites point to a severe exploration gap, and it might be that 
the estimates for Latin America, South East Asia and Africa are 
somewhat low. 
One can argue that 300 billion tons of ultimately recoverable 
resources is both a low figure and a high figure. The discovery 
rates might well be conceived to decline quickly because all the 
easily accessible fields are already known. The postulated inc- 
rease in the recovery rate might not materialize. Furthermore, 
institutional constraints might prevent exploration or development 
of new fields. 
But there might also be a lucky strike. New technologies 
might permit a more thorough exploitation of existing fields, 
making fields and resources accessible that so far were impossible 
to exploit. 
In the face of these enormous uncertainties, it does not 
appear prudent to devise any strategy for the future that relies 
on oil in a measure similar to that of present oil supply avail- 
ability. On the other hand, oil will -- at a certain price -- 
continue to be a most important element of the supply system. 
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TABLE 29 O i l  resources ,  r e se rves  and d r i l l i n g  d e n s i t i e s  f o r  seven IIASA regions.  
b P r o s p e c t i v e  T o t a l  Number a D r i l l i n g  Dens i ty  Resources Reserves  nreasC o f  WellsC ( t o t a l  w e J . l s /  
Region ( l o 6  t )  ( l o 6  t) (X  1000 km2) (end o f  1975) 10W km2) c 
I (NA) 28,000 4,857 12,928 >2,575,000 202.75 
11 (SU/EE) 46,730 10,670 9,797 542,325 55.36 
111 (WE/JANZ) 16,020 4,021 11,030 34,737 3.15 
IV (LA) 23,000 5,521 12,444 103,359 8.31 
v (A£/SEA) 21,150 6,176 17,729 28,281 1.60 
VI (ME/NAE) 109,100 54,363 8,212 12,501 1.52 
VII (C/CPA) 12,730 2,736 2,831 8, 500 3.00 
257,230 88,344 -75,0C?o >3,300,000 44.00 T o t a l  
a Based on d a t a  from D e s p r a i r i e s  (1977). 
- 
b ~ a s e d  on d a t a  from I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Pe t ro ler~ln  Encyclopedia (1978). I m 
N 
C Based on d a t a  from G r o s s l i n g  (1976). I 
Unconventional O i l  Resources 
Many s tud i e s  point  c lose ly  t o  unconventional o i l  resources,  
such a s  sha les  o r  sands, e t c . ,  a s  being probably by f a r  b igger  
than conventional resources.  They were extens ively  reviewed 
a t  I I A S A ,  on t h e  occasion of tk?  Second IIASA Resources 
Conference i n  1976 on 'The Future Supply of Nature-made O i l  
and Gas', j o i n t l y  organized with t h e  United Nations I n s t i t u t e  
f o r  Training and Research (UNITAR) (Meyer 1977). Most of t h e  
r e s u l t s  of t h a t  conference have, wi th  minor modif icat ions,  
been adopted by t h e  World Energy Conference study. 
The most not iceable  f e a t u r e  of exp lo i t a t i on  of uncon- 
vent ional  o i l  resources is t h a t  it resembles more c lose ly  t h e  
exp lo i t a t i on  of coa l  than o f  o i l .  Since s traightforward 
d r i l l i n g  i s  usual ly  not  poss ib le ,  i n  order  t o  gain access  t o  
t he  energy source,  l a rge  amounts of overburden w i l l  have t o  be 
moved o r  processed. 
Furthermore, t h e i r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  very uneven. 90% of 
t he  world 's  sands and heavy crudes can be found i n  t h r e e  
countr ies :  Canada, Venezuela, and t h e  USSR. Approximately 
300 b i l l i o n  tons  of heavy o i l  and t a r  sands a r e  contained i n  
four  g i a n t  f i e l d s .  The Orinoco b e l t  i n  Venezuela (100 b i l l i o n  
t o n s ) ;  Athabasca (86 b i l l i o n  t ons )  and Cold Lake (23 b x l l i o n  
tons)  i n  Canada; and Olenck (86 b i l l i o n  tons )  i n  t h e  USSR. 
Another 27 b i l l i o n  tons  i s  contained i n  8 l a r g e  f i e l d s  i n  
Canada, t h e  USA, and i n  Madagascar. With present  su r face  
mining technologies  5-105 is recoverable.  An add i t i ona l  
30-50s might be recovered by o t h e r  techniques.  
More than 420 b i l l i o n  t ons  of sha l e  resources have - 
been i d e n t i f i e d ,  two t h i r d s  o f  which l i e  i n  t h e  USA. Here, 
too ,  under p resen t  condi t ions ,  5%-10% seems recoverable.  
Production c o s t s  f o r  recovery a r e  given from 12-15 US$/barrel 
(Orinoco),  12-20 US$/barrel (Athabasca),  up t o  20-25 US$/barrel 
f o r  t h e  Colorado o i l  shale  (1978 U.S.  d o l l a r s ) .  Costs might 
be lowered through government sponsored R and D programs. 
Aqainst t h i s  backaround, estimates of u l t imate ly  recoverable 
o i l  resources have bee; provided by M. Grenon f o r  t h e  supply 
p a r t  o f  our  scenar ios  (see Chapter 5 ) .  These es t imates ,  grouped 
according t o  cos t  c a t ego r i e s ,  a r e  s m a r i s e d  i n  Table 30. 
Gas Resources 
The r a p i d  growth of n a t u r a l  gas consumption i s  a s t i l l  recen t  
phenomenon. It s t a r t e d  i n  t h e  USA only a f t e r  World War 11, and 
i n  Europe during t h e  1960s wi th  t h e  discovery of t he  I t a l i a n ,  
French, and Dutch f i e l d s .  Unt i l  now less than 8% of  t h e  gas 
resources  have been used up - l a r g e l y  i n  e x i s t i n g  production 
plans.  The volume of rese rves  i s  cons tan t ly  expanding by new 
d i scover ies .  New deep d r i l l i n g  techniques enhance gas  f ind ings ,  
and t h e r e  i s  no slackening i n  t h e  r a t e  a t  which new g i a n t  o r  
supergiant  depos i t s  a r e  recovered. There is s t rong  consensus 
t h a t  dur ing  t h e  next  decades gas  consumption and production, 
even i n  t h e  face  of s to rage  and t r anspo r t a t i on  problems, w i l l  
continue t o  expand. 
Est imates of u l t imate ly  recoverable gas resources  a r e  
scarce.  The values  s e l ec t ed  f o r  our purposes a r e  those prepared 
-64- 
TABLE 30 Summary of estimates of ultimately recoverable oil resources. 
9 
m Y  r 10 toe 
a Cost Category 
Region I (NA) 2 3 26 125 16.2 18.3 88.2 
Region I1 (SU/EE) 37 45 69 26.8 31.8 49.4 
Region I11 (WE/JANZ) 17 3 21 12.0 2.1 14.8 
Region IV (LA) 19 81 110 13.4 57.1 77.6 
Region V (Af/SEA) 25 5 33 17.6 3.5 23.3 
Region VI (ME/NAf) 132 27 n.e. 93.1 19.0 n.e. 
Region VII (C/CPA) 11 13 15 7.8 9.9 10.6 
World 264 200 373 187.0 141.7 263.9 
n. e. : no estimate made 
a 1: 12$/boe 
2: 12-20$/boe 
3 : 20-25$/boe 
(in constant 1975$) 
by the US Institute of Gas Technology (Parent and Linden 1977), 
which have also been adopted by the WEC: 280,000 billion m3 
remain to be produced after 1975. Table 31 gives a tentative 
distribution according to the IIASA world regions. WEC experts 
have estimated that by 2000 75% of these resources should be 
recoverable at a cost of less than US$(1974)44/boe, and the 
remainder at less than US$ 20/boe. 
The IIASA/UNITAR Conference attempted to assess uncon- 
ventional gas resources (gas in geopressure zones, in tight 
formation, methane from coal fields, etc.). The conference 
agreed that the volume of unconventional gas resources is 
remarkable, but it concluded that a worldwide estimate cannot 
be made at present. Unconventional resources might be one or 
two orders of magnitude higher than conventional ones. 
For the purpose of the modeling effort, these considerations 
were synthesized into estimates per cost categories of the 
ultimately recoverable resources (Table 32). 
Potential Future Oil Production 
Given an estimate of the ultimately recoverable oil resources, 
it would be interesting to know how much of this oil could be 
recovered and fed into the energy supply system within the 
study period considered. 
Future oil production will have to rely on future additio~s 
to reserves, which could come from extensions of existing fields, 
discovery of new fields, or enhanced recovery and exploitation 
of unconventional resources, such as deep offshore, tar sands, 
or shale. 
TABLE 31 Estimates of ultimate gas resources remaining t o  be discovered a d  
world gas reserves for  the seven IIASA regions ( i n  lo9 In3). 
Resenres Resources S t l l l  to  
Region (as of 1 January 1977)' be ~ i s c o v e r e d b  
I (NA) 7,763 43,500 
11 (SU/EE) 22,654 59,000 
111 (WE/JANZ) 5,061 14,MO 
N (LA) 2,695 15,000 
v (Af/SEA) 3,560 12,000 
VI (ME/NAF) 21,157 78,000 
V I I  (C/CPA) 594 10,000 
TO talc 63,484 232,000 
a Based on data from World Oil (1978). 
bBased on data from World Energy Conference (1978) . 
C The two values  do not  add up to  t h e  u l t h t e  value of 280,000 b i l l i o n  m3 
given above because of d i f fe rences  of d a t e s  and of or ig ins  of t h e  data. 
TABLE 32 Summary of estimates of ult imately recoverable gas resources. 
- 
a Cost Categories 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Region I (NA) 34 40 29 28.90 34.00 24.65 
Regron I1 (SU/EE) 66 51 31 52.70 40.80 24.65 
Region I11 (WE/JANZ) 19 5 14 16.15 4.25 11.90 
Region IV (LA) 17 12 14 14.45 10.20 11.90 
Region V (A~/sEA) 16 10 14 13.60 8.50 11.90 
Region V I  (ME/NAf) 108 10 14 91.80 8.50 11.90 
Region V I I  (C/CPA) 7 13 14 5.95 10.20 11.90 
World 267 141 130 233.55 116.45 108.80 
a 1: 12$/boe 
2: 12-20$/boe 
3: 20-25$/boe ( ~ n  constant 1975$) 
We do not expect giant new oil fields to be discovered. 
However, a correlation is known to exist between conventional 
oil finding rates, the size of exploratory drilling, and 
cumulative discoveries. For several regions the correlations 
have been analyzed qualitatively. The result thus obtained 
served as a basis for extrapolating conceivable additions of 
conventional reserves in the study period. Since little is 
known about such future additions we assumed similar correlations 
to exist but that, due to improved exploratory methods and 
economic incentives, unconventional resources would, in the 
aggregate, be discovered more rapidly than conventional 
resources. Figure 19 illustrates the results for conventional 
oil in several regions. 
The introduction of enhanced (tertiary) recovery techniques 
could substantially increase reserves. Yet many techniques are 
not yet mastered on a large scale and might be also strongly 
constrained by physical factors, such as rock porosity, oil 
viscosity, etc. Note that enhanced recovery data exist only for 
the USA. We have assumed similar results to be obtained also 
in other regions, postulating however, that only conventional 
fields would be exploited in this way and that enhanced recovery 
increases reserves of conventional oil in place to 2030 by a 
factor of 1.25. 
Oil shales production is not expected to be constrained in 
terms of reserves, but by market penetration dynamics and environ- 
mental impacts in terms of large-scale exploitation. Since the 
situation is similar to that of coal liquifaction, the same 
maximum buildup rates have been assumed. 
The maximum potential oil production rates for the various 
regions were estimated under the following assumptions: 
Region I (NA) 
R ~ O "  1 1  I (YIEIUND 
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FIGURE 19 Annual gross additions to reserves of conventional 
oil, world except centrally-planned economies, 1975-2030. 
The limiting ratio of reserves to production is 15:l 
(worldwide average) for unconventional, deep offshore, and 
polar region oil; 7.5:l for enhanced recovery methods; and 
25:l for (conventional) heavy crude recovery. 
Production rates, after reaching peak levels, decline 
exponentially. 
Peak production for enhanced recovery is obtained 
after 5 years. 
Oil production plants for tar sands, shales, and heavy 
crudes (advanced methods) operate at constant levels over their 
assumed 30-year lifetimes. 
Buildup of shale or tar sand processing feasibility 
requires 5 years. In developed regions,ance a capacity of 
6 GWyr/yr is reached, this capacity might be doubled in 5 years 
hence. 
In North America (Region I) presently known reserves will 
be exhausted by 2000. High, but gradually declining, additions 
to reserves could increase oil production by 430 GWyr/yr 
(2.4 billion barrels) in 2000. By 2030, conventional oil 
production would have declined to 120 GW, however(Figure 20a). 
Enhanced recovery would reach its maximum contribution of 730 GW 
(3.8 billion barrels/year) in 2005. The major new source would 
be Canadian tar sands (strip mined and in-situ conversion) which 
might contribute about 1 TWyr/yr by 2030. Due to restricted 
water availability and waste handling, oil shales will only 
contribute a small fraction. 
North Sea oil will bring Region I11 oil production to a 
peak by 1985-90, which will decline thereafter. New discoveries 
in Oceania or Turkey might delay the decline somewhat, but by 
2000 total conventional oil production will not be more than 
3k0 GWyr/yr (1.8 billion barrels/year). By 2030 it will have 
declined to 30-50 GWyr/yr. Enhanced recovery will peak around 
2010-2015 at 160-170 GFlyr/yr, and deep offshore might contribute 
180 to 200 GWyr/yr by 2030 (Figure 20b). Oil shales will not 
be able to contribute significantly. 
Latin America's conventional oil production will be of the 
order of 430-450 GWyr/yr by 1990-1995, and decline to 160 GVlyr/yr 
by 2030. Heavy crudes, however, might contribute very significantly 
if huildup constraints on drilling equipment, steam generation, 
and upgrading capacity are overcome. The development assumed 
appears modest in relation to the resource base but still leads 
to a production of 3 TWyr/yr in 2030 (Figure 21a) 
Past development of oil production (Figure 21b) in Region V 
has been rapid. We assume high additions to reserves till the 
end of the century. Peak production of conventional oil would be 
around 1995-2000 at 480 to 500 GWyr/yr. Enhanced recovery and 
unconventional oil might bring 2030 production up to 750 GWyr/yr. 
Together, Regions I, 111, IV and V might thus produce 3.2 
to 3.3 TWyr/yr by 2000, and 6.3 to 6.5 TWyr/yr by 2030. Those 
figures are very high: they denote a maximum potential, much 
in the sense of the technical potential of renewables, under 
optimum technical and economic conditions; actual production 
rates will be much lower (see Chapter 5). 
As for Region VI, we have to distinguish between countries 
with high and low reserve-to-production ratios. The latter are 
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FIGURE 20 Maximum p o t e n t i a l  p roduc t ion  p r o f i l e s  by t ype  o f  o i l  
i n  Regions I and 111. 
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FIGURE 21 Maximum p o t e n t i a l  production p r o f i l e s  by type of o i l  
i n  Regions I V  and V. 
a l r eady  now producing up t o  capac i ty  l i m i t s ;  t h e s e ,  a s  a  r u l e ,  
a r e  densely  populated c o u n t r i e s  wi th  u rgen t  development needs.  
In c o n t r a s t ,  most of t h e  former c o u n t r i e s  have a low c a p a c i t y  
f o r  absorb ing  f i n a n c i a l  income. 
Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and t h e  United Arab Emirates ,  owning 
approximately one h a l f  of t h e  w o r l d ' s  convent iona l  r e s e r v e s ,  
could i n  p r i n c i p l e  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  p roduc t ion  s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  
But, w i th  no o t h e r  r e s o u r c e s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  them and being hard- 
p ressed  t o  absorb  an income much above t h e i r  requirements  with- 
o u t  s e v e r e  socioeconomic d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  c o n s i d e r  
l i m i t a t i o n s  on o i l  p roduc t ion  a  n e c e s s i t y ,  i n  o r d e r  t o  s t r e t c h  
t h e i r  v i t a l  r e s o u r c e s  u n t i l  they  can b e  supplemented by a l t e r n a t i v e  
sources  o f  income. 
F i n a l l y ,  a  p h y s i c a l  doubl ing o f  p roduc t ion  i n  t h e  Arab 
Peninsula  i s  doub t fu l .  I n  Saudi-Arabia, t h e  OPEC member most 
h igh ly  endowed, p roduc t ion  can n o t ,  a t  s h o r t  n o t i c e ,  be i n c r e a s e d  
by more t h a n  a  couple  of m i l l i o n  b a r r e l s  p e r  day. 
I n  view o f  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  w e  have imposed an 
a r t i f i c i a l  c e l l i n g  on o i l  product ion i n  Region V I  of 3 3 . 6  mbd. 
THE FOSSIL OPTION: COAL 
Coal Between Wood and O i l  
Coal development i s  c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  t o  t h e  o r i g i n s  o f  Western 
i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  s o c i e t i e s .  A s  an energy source ,  c o a l  has  been 
known f o r  a lmost  2000 yea r s .  Its r o l e  a s  n a i n  energy s u p p l i e r  
began when energy consumption d e n s i t i e s  r a p i d l y  o u t s t r i p p e d  
t h e  l o c a l  s u p p l l e s  o f  renewable energy sou rces ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
wood, which u n t i l  t hen  had met t h e  l a r g e s t  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  de- 
mand. 
This  t r a n s i t i o n  w a s  due t o  two f a c t o r s .  The e a r l y  indus-  
t r i a l  r e v o t u t i o n  l e d  t o  h ighe r  l a b o r  requi rements ,  f o s t e r i n g  
r a p i d  popu la t ion  growth i n  urban c e n t e r s  and c e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o f  
economic s t r u c t u r e s .  Among t h e  energy sou rces  a v a i l a b l e ,  on ly  
c o a l  w a s  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  concen t r a t ed  form o f  energy to  match 
t h i s  c e n t r a l i z e d  demand. The necessary  bulk  t r a n s p o r t  o f  c o a l  
from t h e  mines t o  t h e  consuming c e n t e r s  was made p o s s i b l e  by 
t h e  new pai tways.  The ''new'' f u e l  boos ted  t h e  growth o f  t h e  
ra i lway  systems,  r a i s i n g  t h e  demand f o r  steel and l e a d i n g  t o  a  
s t i l l  g r e a t e r  need f o r  c o a l .  
F igure  22 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h a t  it took c o a l  on ly  some 80 y e a r s  
t o  r e p l a c e  wood a s  t h e  main source  o f  energy;  p rov id ing  less 
than  30% of t h e  wor ld ' s  energy i n  1850, it h e l d  70% o f  t h e  energy 
market by 1930. 
F igure  22 a l s o  shows t h a t  c o a l  was n o t  a b l e  t o  hold  i ts 
ground f o r  long.  O i l  p e n e t r a t e d  t h e  market a l r e a d y  b e f o r e  1900 
and t o g e t h e r  w i t h  n a t u r a l  gas i n i t i a t e d  t h e  d e c l i n e  o f  c o a l  from 
about 1920 onward. Coal was pushed o u t  o f  i t s  predominant 
p o s i t i o n  a s  q u i c k l y  a s  it had cap tu red  it. 
Thi s  r a t h e r  d ramat ic  r e t r e a t  was founded on t h e  more 
s o p h i s t l c a t e d  urban l i f e s t y l e s  of  t h e  growing c i t i e s ,  r e q u i r i n g  
energy i n  forms o t h e r  t han  s o l i d  c o a l .  G a s  l i g h t i n g ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
which was used f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  a l r e a d y  i n  1825, i n i t i a t e d  t h e  
bu i ldup  of urban p i p e l i n e  networks s u p p l i e d  by towngas de r ived  
FIGURE 2 2  Global primary energy s u b s t i t u t i o n .  Logar i thmic p l o t  
o f  t h e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  F/(I-F) where F i s  t h e  f r a c t i o n a l  market  
s h a r e .  Smooth l i n e s  a r e  model e s t i m a t e s  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a ;  
s c a t t e r e d  l i n e s  a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  d a t a ;  s t r a i g h t  l i n e s  show t h e  
l o g i s t i c  model s u b s t i t u t i o n  p a t h s .  
from c o a l .  I n  t h e  second h a l f  o f  t h e  19 th  c e n t u r y ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  
began t o  d i s p l a c e  gas  a s  a sou rce  o f  i l l u m i n a t i o n ,  and g a s  w a s  
i n c r e a s i n g l y  used f o r  h e a t .  Coal ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand, q u i c k l y  
over took hydropower a s  a main sou rce  o f  e l e c t r i c i t y .  
O i l  and gas  m e t  w e l l  w i t h  t h i s  t r e n d  towards more convenien t  
and f l e x i b l e  energy s e r v i c e s .  N a t u r a l  gas  w a s  an easy  f eed  t o  
e x i s t i n g  g r i d s ;  and o i l  w a s  much easier t o  s t o r e  and t r a n s p o r t  
t h a n  c o a l .  O i l ,  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  World 
War I1 i n  Western Europe, smothered s o c i a l  economic c o n s t r a i n t s  
l i m i t i n g  c o a l  p roduc t ion  a t  t h e  t i m e .  F i n a l l y ,  o i l - f u e l e d  
s h i p s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  automobi les  and a i r p l a n e s  made o i l  t h e  in-  
d i s p e n s i b l e  f u e l  i n  t h e  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  s e c t o r .  
I n  summary, o i l  and n a t u r a l  g a s  have a l lowed t h e  e x t e n s i o n  
and enhancement o f  an i n d u s t r i a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  was o r i g i n a l l y  
fueled by coal .  The lower p r ice  of o i l ,  though he lp fu l ,  was less 
i n f l u e n t i a l  than these  development pa t t e rn s  themselves, which l ed  
t o  spec ia l i za t ion ,  a  g rea te r  mobil i ty ,  a  high urban population 
densi ty,  etc. And the re  a r e  no s igns  t h a t  t he  t rend toward in- 
creas ing soph is t i ca t ion  w i l l  abate.  On t h e  contrary.  
Coal Resources 
This development has l ed  t o  the  r a t h e r  paradoxical s i t u a t i o n  of 
our  present  r e l i ance  on scarce hydrocarbons although t h e  coa l ,  
i .e . ,  carbon, resources a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  more abundant. Compared 
t o  an estimate of 840 TWyr of u l t imate ly  recoverable o i l  resources ,  
the re  a r e  some 600 TWyr of known coa l  reserves  t h a t  a r e  acce s s ib l e  
with p resen t  technologies--amounting t o  about 6% of t he  est imated 
t o t a l  coa l  resources (10,000 TWyr) or 20% of t he  i d e n t i f i e d  coa l  
resources (3000 TWyr) . 
These f i gu re s  show t h a t ,  a t  p resen t  consumption r a t e s ,  coa l  
w i l l  be ava i l ab l e  f o r  severa l  c en tu r i e s  t o  come. They even 
seem t o  i nd i ca t e  op t imi s t i c a l l y  t h a t  coal  would, f o r  a  lengthy 
period, be a b l e  t o  meet t he  global  f o s s i l  energy requirements. 
But severa l  cons t r a in t s  might dim t h i s  view. 
Coal resources,  l i k e  o i l  resources,  a r e  very unevenly 
d i s t r i bu t ed .  The regional  and n a t i o n a l  coa l  resources es t imates  
show t h a t  about 85% of t he  resources a r e  located  i n  t h r ee  coun- 
t r i e s :  t h e  USSR, t he  USA, and China (see Table 33) .  This con- 
cen t ra t ion  c r e a t e s  an obvious t r anspo r t a t i on  and t r ade  problem, 
but  a l so  makes coa l  a  sub jec t  of s e n s i t i v e  s t r a t e g i c  considera- 
t i ons . .  Only i n  a  s t a b l e  world of p o l i t i c a l  dktente,  wi th  a l l  
t he  p a r t i e s  accepting t he  necess i ty  f o r  g loba l ly  responsib le  
ac t ion ,  can w e  hope t h a t  s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts of coal  w i l l  become 
ava i l ab le  on a t r u l y  worldwide s c a l e .  
The second cons t r a in t  is resource economics. No fu tu r e  
energy system can use a  source regard less  of i t s  pr ice .  Even 
today, t he r e  is no global  reference  p r i c e  f o r  coa l .  Factors  
such a s  q u a l i t y ,  demand f o r  c e r t a i n  types of coa l ,  t he  genera l  
energy p r i c e  development, etc. s t r ong ly  inf luence t he  market 
TABLE 33 Geological Coal Resources: worldwide and i n  Western Europe. 
Geological 9 Percent Coal Resources 10 t c e  o f  World Total 
World 10,126 10 0 
USSR 
USA 
China 
Western Europe 
FRG 
UK 
Others 9 0 . 1  
SOURCE: Based on World Energy Conference data (1978). 
value of coal .  A very rough f i gu re  of o r i e n t a t i o n  f o r  a  r e l a t i v e l y  
cheap coal  might be $20/ton a t  t h e  minemouth. 
A. Astakhov (1980) studying t he  prospects  of exp lo i t i ng  
the world 's  major coal  bas ins  has est imated "ul t imate  economically 
recoverable resources."  This category includes a l l  resources 
t h a t ,  i n  accordance with foreseeable technological  improvements 
and labor  cost t rends ,  could become ava i l ab l e  a t  costs below 
$(1975)40/tce a t  t h e  minemouth i f ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  of the l o c a l  
demand, a l l  t h e  access ib le  resources w e r e  t o  be exp lo i t ed .  TO 
some extent ,  the  es t imated  volume of some 3200-3700 tce (see 
Table 34) corresponds t o  the " techn ica l  po t en t i a l "  of renewable 
sources. Under op t imi s t i c  assumptions (excluding, f o r  i n s t ance ,  
environmental c o n s t r a i n t s ,  exo t i c  bas ins ,  a s  w e l l  a s  depos i t s  
with a  recoverab i l i ty  of less than 0.2% of t h e  s t a t e d  geologica l  
r esources ) ,  some 2900 TWyr of coal  might be made a v a i l a b l e  a t  
the minemouth a t  an average c o s t  of $(1975)17.5/tce. Coal, 
o t h e r  than o i l ,  is not  a  cheap ma te r i a l  t o  t r anspo r t ,  and i ts 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  over  t h e  globe i s  unfavorable.  Should it st i l l  
become a global  opt ion  it would have t o  be c a r r i e d  over  long 
dis tances .  The p r i c e  d i f fe rence  between $20-30/tce a t  t h e  mine- 
mouth i n  t he  Rocky Mountains and of about $50/tce a f t e r  de l ive ry  
t o  t h e  U.S. East  c o a s t  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  magnitude of t h e  problem. 
In t roduct ion  of long-distance e l e c t r i c a l  t ransmission o r  s l u r r y  
p ipe l ines ,  though d i f f i c u l t  ( l a rge  c a p i t a l  investments,  t r ans -  
mission l o s se s ,  environmental impacts, e t c . ) ,  could help  t o  
so lve  t he  t r a n s p o r t  problem. 
Against t h i s  background, a s  i n  t he  case of hydrocarbons, 
regional  coal  resources f igures  f o r  the study per iod  considered 
were est imated f o r  two c o s t  c a t ego r i e s ,  4$(1975)25/ tce  and 
$(1975)25-50/tce, r e spec t ive ly ,  a t  t h e  minemouth. Uncer ta in t i es  
made us choose r a t h e r  conservat ive assumptions such a s  cons ider ing  
only 10% of t he  resources  i n  the  USSR, USA, and China. The 
r e s u l t s  a r e  summarized i n  Table 35. 
TABLE 34 Prospective economically recoverable coal  resources (TWyr). 
Long-term global prospects 
at c o s t  l e v e l s  LS (1975)40/tce 3200 3700 
Out o f  which i n  major basins 
USA 
Northern Rocky Mountains 450 
I l l i n o i s  130 
USSR 
Lenski j 450? 
m g u s k i  j 300? 
China 800 
Australia 185 
India 45 
Total 2360 
Non-exotic larger coal  basins t o t a l  a t  a weighted c o s t  
average of  $(I9751 17.5 / tce  2400 
TABLE 35 Recoverable coal resources. 
Resource Unit lWyr 109tce 
Cost categorya 1 2 1 2 
Region I (NA) 174 232 
Region I1 (SU/EE) 136 448 
Region I11 (WE/JANZ) 93 15 1 
Region I V  (LA) 10 11 
Region V ULf/SEA) 55 52 
Region VI (ME/NAf) C 1  1 
Region V I I  (C/CPA) 92 124 
World 560 1019 606 1105 
a 1: <US$ (1975) 25/tce. 
2: US$ (1975) 25-50/tce. 
NOTE: Only a p a r t  of the ultimate resources (-15%) has been included because 
the figures a re  already very large fo r  the time horizon of 2030 and because 
of the many uncertainties about very long-term coal resources and production 
technologies. 
SOURCES: Ashley e t  a l .  (1976), Grenon (19771, and Penner and Ice- (1975). 
Condi t ions  and C o n s t r a i n t s  f o r  a Coal Revival  
With t h e  growing need f o r  r e p l a c i n g  hydrocarbons a s  t h e  major 
energy s u p p l i e r  and i n  view o f  c o a l ' s  very  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o t e n t i a l ,  
it would seem a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  use  more o f  t h e  l a t t e r .  But c o a l  
has  been shown t o  be  l o s i n g  ground, and i n  o r d e r  t o  r e v e r s e  t h i s  
t r e n d  it would have t o  meet c e r t a i n  requi rements .  
For one, it would have t o  be compat ible  w i t h  modern energy 
supply systems t h a t  are geared  toward f l e x i b l e  and convenient  
secondary and f i n a l  energy forms. 
Success o r  f a i l u r e  of secondary ene rgy  form depends on  
its t e c h n i c a l  s u i t a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  consumer; 
its e f f e c t i v e  convers ion ,  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,  and d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n ;  and 
the c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  s i d e  e f f e c t s  on the supply s i d e  
r a t h e r  t han  a t  t h e  consumer 's  end. 
These f i l t e r s - - t h e  f i r s t  two having been most prominent i n  
t h e  p a s t ,  and t h e  t h i r d  most l i k e l y  t o  be c o n s t r a i n i n g  i n  t h e  
future--have been pushing i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  development t o  t h e  use  
o f  l i q u i d  f u e l s  and g r i d s .  F igure  2 3  is  an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
secondary energy market  i n  t h e  FRG ove r  the p a s t  25 y e a r s .  There 
is  a dramat ic  t r a n s i t i o n  from s o l i d s  to  l i q u i d s  f o r  h e a t i n g  
purposes ,  accompanied by a  s lower  b u t  d i s t i n c t  p e n e t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
market  by gr id -suppl ied  energy,  s a t u r a t i n g  the l i q u i d s  market  
s h a r e  even b e f o r e  t h e  1973/74 o i l  c r i s i s .  Again, these t r e n d s  
a r e  fundamentally r e l a t e d  to  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  r a t h e r  t han  t o  p r i c e  
s t r u c t u r e s  o r  shor t - te rm a v a i l a b i l i t y .  
Even wi th  a  f u r t h e r  e x t e n s i o n  o f  g r i d s ,  an i r r e d u c i b l e  de- 
mand f o r  l i q u i d s  remains .  T ranspor t a t i on  i s  t h e  prime example; 
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FIGURE 23  Secondary energy supply, FRG, 1950-1970. Logarithmic 
p l o t  of t he  t ransformat ion F/(I-F) where F i s  the  f r a c t i o n a l  
market share.  Smooth l i n e s  a r e  model es t imates  of h i s t o r i c a l  
da ta ;  s t r a i g h t  l i n e s  show the  l o g i s t i c  model s u b s t i t u t i o n  paths;  
model es t imates  follow h i s t o r i c a l  da ta  and a r e  t he r e fo re  no t  
e a s i l y  d i s t ingu i shab le  i n  t he  graph. 
it accounts f o r  about 20% of t he  t o t a l  f i n a l  energy requirements 
i n  advanced s o c i e t i e s .  Decentral ized uses i n  r u r a l  a r ea s  o r  i n  
smaller agglomerations enhance t he  l i q u i d  demand i n  i n d u s t r i a l  
regions.  I n  less developed regions,  with inadequate i n f r a s t ruc -  
t u r e s ,  the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of energy-dense and e a s i l y  t r anspor tab le  
and s t o r a b l e  l i q u i d  c a r r i e r s  i s  even more important.  F i f t y  
percent  of t h e  p r e sen t  f i n a l  energy needs requ i res  l i q u i d s .  
Confining l i q u i d  almost ex lus ive ly  t o  e s s e n t i a l  uses i n  t h e  
fu tu r e ,  s t i l l  some 7-10 TWyr/yr of l i q u i d  secondary energy w i l l  
be required. 
Possible  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  carbonaceous syn the t i c  energy 
c a r r i e r s  might be hydrogen o r ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e  ammonia, and SO2.  
Early hopes f o r  a f a s t  in t roduc t ion  of hydrogen have f a l t e r e d ;  
and the  technological ,  economic and s a f e t y  fea tu res  of a pure 
hydrogen system a r e  sti l l  t o  be mastered. Nevertheless, w e  w i l l  
see  t h a t  hydrogen could play an important,  i f  not dominant, r o l e  
within the s tudy period considered. This is not so  f o r  s y n t h e t i c  
f ue l s  t h a t  r e l y  on substances o ther  than carbon o r  hydrogen. 
Synthet ic  l i q u i d s  derived from coa l  a r e  i n  f a c t  i n t e r -  
mediaries between nature-made petroleum and gas and a pure hydro- 
gen socie ty .  I n  syn the t i c  hydrocarbon f u e l s  t h e  carbon atom 
a c t s  a s  a kind of l o s t  s torage  mater ia l  f o r  the  hydrogen atoms 
it c a r r i e s .  Thus coal  l iquefac t ion  appears the  b e s t  so lu t i on  
f o r  providing t he  required fue l  supp l ies ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  t he  coming 
century,  bridging t h e  t i m e  u n t i l  a pure hydrogen technology would 
be wel l  i n  hand. 
While coa l  l i que fac t i on  o r  g a s i f i c a t i o n  may be t he  b e s t  
so lu t ion ,  t he  use of carbonaceous f u e l s  obtained i s  not  without 
problems. Foremost i s  t he  impact on climatic condit ions of 
l a rge  re leases  of C02 t o  t he  atmosphere. This i s sue  has been 
s tud ied  i n  some depth under the  UNEP/IIASA con t r ac t  on "A Systems 
Study of Energy and Climate", FP-0700-75-02 (717) (Williams and 
K r B m e r ,  1978) .  The r e s u l t s  suggest t h a t  C02 might indeed s eve re ly  
cons t ra in  the  use of f o s s i l  fue ls .  But they a l s o  i nd i ca t e  t h a t  
i f  t he  f o s s i l  carbon context  is handled prudently,  r e l ea se s  might 
be held  low enough so  a s  t o  prevent c l i m a t i c  changes from r i s i n g  
too rapidly  f o r  mankind t o  a d j u s t  t o .  A l i q u i d  hydrocarbon con- 
sumption of 10 TWyr/yr might thus still be acceptable.  Y e t  t h e  
ove ra l l  goal must be t o  save t he  carbon f o r  s p e c i f i c  purposes. 
Thls requirement coincides with o t h e r  environmental con- 
s ide ra t ions .  Mining opera t ion  hazards,  p a r t i c u l a t e  emissions, 
emission of s u l f u r  and n i t rogen oxides,  etc.--they a l l  support  
a prudent use of t h e  carbon atom. 
Therefore, i n  order  t o  recapture  a major energy market sha re  
and thus  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  con t r ibu te  t 2  t h e  world 's  energy supply, 
coal  a s  an energy source must be ad jus ted  s o  tha t :  
it becomes a f l e x i b l e ,  e a s i l y  t r anspor tab le  and s t o r a b l e  
energy c a r r i e r ;  
8 the  p o t e n t i a l  hazards of i t s  large-sca le  use can be 
minimized ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r  C O 2 ) ;  
t he  l a r g e  b u t  nonetheless exhaust ib le  recoverable re- 
sources can be properly managed; and 
the  t r a n s i t i o n  may be e a s i e r  t o  a f u tu r e  noncarbon system 
t h a t  most probably i s  based on hydrogen. 
A promising candidate f o r  such a f u e l  is methanol. I t  can 
be synthesized from coa l  and o the r  r e s idua l  f o s s i l  f u e l s  a s  is 
out l ined  i n  Figure 24. Coal i s  f i r s t  g a s i f i e d  by p a r t i a l  com- 
bus t ion  with oxygen and then combined wi th  hydrogen t o  form 
methanol. The excess hydrogen needed may be provided v i a  a 
s h i f t  reac t ion  with g a s i f i e d  coal  and steam, o r  through thermo- 
l y t i c  o r  e l e c t r o l y t i c  water s p l i t t i n g  using s o l a r  o r  nuclear  
hea t  o r  e l e c t r i c i t y  a s  t he  primary energy, a s  w i l l  be described 
i n  t he  following subsect ion.  In  t he  l a t t e r  case,  no C02 i s  re- 
l eased  during t he  e n t i r e  process; coa l  i s  not  only a source of 
energy but  a l s o  funct ions  a s  chemical c a r r i e r  f o r  hydrogen. 
Figure 25 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s ;  t he  energy content  of t he  methanol 
obtained i s  twice t h a t  of the coal  i npu t ,  which i s  t he  most eco- 
nomical way of using coal  f o r  production of a syn the t i c  hydrocarbon. 
CARBON SUPPLY ( HYDROGEN SUPPLY 
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FIGURE 24  Methanol product ion  r o u t e s .  
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FIGURE 25 Efficient use o f  carbon atoms. 
Methanol i s  a l i qu id  t h a t  could be incorporated i n t o  
our system of consumption without major technological  changes 
s ince ,  technological ly speaking and with respect  t o  use,  t rans-  
por t ,  and s torage ,  it does not d i f f e r  much from gasol ine .  But 
its densi ty is ha l f  t h a t  of gasol ine,  and i ts large-scale  use 
would require  add i t iona l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  investments--but these  
a r e  sti l l  lower than those t h a t  would be needed f o r  d i r e c t  use 
of s o l i d  coal .  On the  o the r  hand, a s  an alcohol it has c l e a r  
environmental advantages over present  fue l s :  a i r  po l lu t ion  is 
much l e s s ,  s p i l l a g e  i n t o  water has less dramatic impacts, e t c .  
Coal 's  Po t en t i a l  Contribution 
So f a r  the ana ly s i s  has shown t h a t  a r ev iva l  of coal  w i l l  not  
be easy though most probably necessary. Any coa l  s t r a t egy  would 
probably have t o  r e l y  extens ively  on a coa l  l iquefac t ion  scheme 
because of s t r u c t u r a l  (e.g. ,  t r anspor t ,  demand f o r  l i q u i d s ,  etc.) 
and environmental reasons ( e - g . ,  minimizing C02 re leases ,  concen- 
t r a t i o n  of de t r imenta l  e f f e c t s ,  e t c . )  . 
The most d i f f i c u l t  s t e p  i n  t h e  chain from mining t o  using 
a l i q u i d  syn the t i c  f u e l  is t o  convert  t he  s o l i d  coa l  i n t o  a raw 
gas s u i t a b l e  f o r  f u r t h e r  conversion. Two bas ic  requirements 
must be f u l f i l l e d :  
1 This conversion should work f o r  a l l  types of coa l ,  ranging 
from an th rac i t e  t o  the  lowest-quality l i g n i t e s ;  and 
2 I t  must be appropr ia te  f o r  c o m e r c i a l i z a t i o n  on a t e r a -  
watt  s c a l e  around the  t u rn  of t h e  century.  
Only few processes a r e  known today t o  produce a gas s u i t -  
ab le  f o r  f u r t h e r  synthes is .  Most of them, however, are care- 
f u l l y  designed f o r  an optimal u t i l i z a t i o n  of a narrow choice of 
coals .  The reference  g a s i f i c a t i o n  technology discussed here i s  
t he  molten i r o n  process (MIP) inves t iga ted  by KlBckner Humboldt, 
FRG, and o the r  companies. It  has been chosen t o  serve  a s  a ba s i s  
f o r  quan t i t a t i ve  es t imates  and no t  t o  support p red ic t ion  of a 
c e r t a i n  technological  development. 
The molten i r on  process i s  conceived t o  use an i r on - s t ee l  
converter.  Pure oxygen and carbon, together  with minerals 
capable of forming a p a r t i c u l a r  type of s l ag ,  a r e  fed  i n t o  t he  
bottom of t h e  converter .  The carbon is dissolved and oxidized 
i n  a l i q u i d  i r on  bath  and leaves  t h e  converter  a s  CO. Impur i t ies  
such a s  s u l f u r  a r e  taken up by t he  s l a g  forming on t op  of t he  
bath.  A tandem concept ( i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 2 6 )  would allow 
impur i t ies  t o  be separated while achieving a high carbon u t i l i -  
za t ion  fac to r .  The discontinuous t ransformation process requ i res  
two separa te  gas and s l a g  handling systems but  only one i ron  
loop. 
Technologically,  the  molten i r o n  process i s  derived from 
the  widely used LD s t e e l  technology, which may be i nd i ca t i ve  
of the  technologica l  f e a s i b i l i t y  of t h e  MIP and i ts  p o t e n t i a l  
f o r  la rge-sca le  coa l  conversion. With t he  main components a l -  
ready opera t ing  on t he  s ca l e  t h a t  w i l l  be required,  one can 
attempt t o  ob ta in  prospect ive cos t  es t imates .  A technoeconomic 
study (Mietzner and Schwerdtfeger, 1980)  based on t he  performance 
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FIGURE 26 The Linz-Donawitz (LD) process modified f o r  coal  gas i -  
f i c a t i o n  f o r  syn the t i c  l i q u i d  fue l s  production: TANDEM scheme. 
A and B d i s t i ngu i sh  between two d i f f e r e n t  s l a g  add i t ives .  
SOURCE: Based on Mietzner and Schwerdtfeger (1980).  
da ta  of steel conver ters  po in t s  t o  a prospect ive investment c o s t  
l e v e l  of US$ 100 per  continuous kW of coa l  i n p u t  f o r  u n i t  s i z e s  
i n  t h e  GW range. 
However, the  change from present  uses of coa l  (e.g. ,  a s  hea t  
o r  e l e c t r i c i t y  source) t o  s u b s t i t u t i o n s  f o r  na tu r a l  hydro- 
carbons w i l l  not occur overnight .  The bulk coa l  supply up t o  
2000 would still  go t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  uses.  Af t e r  2000,  how- 
ever ,  coa l  would inc reas ing ly  have t o  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  na tu r a l  
l i q u i d  hydrocarbons. 
Figure 27 dep i c t s  two a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s .  Curve ( a )  
i s  based on a p ro jec t ion  of p resen t  growth r a t e s  i n  coal  indus t ry  
u n t i l  2020. It impl ies  GW methanol production t o  set i n  by the  
beginning of t he  1990s and s u b s t i t u t i n g  nonfoss i l  hydrogen f o r  hydro- 
gen from coa l  t o  s t a r t  by 2010. Thus with a share  of 12% of t he  
geo log ica l  coa l  resources ,  a l i q u i d  hydrogen production of 
10 TWyr/yr could be sus ta ined  f o r  more than a century. 
This  is con t ras ted  by curve ( b ) ,  a high f o s s i l  energy s t r a t e g y  
supplying 15-17 TWyr/yr of l i q u i d s  over a long t i m e  which accounts 
f o r  de lays  i n  t he  i n t roduc t i on  of nonfoss i l  energy sources.  With 
a t o t a l  resource requirement of 24% of t he  geologica l  resources,  
s t r a t e g y  (b) probably touches upon t he  l i m i t s  of nonexotic re- 
coverable resources.  Any higher  production than t h e  l a t t e r  would 
severe ly  c u t  t h e  investment c apab i l i t y  of s o c i e t i e s  to adapt  
nuclear  and s o l a r  energy t o  fu tu r e  se t t l ement  and l i f e s t y l e  
p a t t e r n s  and thereby s h i f t  coal  use from investment t o  consump- 
t i o n .  
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FIGURE 2 7  Resource requirements fo r  a l t e r n a t i v e  "maximum" coa l  
s t r a t e g i e s .  
Over t i m e ,  curve ( a )  w i l l  most probably not  exceed environ- 
mentally "prudent" C 0 2  r e l ea se  l eve l s .  Curve (b )  might w e l l  
go beyond acceptable l eve l s ,  and the re fore ,  is a "maximum" coa l  
s t r a t egy  by d e f i n i t i o n .  
In  both cases ,  coa l  would have t o  commence i t s  new and non- 
t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  a s  a l i q u i d  i n  an autothermal conversion scheme, 
i n  o rder  t o  compete with t h e  na tu ra l  l i q u i d  hydrocarbons. Then, 
f o r  t he  more expensive f o s s i l  hydrogen economy t o  develop, the  
p r i ce s  of o i l  and gas would have t o  be s t i l l  higher.  I t  i s  
c r u c i a l  the re fore ,  t o  bu i l d  up a system t h a t  i s  f l e x i b l e  enough 
t o  involve nonfoss i l  hydrogen a t  a l a t e r  da t e .  Methanol produc- 
t i o n  q u a l i f i e s  w e l l  s ince ,  a s  we have seen,  it permits decoupling 
f r o n t  end g a s i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  coal  from i t s  syn thes i s  i n t o  a 
l i q u i d .  
However, a s  w e  have noted the  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  nonfoss i l  hydrogen 
i s  much slower i n  t h e  maximum coal  s t r a t e g y  curve ( b ) .  Here, c o a l  
use i s  maximized by keeping t he  short-term economic c o s t s  low, 
and the  emphasis i s  on coal  a s  a primary energy source. I f  one 
es t imates  t he  investment c o s t  of an MIP-based autothermal scheme 
by t a r g e t  f i gu re s  of US$ 400-800 per  continuous kW of methanol, 
and i f  one assumes a conversion e f f i c i ency  of 0.65, adding a 
bonus of lO$/bbl of crude f o r  r e f i n ing  cos t s  and losses ,  a coal  
a t  a minemouth c o s t  o f  US$ 25-70 per  tce could be transformed 
i n t o  a l i q u i d  a t  a bbl  c o s t  of US$(1975)12.5-30. I n  s p i t e  of 
t he  recen t  dramatic changes i n  t he  world o i l  market t h i s  i nd i ca t e s  
t h a t ,  a t  t h e  beginning, coal  l iquefac t ion  w i l l  have t o  r e l y  on 
t he  cheapest coal  ava i l ab le  and perhaps on some form of subsidy. 
What concrete  medium-term measures would be necessary t o  
e f f i c i e n t l y  enhance the  uses of coa l  has been s tud ied  i n  a j o in t  
t a sk  force  with i n s t i t u t i o n s  i n  t he  FRG and t h e  UK, analyzing 
poss ib le  coal  s t r a t e g i e s  f o r  those two coun t r i es  (Sass in ,  Hoffmann, 
and Sadnicki,  1977). The two coun t r i es  were chosen because both, 
a s  major producers, a r e  experiencing a s t agna t ion  o r  even decl ine  
FIGURE 28 New coal  technologies ,  t h e i r  pene t ra t ion  character-  
i s t i c s ,  and app l ica t ions  i n  t he  FRG a s  p ~ o j e c t e d  f o r  t h e  year  
2000 .  
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FIGURE 29 Uses of coal  by e x i s t i n g  and new technologies ,  FRG, 
1970-2000. 
of t h e i r  c o a l  i n d u s t r y .  Thus, any s t r a t e g y  l e a d i n g  t o  a r e v i v a l  
of  t h e i r  c o a l  s e c t o r s  would c e r t a i n l y  presuppose c o n d i t i o n s  a t  
l e a s t  a s  f avo rab le  a s  t hose  now p r e v a i l i n g  i n  Poland o r  t h e  USSR, 
f o r  i n s t a n c e .  Besides c o a l  t echnologies  t h a t  a r e  soon t o  mature 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  and which would o f f e r  a compe t i t i ve  secondary 
energy form f o r  broad e x i s t i n g  submarkets,  s e v e r a l  pathways to-  
wards new p a t t e r n s  o f  c o a l  use  were determined (see Figure  2 8 ) .  
Assgning a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  mechanisms based on  e n e r g i e s  d e r i v e d  
from c o a l  a t  t h e  same t i m e  t h e s e  e n e r g i e s  become compe t i t i ve ,  
one cou ld  i d e n t i f y  unexpectedly h igh  p o t e n t i a l s  f o r  c o a l  use .  
Figure  29 summarizes t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  FRG. For t h e  UK a 
similar p a t t e r n  would a r i s e  10-15 y e a r s  l a t e r  due t o  North Sea 
o i l  e x p l o i t a t i o n .  
Both i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  r e v e a l  t h a t  t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  o f  c o a l  
w i l l  n o t  b e  r e a l i z a b l e  under normal market  c o n d i t i o n s ,  no t ab ly  
s i n c e  newly in t roduced  t echno log ie s  t a k e  a l ong  t i m e  t o  a f f e c t  
consumption r a t e s  and s i n c e  l a r g e  inves tments  would be r e q u i r e d  
a t  a t i m e  of  s t a g n a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o a l  i n d u s t r i e s .  
These f i n d i n g s  w e r e  e x t e n s i v e l y  d i s c u s s e d  and compared t o  
o t h e r  n a t i o n a l  c a s e  s t u d i e s  a t  t h e  1977 I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Coal Con- 
f e r ence  i n  Moscow, o rgan ized  by I I A S A  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  Moscow 
All-Union I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Systems S t u d i e s  (1977) .  T h e i r  main con- 
c l u s i o n  w a s  t h a t  t h e  t echno log ie s  under development most ly  con- 
c e n t r a t e  on e l e c t r i c i t y ,  p i p e l i n e  g a s ,  o r  d i s t r i c t  h e a t  and do 
n o t  p repa re  f o r  l i q u i d  c o a l .  T h i s  o b s e r v a t i o n  conf i rms t h a t  a 
fundamental mismatch e x i s t s  between p lanning  t endenc ie s  toward 
expanding t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  u s e s  and t h e  e v e r  g r e a t e r  long-term 
n e c e s s i t y  t o  enhance c o a l  use  f o r  l i q u i d  purposes .  
Summary Eva lua t ion  o f  Coal 
Coal r e sou rces  a r e  very  l a r g e .  I n  p r i n c i p l e ,  c o a l  cou ld  con- 
c e i v a b l y  become t h e  t o p  pr imary energy sou rce  i n  t h e  nex t  
cen tu ry .  Half o f  t h e  g e o l o g i c a l  c o a l  r e s o u r c e s  would t h e o r e t i c a l l y  
s u f f i c e  t o  meet even t h e  requi rements  o f  t h e  High s c e n a r i o  u n t i l  
t h e  end o f  t h e  2 1 s t  cen tu ry .  Th i s  p o t e n t i a l ,  which b a s i c a l l y  
compares t o  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  p o t e n t i a l  of  renewables,  does n o t  
account  f o r  fundamental c o n s t r a i n t s .  I n  terms o f  a r e a l i z a b l e  
p o t e n t i a l ,  a maximum primary c o a l  s t r a t e g y  would be capable  o f  
s u s t a i n i n g  a peak supply of  20-25 TWyr/yr around 2050, provided 
t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  and s t r u c t u r a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  can be overcome. 
The q u e s t i o n  remains whether such a s t r a t e g y  i s  d e s i r a b l e .  
The s i t u a t i o n  o f  c o a l  among the v a r i o u s  energy o p t i o n s  is a 
p e c u l i a r  one.  Its a c t u a l  " p o t e n t i a l "  does n o t  l i e  i n  i t s  primary 
use b u t  i n  i t s  s u i t a b i l i t y  as a chemical  c a r r i e r  f o r  s o l a r -  and 
nuclear-produced hydrogen. Th i s  r o l e  of  c o a l  would s t r e n g t h e n  
t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  n o n f o s s i l  t e chno log ie s ,  smoothen t h e  t r a n s i -  
t i o n  towards a secondary energy  system r e l y i n g  e x c l u s i v e l y  on 
hydrogen. Using c o a l  i n  t h i s  way would mean t o  i n v e s t  i n t o  an 
energy f u t u r e  t h a t  is n o t  c o n s t r a i n e d  by f o s s i l  r e sou rces  and 
resource-dependent t echno log ie s .  
By way o f  such a s t r a t e g y  o f  i n v e s t i v e  c o a l  u s e ,  auto-  
thermal  c o a l  convers ion  would have t o  be i n t roduced  f i r s t  i n  
o r d e r  t o  r e v i s e  t h e  p r e s e n t  downward t r e n d  o f  c o a l  w i t h i n  t h e  
given economic c o n s t r a i n t s  and then ,  g r a d u a l l y ,  a s  t h e  p r i c e s  
of a l t e r n a t i v e  l i q u i d  o r  gaseous energy c a r r i e r s  increase ,  
hydrogen from nonfossi l  resources would become a s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  
hydrogen from coal .  The sooner t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  t akes  place the  
b e t t e r  one of man's few t r u l y  l a rge  na tu ra l  resource a s s e t s  could 
be managed and be preserved. 
THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
The Scope of the  Inves t iga t ions  
Nuclear energy i s  one of  t h e  most promising technologies .  That 
it can con t r ibu te  a l a r g e  share  of t he  fu tu r e  energy requirements 
i s  undisputed. S t i l l  it i s  one of t h e  most ho t ly  debated i s s u e s  
of today. Though its s c i e n t i f i c  b a s i s  i s  w e l l  known and under- 
stood, most nonsc ien t i s t s  view it a s  a mysterious and extremely 
complicated and new technology--even a f t e r  some 20 years  of 
p r a c t i c a l  experience. 
Its real po ten t i a l  can only be apprecia ted  i f  it is considered 
i n  t h e  appropr ia te  framework. Today, t h e  need f o r  a t r a n s i t i o n  
away from resource-l imited technologies  t o  energy opt ions  sus ta in -  
ab le  i n  t h e  long term is no t  y e t  r e a l l y  f e l t ,  and t h e  consequences 
of having t o  balance g loba l  demand and supply on a l e v e l  of 20, 
30, 50 o r  more TWyr/yr is not  y e t  understood. I t  is t h i s  long- 
term globa l  background, however, aga ins t  which nuclear  energy 
must be judged: the  p ress ing  reasons f o r  beginning t h e  nuclear  
adventure now roo t  i n  t h e  requirements o f  t he  next  century.  
To use nuclear  energy i n  such a la rge-sca le  fashion r equ i r e s  
t h a t  it be re leased from t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  imposed by t he  e lec-  
t r i c i t y  market. Therefore,  a major t h r u s t  of our  i nves t i ga t i on  
has been d i r ec t ed  towards t h e  study of none l ec t r i c  app l ica t ions .  
Already i n  1975, on t he  occasion of t he  European Nuclear Con- 
ference on Nuclear Energy Maturity i n  Pa r i s ,  W. HBfele and 
W. Sass in  (1975) pointed i n  t h i s  d i r ec t i on .  Thei r  paper con- 
cluded t h a t  nuclear  energy was o r i g i n a l l y  considered a means of 
technologica l  innovation, t h e  spearhead of modern technology i n  
t he  1950s. Its t y p i c a l l y  l a r g e  u n i t s  and high power dens i ty  
made it an i d e a l  candidate f o r  e l e c t r i c i t y  generat ion.  I f  
nuclear  energy was t o  con t r i bu t e  t o  t h e  fu tu r e  energy supply, 
i ts  use would have t o  s h i f t  toward t h e  production of process 
hea t  and l i q u i d  energy c a r r i e r s .  The paper i d e n t i f i e d  hydrogen 
produced by thermochemical o r  e l e c t r o l y t i c a l  water  s p l i t t i n g  
a s  t h e  most probable long-term, fu tu r e  use of nuclear  energy a t  
t he  t i m e  t h e  asymptotic s t a g e  of t h e  nuclear  system would be 
reached. It  concluded t h a t  an a l l -nuc lea r  supply would be 
pos s ib l e  i n  p r i nc ip l e ,  and described t he  main f e a t u r e s  of a 
r e l a t e d  s t r a t egy .  
The second l i n e  of us ing nuclear  energy on a l a rge  s ca l e  
i s  t he  deployment of a nuc lea r  f u e l  cycle .  I n  t h e  f a l l  of 
1975 R. Avenhaus, W. Nafele,  and B.E. McGrath (1975) published 
a s tudy evaluat ing  t he  o rde r  of magnitude of hazards and r i s k s  
involved i n  t he  l a rge  throughputs of a conceived asymptotic 
nuclear  system. The a n a l y s i s  included mass flows of nuclear  
ma te r i a l ,  normal ope ra t i ona l  r ad ioac t ive  r e l e a s e s ,  the  problem 
of waste s to rage  a s  w e l l  a s  p o t e n t i a l  hazards from blackmail 
o r  sabotage, including t h e  const ruct ion  of a nuclear  device.  
The paper concludes with severa l  decision-oriented assessments. 
F iss ion  breeding i s  one long-term nuclear  technology, 
fusion is  t he  o ther  one. O u r  t h i r d  l a rge  e f f o r t  i n  t h e  nuclear 
f i e l d  was a comparison of the  f i s s i o n  and fus ion breeder tech- 
nologies  (Hdfele e t  a l .  1977). The format of a t a sk  force  was 
chosen, comprising exper t s  of t he  University of Berkeley, t he  
University of Wisconsin, and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory i n  
t h e  USA, Gesellschaft  ft lr  Kernforschung, Karlsruhe, FRG, the 
I n s t i t u t e  of High Temperature and the  Academy of  Sciences,  Moscow, 
USSR, a s  w e l l  a s  Energy Systems Program members. The two year 
e f f o r t  l ed  t o  severa l  s u b s t a n t i a l  conclusions: n e i t h e r  tech- 
nology i s  l imi ted  i n  resources.  The i n s e n s i t i v i t y  of t h e  c o s t  
of e l e c t r i c i t y  from f i s s i o n  breeders  with respec t  t o  fue l  c o s t  
allow t h e  use of even very d i l u t e  sources of uranium. The l i m i t -  
ing  f u e l  i n  t h e  case of deuterium-trit ium (D-T) fus ion (deuterium- 
deuterium fusion i s  much less understood) is l i th ium.  The 
smal les t  es t imates  of low c o s t  resources po in t  t o  a p o t e n t i a l  
of some 2500 TWyr/yr. The two technologies g r e a t l y  d i f f e r  i n  
terms of maturi ty.  F i s s ion  breeding, which is ava i l ab l e  i n  a 
prototype form a f t e r  having passed t h e  thresholds  of s c i e n t i f i c  
and technological  f e a s i b i l i t y ,  should become commercial by 1990. 
Fusion power, i n  con t r a s t ,  s t i l l  has t o  pass t h e  threshold  of 
s c i e n t i f i c  f e a s i b i l i t y .  Magnetic confinement technologies  are 
est imated t o  a t t a i n  s c i e n t i f i c  break-even by t h e  e a r l y  1980s. 
Some advocates of l a s e r  technologies  be l ieve  t h a t  t h i s  might 
a l s o  happen with l a s e r ,  which is more con t rove r s i a l  and uncer- 
t a i n  however. Technological f e a s i b i l i t y  of fus ion w i l l  probably 
not  come before 2000, and commercialization i s  unl ikely  t o  be 
achieved i n  t i m e  f o r  fus ion t o  con t r ibu te  even 10% of t he  world's 
e l e c t r i c i t y  demands by 2030. 
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of the two technologies were compared 
by way of the TOKAMAK and l i q u i d  metal f a s t  breeder  ( t h e  German/ 
Belgian/Dutch SN300 design)  r eac to r  reference  systems. From an 
ecsnomic po in t  of view, both fus ion and f i s s i o n  breeders  requi re  
a heavy RED e f f o r t  and high c a p i t a l  investments f o r  commercial 
r eac to rs  and supporting f a c i l i t i e s  t o  continue. Technologically 
and physica l ly ,  they have much i n  common: complex large-scale  
engineering, l a rge  u n i t s ,  ma t e r i a l s  damage and a c t i v a t i o n  by 
neutrons, t he  need t o  conta in  and manage l a rge  rad ioac t ive  in- 
ven tor ies ,  and, f o r  many present  designs,  the  use of l i q u i d  metal 
f o r  hea t  t r a n s f e r .  Construct ion and operat ion of both the re fore  
requ i re  a very high degree of meticulousness and v ig i l ance .  
The environmental a spec t s  o r  problems are very s i m i l a r ,  but  
fusion i f  prudently developed might be q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  super ior  
t o  f i s s i o n .  Spec i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  damage po t en t i a l  of i ts  radio- 
a c t i v e  inventory of fus ion would be lower a s  would be i t s  radio- 
a c t i v i t y  decay-heat; t h e  amounts of readioact ive  waste from 
fus ion would have s h o r t e r  decay-times, requi re  a smaller  volume 
of dangerous shipments and o f f e r  less opportuni ty f o r  f u e l  
d ivers ion  f o r  weapon purposes. However, t h e  widespread use of 
fusion would r e s u l t  i n  a p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of weapon know-how. 
In  summary, a c a r e fu l  development of fusion breeding would 
make t h i s  opt ion  appear more advantageous than f i s s i o n  breeding. 
I t  i s  inconceivable,  however, t h a t  it would in f luence  t he  energy 
supply wi th in  the  period of cons idera t ion .  
The Po t en t i a l  of Nuclear Power by 2030 
By t h e  end of 1977 t he  t o t a l  i n s t a l l e d  nuclear  capaci ty  was on 
t h e  order  of 0.12 TW (e) yr /y r  (Nuclear News 1978) . This value i s  
expected t o  be c lose  t o  0.4 TW(e)yr/yr by 1982 when a l l  p lan t s  
p resen t ly  under cons t ruct ion  w i l l  operate .  The f r o n t  end s t e p  
of t he  f u e l  cycle (uranium mining, processing i n t o  yellow cake, 
conversion i n t o  UFg,enrichment, conversion i n t o  UO2, and f u e l  
f ab r i ca t i on )  a r e  commercially w e l l  i n  hand. The t a i l  end 
( in termedia te  f u e l  element s torage ,  reprocessing,  intermediate  
waste d isposal ,  waste s o l i d i f i c a t i o n ,  and f u e l  waste d isposal )  
a r e  technologica l ly  mastered but  no t  a l l s i t s  uses a r e  mature 
commercially. The s t a t u s  and t he  near-term development of t h e  
f u e l  cyc le  indust ry  a r e  described i n  Table 36. 
Against t he  background of e x i s t i n g  and foreseeable  achieve- 
ments w e  have attempted t o  es t imate  t h e  maximum poss ib le  con- 
t r i b u t i o n s  of nuclear  power i n  our  s tudy per iod .  
Disregarding t h e  e a r l y  in t roduc t ions  o f  nuc lea r  power i n  
nuclear  weapon s t a t e s  where c i v i l i a n  uses p r o f i t e d  from the  
m i l i t a r y  i n f r a s t ruc tu r e ,  t h e  beginning of commercial nuclear  
power can be placed i n  t h e  year  1966 when nonweapon s t a t e s  made 
t h e i r  f i r s t  conrmitments. L i t t l e  can be done, on t h e  o the r  hand, 
to  add s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  t h e  t o t a l  p o t e n t i a l  expected by 1982. 
Within t h i s  " h i s t o r i c "  per iod  the highes t  observed in t roduc t ion  
r a t e  was 37 GW(e) per  year  (1980). 
Poss ib le  in t roduct ion  r a t e s  of nuclear  power i n  t h e  USA 
were analyzed i n  a s tudy sponsored by t h e  Atomic I n d u s t r i a l  
Forum (1973).  It concluded t h a t  a vigorous nuclear  program 
s t a r t e d  i n  1973 and c a r r i e d  on without pub l ic  opposi t ion ,  would 
have l e d  t o  a capaci ty  o f  500 G W ( e )  by 1980. For the OECD coun- 
t r ies  t h i s  i nd i ca t e s  t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  accelera- 
t i o n  should be exp lo i t ab le  t h e  more so  i n  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t s  of t h e  
world unhampered by opposi t ion  t o  nuclear  power. I n  our  b e s t  
judgment w e  have est imated t h a t  a program s t a r t e d  i n  1985 could 
r e s u l t  i n  in t roduct ion  r a t e s  of 150 GW(e)/yr around the year  
2000. This f i gu re  is high bu t  not  i ncons i s t en t  wi th  an es t imated  
in t roduc t ion  r a t e  of 37 GW(e) i n  1980. Assuming t h e  con t r ibu t ion  
of nuclear  energy t o  double o r  even t r i p l e  between 1982 and 2000, 
and assuming fu r the r  a 4 %  annual growth i n  the r a t e  of in t ro -  
duct ion a f t e r  2000, a capac i ty  of about 8-10 TW(e) would be 
provided by 2030. 
A second, d i f f e r e n t  approach y i e ld s  a s i m i l a r  r e s u l t .  Using 
a l o g i s t i c  curve t o  desc r ibe  t he  in t roduc t ion  o f  a new technology 
i n t o  t h e  primary energy market and assuming t h a t  nuclear  growth 
r a t e s  would be s i m i l a r  t o  those  of o t h e r  energy technologies ,  
w e  es t imated  t h a t  by 2030 nuclear  energy would have captured 40% 
of t h e  market. 4 more t h e o r e t i c a l  approach developed by V. Peterka 
(1977) employing c o s t  and p r i c e  r a t i o s  t o  p r e d i c t  market pene- 
t r a t i o n  r a t e s  has l e d  t o  t he  same f igures .  
Forty percent  of t h e  primary energy demand corresponds t o  
roughly 14 TWyr/yr. Assuming a thermal e f f i c i e n c y  of 0.4 and a 
load f a c t o r  of 0.7, t h i s  is equivalent  t o  8 TW(e1 of i n s t a l l e d  
capac i ty .  
Aiming f o r  a rough upper guess and i n  view of  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  we, t he r e fo re ,  consider  a capaci ty  of  10 TW(e) t o  be 
the maccirmun reliable g loba l  p o t e n t i a l  of nuclear  energy by 2030-- 
TABLE 36 worlda nuclear  f u e l  cycle  c a p a c i t i e s  and number of  f a c i l i t i e s b  (operable,  under cons t ruct ion  or  on order)  
A. Front  End 
Uranium Uraniumc ~ r a n i u m d  Fabr ica t ion  Fabr ica t ion .  Mixed 
Mining and Mil l ing  Conversion Enrichment, Uranium Metal and Oxide and Plutonium Oxide 
Year # 103 t / y r  # 103 t / y r  # 10" SWU/yr # 10' t / y r  # t / y r  
1977 63 35 14 50 17 19 30 12 14 119 
1980 70 62 34 1 8  
1985 9 7 62 7 1 20 
1990 115 62 9 1 na 
B. T a i l  End 
I 
Uranium Metal Uranium Oxide m 
reprocess in^ Reprocessj.np m Reprocessinq__ I 
Year # l o 3  t / y r  # lo3  t / y r  # t / y r  
a Excluding the  central ly-planned economies. 
b .  P ~ l o t  and labora tory  f a c i l i t i e s  are included. 
C Dif fe ren t  conversion s t ages  added i n  terns of  c a p a c i t i e s  p e r  year .  
d ~ i f f e r e n t  enrichment processes added i n  terms o f  SWU p e r  year .  
SOURCES: Nuclear Engineering I n t e r n a t i o n a l  (1976); Hausserman, H. e t  al .  (1977); OECD-NEA/IAEA (1977); F u j i ,  H. (1978) 
a power which w i l l  not  be used f o r  e l e c t r i c i t y  generat ion only 
but  a l s o  f o r  t hc  generat ion of o ther  secondary energies .  
Uranium Resources 
The s i z e  of uranium resources i s  a heavily discussed top ic .  
There have been s eve ra l  at tempts  t o  assess  t h e  economically ex- 
p l o i t a b l e  resources.  Table 37 summarizes va lues  determined by 
a j o i n t  OECD-NEA/IAEA study (19771, e s t imat ing  t h e  world 's  
uranium resources a t  less than US$ 130/kg t o  be approximately 
4.3 mi l l ion  tons. 
For our  purposes, using t he  breeder technology, resource 
c o s t s  do no t  r e a l l y  matter  and t he  value of i n t e r e s t  would be 
u l t imate ly  recoverable resources.  But t h i s  value is unknown. 
Present  knowledge o f  t h e  geologica l  f e a t u r e s  of uranium 
depos i t s  seem t o  i nd i ca t e  t h a t  much more uranium than t h e  
c i t e d  4.3 mi l l ion  tons  might be ava i l ab le .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
exp lora t ion  has no t  been very even. Table 38 i l l u s t r a t e s  t he  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  between d r i l l i n g ,  r ese rves  and f inding r a t e s  
f o r  var ious  countr ies .  Most remarkably it t u r n s  ou t  t h a t  t he  
USA, t he  country wi th  t h e  h ighes t  reserves ,  has shown a very 
low f ind ing  r a t e .  A.M. Perry (1979) and o t h e r  authors  conclude 
from t h i s  t h a t  t h e  USA i s  no t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w e l l  endowed with 
uranium resources.  
Thus it might no t  be unreasonable t o  t ake  t h e  USA a s  a 
sample on which t o  base a very rough order  of magnitude es t imate  
of the  wor ld ' s  uranium resources  t o  be acces s ib l e  i n  a no t  too 
d i s t a n t  f u tu r e .  I n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  uranium a t  a c o s t  of 
less than US$130/kg is a v a i l a b l e  a t  an average o f  0.2 tons  per  
km2. Using Pe r ry ' s  method, w e  t he r e fo re  es t imated  world re- 
sources by assuming a dens i ty  of 0.18 tons  pe r  km2 f o r  a l l  
o t h e r  regions of t h e  world; accordingly we concluded a p o t e n t i a l  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of about 27 mi l l i on  tons  o f  uranium (Table 39) .  
Other similar s t u d i e s  have confirmed t h i s  o rde r  of magnitude. 
A Soviety study (Alexandrov and Ponomarev-Stepnoy 1974; Belostotsky 
19771, using ano ld  IAEA/OEDC da ta ,  est imated resources  a t  17.5 
mi l l ion  tons.  The f indings  of Brian J. Skinner (1976),  based 
on a comparison of geologica l  occurrence f o r  geochemically sca rce  
metals ,  po in t  up t o  27 mi l l ion  tons  of recoverable resources.  
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TABLE 37 Estimated worlda resources of uranium (10 tons of uranium). 
Reasonably Estimated 
.Assured Additonal 
Resources Resources Sum 
< $8O/kg 1.65 1.51 3.16 
$80- 130/kg 0.54 0.59 1.13 
Total (<$130/kg) 2.19 2.10 4.29 
a Excluding Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China. 
SOURCE: OECENFWIAEA ( 1977) . 
TABLE 38 Uranim Findings and Finding Rates 
a 
Finding 
D r i l l  Holes Findings Rates (lo3 ,) (10' tons) (kg/m) 
~ u s t r a l i a  
Central African Empire 
Argentina 
India 
Finland 
Philippines 
I ta ly  
Turkey 
Germany, Federal Republic of 
Spain 
France 
United S ta t e s  
J a w  
poitugal 435 9.2 21 
Mexico 723 7.1 9.8 
 indi dings include a l l  resources producible a t  a forward cos t  of l e s s  than 
$130/kg, plus  cumulative production. 
SOURCE: Based on data  frarm OECD-NEI)/IAEA (1977) . 
TABLE 39 Adjusted Uranium Resource Estimates 
OECD-NEA/IAEA I IASA 
IIASA World Area Estisake Estimate 
Regions (lo6 !az) (10' tons)a (lo6 tons) 
I (North America) 21.5 2.53 3.87 
11 (Soviet Union and E. Europe) 23.5 4.23 
I11 (W. Europe, Japan, Australia,  
N. Zealand, S. Africa, I s r ae l )  15.5 1.26 2.79 
I V  (Latin America) 20.6 0.08 3.71 
V 'Wrica except N. Africa and 
S. Africa, South and Southeast 
Asia) 33.6 0.33 6.05 
V I  (Middle East and N. Africa) 9.8 0.08 1.76 
V I I  (China and Centrally Planned 
Asian Econom~es) 11.5 2.07 
I - V I I  136 4.29 24.48 
Polar reaions (including unin- 
habited i s lands)  
- 
12.5 2.25 
World 148.5 4.29 26.73 
( 1 4 . 2 - ~ 6 . 4 1 ~  
a Excluding Regions11 (Soviet Unlon and E. Europe) and V I I  (China and Centrally 
planned Asian Europe). 
b~ncludrng  the speculative resources given i n  OECD-NEA/IAEA (1977). 
Therefore, it seems a reasonable assumption t o  expect 
a l toge ther  some 15-30 mi l l ion  tons  of uranium p o t e n t i a l l y  ava i l -  
able  a t  g lobal  explora t ion  r a t e s  s i n i l a r  t o  t h a t  of t he  USA. 
A remark about thorium should be added. Thorium, which is 
not  a f i s s i l e  mater ia l ,  would be used f o r  conversion i n t o  U-233. 
The p resen t ly  known resources a r e  i n  an order  of 0.8 mi l l ion  
tons.  Geologically,  however, thorium is four  t i m e s  a s  abundant 
i n  t h e  lithosphere a s  uranium, and w e  can expect t h a t  enough 
thorium should be ava i l ab l e  t o  support a long-term f i s s i o n  economy. 
One should note t h a t  the mining of 15-30 mi l l i on  tons  of 
uranium would be an undertaking q u a l i t a t i v e l y  much less e f f i c i e n t  
than today's  uranium mines exp lo i t i ng  t he  r i c h e s t  depos i t s  a t  
around 2000 ppm. Exploi ta t ion  o f  depos i t s  of 50-100 ppm would 
eventual ly  requ i re  a mining opera t ion  comparable t o  t h e  e f f o r t  
of coa l  mining (Table 4 0 )  with respec t  t o  material handling, 
l abor  i n t e n s i t y  and land requirements. Uranium would, s o  t o  
speak, become a kind of yellow coa l .  
Reactor S t r a t e g i e s  
F i f t een  t o  t h i r t y  mi l l ion  tons  of uranium used i n  a l i g h t  water  
r eac to r  (LWR) s t r a t egy  without  reprocessing is no t  a very s ig-  
n i f i c a n t  amount of energy. A s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 30, a l e v e l  
of 10 Tw(e)yr/yr could no t  be sus ta ined  f o r  much longer  a f t e r  
2020; 20 mi l l i on  tons  of uranium would be equ iva len t  t o  approxi- 
mately 240 Twyr--a r e l a t i v e l y  low f i g u r e  compared t o  a demand of  
22-36 TWyr/yr. 
Severa l  technologies  e x i s t  t h a t  could improve t h e  s i t u a t i o n .  
Some advanced designs such a s  o f  t he  high temperature reac to r  
(HTR) o r  t h e  heavy water r eac to r  (HWR), and even some forms of 
t he  LWR, would be ab le  t o  convert  n o n f i s s i l e  ma te r i a l  (e.g. ,  
U-238 o r  Th) i n t o  f i s s i l e  mate r ia l .  However, those  high con- 
v e r t e r s  o r  near-breeders a r e  s t i l l  uneconomic today compared t o  
optimized burner r eac to r s  and, more important,  they s t i l l  burn 
TABLE 40 Requirements for the operation of a 1 GW(e) power plant. a 
Material Handling 
Land Mining Involved 
30-Year Total Personnel b 30-Year Total (h2) (man yr/yr) ( lo6  tons) 
LWR (2.000-pp ore) 3 50 45Cd 
C o a l  10-20 500 321d 
LWR (70-ppm ore) 33 300 360 
a Corresponds to  an e lectr ic i ty  chain producing 6 . 1  TWh with a 30-year l i f e -  
span. 
b l  man year = 2,000 hours. 
C Overburden factor: 15 rn3 per ton (averaged). 
d~verburden factor: 3 m3 per ton (averaged) . 
-. 
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FIGURE 30 An LWR-U235 once-through s t r a t e a y .  
more f u e l  than they ~ r o d u c e ,  which means t h a t  they a l l e v i a t e  but  
not  so lve  t h e  problem. 
Breeding, i n  con t r a s t ,  means t h a t  more f i s s i l e  f u e l  i s  
produced from n o n f i s s i l e  mate r ia l  than i s  consumed by t h i s  
production. Considering t he  r a t i o  of f i s s i l e  t o  n o n f i s s i l e  f u e l  
i n  n a t u r a l  uranium being 1:140, o rders  of magnitude a r e  won by 
breeding. J u s t  by using t h e  uranium already mined and depleted 
by enrichment would add some 600 TWyr t o  nuclear  energy--a f i gu re  
comparable t o  economical reserves .  A t  t he  same t i m e ,  low-quality 
uranium depos i t s  would be exp lo i t ed  without involving a "yellow 
coa ln  e n t e r p r i s e  (Table 4 1 ) .  
Several  breeder technologies  a r e  conceivable. The most 
advanced thermal breeder r eac to r  design (TBR) is t he  molten 
s a l t  r eac to r .  Experimental u n i t s  have been successfully operated,  
bu t  t he  prototype s tage  has not  y e t  been reached. Another pos- 
s i b i l i t y  would be t o  use t h e  high-neutron f luxes  generated by 
D-T fusion,  a v iab le  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  e l e c t r i c i t y  generat ion from 
fusion access ib le  perhaps even i n  t he  near term. However, a s  
we have seen, it i s  not  reasonable t o  expect fus ion technology 
t o  become ava i l ab l e  on any s i g n i f i c a n t  sca le  much before  2030. 
The most promising breeder  technology wi th in  t he  time 
horizon under considera t ion  i s  t he  l i q u i d  metal f a s t  breeder 
(LME'BR) . Prototypes i n  France, t he  USSR, and t h e  UK a r e  operat- 
ing success fu l ly ,  and t he  commercial threshold w i l l  probably 
be passed i n  t he  next  t en  years .  Their  s a f e ty  is hot ly  debated, 
but  technologica l ly  they could be designed t o  be a s  s a f e  a s  
s tandard LWRs. This was a l s o  one of the r e s u l t s  of our  study 
comparing f i s s i o n  and fusion r eac to r s  (Hafele e t  a l .  1977) .  
The nuclear  community considered the  advantages of breeding 
r a t h e r  e a r l y .  In  1960 severa l  s t r a t e g i f s  were designed combining 
LWR and LMFBR technologies.  The plutonium produced by LWRs would 
a 
TABLE 41 Requirements for operating a 1 GW(e) Plant ( 6 . 1  TWh(e) A 1 yr 
operation at  70% capacity factor) 
Material Handling 
Land Mining Involved 
30-Year Total Pergnnel b 30-Year Total (h2) (man yr/yr) ( lo6 tons) 
LWR (70-ppm uranium 
ore) 33 300 255C 
W B R  0 . 2  2 1 . 3 ~  
'TO calculate the requirements for running a 1 0  TW(e) operation, multiply the 
listed numbers by 10'. 
bl man year = 2,000 hours. 
'overburden factor: 3 m3 per ton (averaged) . 
be used t o  provide t he  f i r s t - c o r e  inven tor ies  f o r  breeder r e a c t o r s .  
Thus gradual ly LWRs would be replaced by a se l f - sus ta in ing  LMFBR 
system. Such a c l a s s i c a l  LWR-LMFBR s t r a t e g y  i s  described i n  
Figure 31. The ccnsumptive use of uranium i s  i n  t h e  order  of 15 
mil l ion  tons ,  a value pe r f ec t l y  cons i s t en t  with t h e  resources.  
But t h i s  s t r a t e g y  presupposes a l l  t he  plutonium produced 
i n  LWRs t o  be used a s  q u i c k l y  a s  p o s s i b l e  i n  o rder  t o  bu i l d  
breeders .  This i s  not  r e a l i s t i c  i n  view of recen t  developments 
and t he  present  s i t u a t i o n  of reprocessing and breeding. There- 
f o r e ,  t he  mere in t roduc t ion  of breeding w i l l  not  enable nuc lea r  
energy t o  reach a l e v e l  o f  10 TW(e) by 2030. 
Additional measures a r e  required. The use o f  high conver te r s  
and improvements i n  enrichment and reprocessing technologies  
might help.  The c r u c i a l  element, however, is t o  emphasize t h e  
breeding c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t he  LMFBR and t o  use t h i s  technology 
f o r  breeding U-233 from thorium. Thus, a lower in t roduct ion  
r a t e  of LMFBRs than t h a t  c a l cu l a t ed  f o r  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s t r a t e g i e s  
might be poss ib le  a t  t h e  op t imi s t i c a l l y  assessed l e v e l  of g lobal  
uranium resources  (Figure 32) . 
Secondary Energy from Nuclear Power 
W e  have a l ready mentioned t h a t  nuclear  enerqy, i f  
it i s  t o  r e a l i z e  i ts f u l l  p o t e n t i a l ,  must produce an energy form 
o t h e r  than e l e c t r i c i t y .  Most a l t e r n a t i v e  uses t o  e l e c t r i c i t y  
a r e  of a l im i t ed  scope only, such a s  f o r  ins tance ,  d i s t r i c t  heat- 
ing. The i d e a l  candidate  is hydrogen production, but  it i s  
doubtful  whether s i g n i f i c a n t  d i r e c t  uses o f  hydrogen f o r  energy 
purposes a r e  poss ib le  before  t he  mid-21st century.  
I n  t h e  s ec t i on  on f o s s i l  f u e l s  w e  have learned t h a t  t h e  
carbon atom, though very abundant, must be used prudently because 
of environmental, economic, and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  reasons. The 
production of methanol by combining coa l  and nuclear  hydrogen 
t he r e fo re  appears a s  a s t r ong  p o s s i b i l i t y .  The carbon atom 
would be used pr imar i ly  a s  a chemical energy c a r r i e r ,  and thus 
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FIGURE 31 A c l a s s i c a l  r eac to r  s t r a t egy .  
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FIGURE 32 A converter-breeder s t r a t egy  
the  precious coal  reserves would be safeguarded. A t  t he  same 
t i m e ,  nuclear  hydrogen could be introduced i n t o  t he  system with- 
out  a r ad i ca l  change of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  
E a r l i e r ,  i n  Figure 24 we compared t h e  e f f i c i e n c i e s  i n  terms 
of coal  of various coal  conversion technologies.  Autothermal 
conversion uses four  times a s  much coal ,  and i f  an e x t e r n a l  source  
of process hea t  such a s  t h e  HTR is employed, it uses t w i c e  a s  
much coa l  per  u n i t  of liquid secondary energy output  a s  does 
methanol production using hydrogen from a nonfoss i l  source,  such 
a s  nuclear .  
This process was i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Figure 2 4 .  Natural coa l  
by and l a rge  conta ins  one hydrogen atom per  carbon atom. A t  
temperatures of around 14000 C coa l ,  upon t he  add i t ion  of hea t  
and steam, i s  transformed i n t o  c i t y  gas (CO + 1/2 H z ) .  Combining 
t h i s  gas with 3/2 H z  of nuclear  o r i g i n  l eads  t o  methanol (CH30H). 
This process would e l iminate  a l l  carbon wastes i n  t he  form of 
C 0 2  releases. 
Two ways a r e  conceivable t o  produce hydrogen from nuclear  
power. E t e c t ~ o t y s i s  of water by nuclear  e l e c t r i c i t y  would be 
one opt ion.  A t  today 's  p r i c e s  t h i s  would be t oo  expensive. 
However, a t  US$30 per  b a r r e l  of o i l  equivalent  and assuming a 
reduct ion i n  t h e  cost of e l e c t r o l y s i s  by a f a c t o r  o f  3 t o  4-- 
which seems poss ib l e  i n  view of the i n t ens ive  research  programs 
under way--such a technology might become competit ive around 
2000. 
The second opt ion  is the rmo ty s i s  of water. One of t h e  most 
i n t e r e s t i n g  processes advanced s o  f a r  i s  associa ted  wi th  Westing- 
house i n  t h e  USA. A s  shown i n  Figure 33, s u l f u r i c  a c i d  is 
decomposed i n  a f i r s t  s t e p  i n t o  SO2, water,  and oxygen a t  a 
temperature of 8000 C .  In  t h e  second s t ep ,  with add i t i ona l  
water,  SO? is recomposed by e l e c t r o l y s i s  i n t o  s u l f u r i c  a c id  and 
hydrogen i s  re leased.  Some 85% of t h e  energy required  i s  process 
hea t  t o  be provided by HTRs. 
!I <850°C 1 - Basic Reaction HZSOq --. H 2 0  + SO2 + 7 O2 
II I 
II 
40.5Voltr j! - Electrolysis SO2 + 2H20 - H2S04 + Hz I 
FIGURE 33 Hybrid and thermolyt ic  water s p l i t t i n g .  SOURCE: 
Farbman and Brecher ( 1 9 7 5 )  ; Marchett i  ( 1973) . 
A Future  Global  Nuclear System 
I n  t h e  long-term asymptot ic  f u t u r e ,  n u c l e a r  energy might evo lve  
i n t o  a s t r u c t u r e  producing e l e c t r i c i t y  and l i q u i d  f u e l s  simul- 
taneously .  This  system is  desc r ibed  i n  F igure  34. FBRs might 
i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  provide e l e c t r i c i t y  and conver t  U-238 and 
thorium i n t o  Pu-239 and U-233. The plutonium would be  used a s  
FBR f u e l .  Uranium-233 would be  burned i n  HTRs which would de- 
l i v e r  t h e i r  p roces s  h e a t  f o r  hydrogen produc t ion  e i t h e r  f o r  d i r e c t  
use  i f  t h e  necessary  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  should  be  a v a i l a b l e ,  o r  f o r  
c o a l  convers ion.  
What would be t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  such a system? An assess- 
ment o f  such a n u c l e a r  f u e l  c y c l e  has  been nade s c a l i n g  up t h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  s tudy  by Avenhaus, H B f e l e ,  and bIcGrath mentioned above 
t o  f i t  t h e  s i z e  o f  10 TW(e) . Thi s  f u e l  c y c l e  would r e q u i r e  t h e  
fo l lowing  f a c i l i t i e s :  
3000 n u c l e a r  r e a c t o r s  w i t h  a r a t i n g  o f  3300 MW(e) each.  
94 f u e l  f a b r i c a t i o n  p l a n t s  o f  1500 tons /year .  
94 chemical  p rocess  p l a n t s  o f  1500 tons /year .  
650 i n t e r m e d i a t e  waste s t o r a g e  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  1000 m 3 
(seven f o r  each  r ep roces s ing  f a c i l i t y )  . 
a 47 f i n a l  waste  s t o r a g e  f a c i l i t i e s .  
F igure  35 g i v e s  a s i m p l i f i e d  summary o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  which are 
remarkable i n  s e v e r a l  r e s p e c t s .  
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  t h e  r e sou rces  requi rements  a r e  unusua l ly  low, 
less t han  8500 tons /year  o f  uranium and thorium. The same amount 
o f  e n e r  y gene ra t ed  by c o a l  would imply a y e a r l y  f low o f  some 3 1 8 . 3 ~ 1 0  t o n s  o f  c o a l .  These amounts o f  nuc l ea r  f u e l  cou ld  
e a s i l y  be  provided even i f  r e s i d u a l  d e p o s i t s  had t o  b e  mined. 
From a r e sou rces  p o i n t  o f  view, t h e  system would t h e r e f o r e  be 
s u s t a i n a b l e  o v e r  very  long pe r iods .  
The y e a r l y  o u t p u t  o f  f i s s i o n  p roduc t s  would be  i n  t h e  o r d e r  
of  6634 t o n s ,  o r  a cube of 20m x 2Om x 20m. Even t o d a y ' s  f i n a l  
waste s t o r a g e  techniques  should  be s u i t e d  f o r  t h i s  volume. 
Losses  t o  w a s t e . a r e  1536 t o n s  p e r  yea r .  Of t h i s  amount, 
144  t o n s  o f  plutonium, uranium, and a c t i n i d e s  are of  concern 
s i n c e  they  l e a d  t o  t i g h t  confinement requi rements .  Table  42 
summarizes t h e  confinement f a c t o r  necessary  t o  keep t h e  c o n t r i -  
bu t ion  o f  each r a d i a t i o n  sou rce  w e l l  below 1 %  of  t h e  n a t u r a l  
r a d i a t i o n  background, which f o r  a qu ick  o r i e n t a t i o n  can b e  
p laced  a t  110 mrem/year. Those c a l c u l a t i o n s  fol lowed t h e  method 
employed i n  t h e  s tudy  by Avenhaus, HBfele and McGrath (1975) 
which t a k e s  i n t o  account  t h e  r a d i o a c t i v e  i s o t o p e  annua l  f low,  
t h e  v a r i o u s  pathways t h e  r e l e a s e d  i s o t o p e s  t a k e  i n t o  t h e  environ-  
ment and whether  t h e  ove r l app ing  impac ts  o f  s e v e r a l  f a c i l i t i e s  
a r e  taken i n t o  account  o r  no t .  
I n  t h e  case of Kr85, confinement i n  r e a c t o r s  would have t o  
be improved by a f a c t o r  o f  3-10, which should  n o t  b e  so d i f f i c u l t .  
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t o  o b t a i n  confinement f a c t o r s  o f  100 i n  r e p r o c e s s i n g  
f a c i l i t i e s  r e q u i r e s  e f f o r t s  which appear  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  
f e a s i b l e .  
P r e s e n t  r e a c t o r  des igns  would b e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  w i t h  r ega rd  
t o  t r i t i u m  r e l e a s e s  i n t o  a i r  and wa te r .  Confinement f a c t o r s  of  
100 f o r  r e p r o c e s s i n g  p l a n t s  might be  necessary .  They a r e  pos- 
s i b l e  b u t  n o t  e a s i l y  ob ta ined .  
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TABLE 4 2  Required confinement factors for making each re la t ive  dose rate 
contribution well  below 1%. 
Reactors Reprocessing Fabrication 
Kr 85 Present designs, 10 0 
s l i g h t l y  improved - 3 H into  a i r  Present designs 100 - 3 H into water present designs loo9 - 
Pu into a i r  - lag 10;; Pu into water - 
Actinides - 1°9 lo 10 lo 3 10 1129 - - 10 - 
I t  has been proven i n  experimental p i l o t  p l a n t s  t h a t  con- 
finement f a c t o r s  of 109 fo r  reprocessing p l an t s  and 1010 i n  f ab r i -  
ca t ion  f a c i l i t i e s  should be achieved with regard t o  plutonium re- 
l eases .  Nevertheless,  confinement f ac to r s  of t h a t  o rder  a r e  
tough and w i l l  d e f i n i t e l y  requ i re  an achievable but  neverthe- 
less l a r g e  technological  e f f o r t .  A c t i v i t i e s  f o r  confining 
Pu-239 and o t h e r  a-emitting transuranium i so topes  appear t o  
p a r a l l e l  those  necessary f o r  plutonium. 
Iodine-129 i s  re leased only i n  very small  amounts but  decays 
with a ha l f  l i f e  of 17 x lo6 years .  Released i n t o  a i r  a t  a con- 
finement f a c t o r  of 103 t he  r e l a t e d  body burden would bu i ld  up 
a t  a r a t e  of 1.6 x 10-4 year  without  s a tu r a t i on .  The pos tu la ted  
l i m i t  dose r a t e  of 1% of t he  na tu r a l  background r ad i a t i on  would 
thus be reached a f t e r  a few decades. A higher confinement f a c t o r  
appears necessary, but  is d i f f i c u l t  t o  obta in .  The problem might 
be solved by choosing sites permit t ing  a s t ronger  d i l u t i on ,  f o r  
instance,  by r e l ea se  i n t o  sea  water.  
N o  e f f o r t  was made a t  IIASA t o  es t imate  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  r i s k  
of nuclear  acc idents .  This would have been beyond t h e  scope of 
our program which c e r t a i n l y  could no t  have contr ibuted  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
i n  a f i e l d  engaging much l a r g e r  spec ia l i zed  groups. Y e t ,  together  
with the  In t e rna t i ona l  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) an e f f o r t  was 
made t o  understand the  discrepancy between t h e  "object ive" r i s k s  
of nuclear  power and i t s  perception by t he  publ ic .  This work 
w i l l  be described i n  Chapter 4 .  
Conclusions 
Nuclear power is an e x i s t i n g  technology no longer  i n  i ts infancy. 
The t h e o r e t i c a l  po t en t i a l  is tremendous, and f o r  a l l  p r ac t i c a l  
purposes unlimited. To r e a l i z e  the  po t en t i a l  of a g lobal  opt ion,  
however, o the r  technologies than t he  present  LWR must be imple- 
mented. The LWR, which i s  t he  main represen ta t ive  of nuclear  
technology today, cannot overcome t h e  uranium resource l imi ta-  
t i ons .  
Several  such new technologies  a r e  foreseeable .  The most 
l i k e l y  t o  mate r ia l i ze  now a s  a f u l l y  commercial energy source i s  
t he  LMFBR. Y e t  even t h i s  r eac to r  type would come too l a t e  t o  
con t r ibu te  a share  on t he  order  of 10 TW(e) (capac i ty )  by 2030-- 
i f  it is used i n  a c l a s s i c a l  r e ac to r  LMFBWLWR s t ra tegy .  Only 
i f  U-233, bred from thorium, i s  used to replace U-235, and wi th  
t h e  help of f a s t  breeders  t he  goal  of 10 TW(e) by 2030 would be 
reached. 
A 10 TW(e) capaci ty  requ i res  nuclear  energy t o  produce more 
than j u s t  e l e c t r i c i t y .  Hydrogen from e l e c t r o l y s i s  o r  t h e m o l y s i s  
is t h e  most s u i t e d  candidate.  Combined with coal ,  a l i q u i d  sec- 
ondary energy carrier--methanol--involving l i t t l e  change i n  t h e  
present  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  could then become ava i l ab l e  a s  a replace-  
ment f o r  o i l  products. 
Af ter  t h e  asymptotic s tage  is reached, a 10 TW(e) nuclear  
system would p r a c t i c a l l y  be resource independent. But t h e r e  is 
a p r i c e  t o  pay f o r  t h i s  independence. Radioact ivi ty w i l l  have 
t o  be handled and con t ro l l ed  successful ly .  Calcula t ions  show 
t h a t  t h i s  should be poss ib le  without  t o o  heavy an impact on t h e  
environment i f  a r e a l i s t i c  technologica l  e f f o r t  is made to o b t a i n  
adequate confinement r a t e s .  A r e s i d u a l  impact w i l l ,  however, re- 
main. Whether t h i s  p r i c e  is high o r  l o w  can only be judged i n  
t h e  l i g h t  of poss ib le  a l t e r n a t i v e s  and the s i g n i f i c a n t  b e n e f i t s  
t o  be derived from t h e  large-scale  use of nuclear  power. 
THE SOLAR OPTION 
The "Resource" 
Of t he  renewable opt ions ,  only one, d i r e c t  s o l a r  energy, is i n  
p r i nc ip l e  capable o f  providing by i t s e l f  very l a rge  amounts of 
energy i n  a medium-tern fu tu re .    bout 25,000 TWyr/yr of sunshine 
reach t he  e a r t h ' s  land surface .  This,  rechargeable and, f o r  p r a c t i -  
c a l  purposes, unl imited p o t e n t i a l  pu t s  direct i n s o l a t i o n  i n t o  t h e  
same ba l lpa rk  a s  nuclear  o r  f o s s i l  energy. 
The "resoureen is q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  Like a l l  renewable 
sources it i s  charac te r i zed  by a low densi ty .  Figure 36 i l l u s -  
t r a t e s  t h e  g lobal  ho r i zon t a l  i n s o l a t i o n  values  f o r  severa l  US 
and European cities.  The average values  are c l o s e r t o  each o t h e r  
than one might expect ;  f o r  temperate and desert regions they 
d i f f e r  merely by a f a c t o r  of 2. I n  Europe, f o r  ins tance ,  they 
vary between 2-5 kWh/m2/dayr with t h e  most t y p i c a l  value being 
3 kWh/m2/day, whereas i n  t he  sunny t r o p i c a l  and d e s e r t  regions 
the  annual average reaches values around 5-6 kwh/mZ/day. IY com- 
par ison o f  seasonal  maxima and minima produces more dramatic 
values.  I n  Phoenix, Arizona, f o r  ins tance ,  t he  r a t i o  between 
winter  and summer i n s o l a t i o n  is merely 1 :2, i n  Europe t he  r a t i o  
i s  on the  o rde r  of 1:8. Therefore, t h e  seasonal  cyc le  i s  much 
more pronounced i n  temperate zones than i n  a reas  i n  proximity to 
the  equator .  
A much g r e a t e r  divergence cha rac t e r i ze s  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  
airect beam rad i a t i on .  I n  c e n t r a l  and nor thern  Europe i n  some 
winter  months a s  much a s  70-855 o f  t h e  i n s o l a t i o n  i n  winter  i s  
d i f f u s e  sun l igh t .  
These physica l  condi t ions  immediately point  up two conclusions.  
F i r s t ,  t h e  low dens i ty  of t he  source makes it necessary not  only 
t o  c o l l e c t  bu t  t o  concentra te  t h e  n a t u r a l  energy flow. The energy 
thus  obtained is hea t ,  a form of energy d i f f i c u l t  t o  t r anspo r t  
and s t o r e .  Wherever t h i s  hea t  cannot be used d i r e c t l y  it has t o  
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FIGURE 36.  Comparison of global  i r r a d i a t i o n  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  c i t i e s ,  
1970.  
be transformed i n t o  a  s t o r a b l e  and t r a n s p o r t a b l e  energy c a r r i e r .  
Second, it i s  obvious without s u b s t a n t i a l  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  t h e  
economics of  any la rge-sca le  s o l a r  system w i l l  r equ i re  s i t i n g  it 
i n  t h e  sunny a r e a s  of  t h e  world. Accordingly, t h e  use of s o l a r  
energy could m a t e r i a l i z e  on s e v e r a l  l e v e l s :  
d i r e c t ,  consumer-oriented l o c a l  uses ,  c e n t r a l i z e d  o r  
decentralized; 
c e n t r a l i z e d  uses wi th in  a  s e c t i o n a l  o r  reg ional  frame- 
work; and 
a la rge-sca le  use wi th in  a  g loba l  framework. 
Decentralized Local U s e  : The S o l a r  House 
As p a r t  of  a  case  study analyzing t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  an enhanced 
use of s o l a r  energy i n  t h e  Federal  Republic of Germany (FRG), 
sponsored by t h e  Federal  Minis try f o r  Research and Technology, 
Bonn, C.R. B e l l ,  F. Jgger  and W. Korzen (1977) examined i n  d e t a i l  
t he  small-scale  a p p l i c a t i o n s  of s o l a r  technology i n  the  FRG, i .e.,  
a t y p i c a l  h ighly  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  n a t i o n  wi th  average i n s o l a t i o n .  
The most promising technology i d e n t i f i e d  comprises roof col-  
l e c t o r s  f o r  space and water hea t ing .  Thei r  use,  however, is se- 
vere ly  cons t ra ined  by the  phys ica l  cond i t ions  of temperate zones. 
Figure 37 compares monthly i n s o l a t i o n  sha res  averaged over  
a t e n  year  pe r iod  and the  space h e a t  demand f o r  s e v e r a l  Aust r ian  
c i t i e s .  I n  June, 15% of t h e  t o t a l  y e a r l y  i n s o l a t i o n  a r e  a v a i l -  
ab le ,  i n  December only 2 % .  The space h e a t  demand, by c o n t r a s t  
a t t a i n s  i ts maximum i n  December/January and i s  c l o s e  t o  zero i n  
summer. Any s i g n i f i c a n t  development of s o l a r  energy f o r  space 
h e a t  purposes w i l l  obviously r e q u i r e  s to rage  and s u b s t a n t i a l  backup. 
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FIGURE 38 Development of the  s o l a r  house. 
This  makes w a t e r  h e a t i n g  appear a s  t h e  most probable  form of 
s o l a r  energy use  i n  houses i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  I n  t h e  medium 
term, space h e a t i n g  could  be in t roduced-- together  w i t h  a h o s t  
o f  suppor t ing  measures, such a s  i n s u l a t i o n ,  p a s s i v e  s o l a r  sys tems ,  
o r  h e a t  pumps. F i n a l l y ,  l i nkage  o f  a d e c e n t r a l i z e d  s o l a r  elec- 
t r i c i t y  p roduc t ion  t o  t h e  g r i d  i s  conce ivab le  i n  t h e  very long 
term. F igu re  38 summarizes t h e s e  phases  i n  t h e  development o f  
a u se r -o r i en t ed  solar technology. I n  a l l  cases, however, a 
backup system r e l y i n g  on f u e l s ,  g a s ,  o r  e l e c t r i c i t y  i s  necessary .  
S t o r a g e  requirements  i n c r e a s e  w i t h  the percen tage  of h e a t  
provided by s o l a r  energy.  Figure  39 demonstra tes  t h e  fundamental  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between c o l l e c t o r  a r e a ,  s t o r a g e  s i z e ,  and 
s t o r a g e  t i m e  f o r  a one-family house consuming 18 MWh/yr. Up t o  
50% o f  t h e  s p a c e  h e a t  demand can be provided by some 50 m2 o f  
c o l l e c t o r s  and requires r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  s t o r a g e ,  a few cubic-  
meters o v e r  a few days. About 50%--that  is, should  solar cove r  
t h e  major p a r t  o f  t h e  space  h e a t  demand--collector a r e a  and 
s t o r a g e  requi rements  i n c r e a s e  r a p i d l y .  A t  90% s o l a r  supply ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  c o l l e c t o r  a r e a  is on t h e  o r d e r  o f  160 m2 and s t o r -  
age on t h e  o r d e r  o f  80-100 m3 f o r  a s t o r a g e  t i m e  of  a few months. 
What a r e  t h e  c o s t s  o f  such systems? Assuming t h a t  t h e  in -  
vestment c o s t s  f o r  a s o l a r  h e a t i n g  system meeting 50% o f  demand 
would be  on the o r d e r  of  US$14,000 f o r  a one-family house,  t h i s  
dev ice  would make up 10% o f  t h e  t o t a l  b u i l d i n g  c o s t  (F igu re  4 0 ) .  
Seventy p e r c e n t  s o l a r  supply would raise t h i s  s h a r e  t o  20% and 
a t  90% s o l a r  supply it would be 40-55s of t h e  t o t a l  investment  
c o s t s  f o r  a one-family house. 
How do t h e s e  f i g u r e s  compare w i t h  t h e  inves tments  f o r  a 
convent iona l  o i l  h e a t i n g  system? I f  t h e  o i l - s p e c i f i c  component 
system i s  e s t i m a t e d  t o  c o s t  $2100, r e p l a c i n g  50% o f  f u e l  h e a t  by 
s o l a r  would i n c r e a s e  t h e  c o s t  by a f a c t o r  o f  4-8, r e p l a c i n g  90%, 
by a f a c t o r  o f  15-30. 
Of cou r se ,  t h e s e  estimates are h i g h l y  u n c e r t a i n  s i n c e  new 
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  developments, mass produc t ion ,  etc. ,  might reduce  
t h e  s o l a r  sys tem c o s t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y .  The above diagram d e s c r i b e s  
a bandwidth c a p t u r i n g  t h e s e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s .  The upper l i m i t s  a r e  
cons idered  " r e a l i s t i c " ,  t h e  lower ones  i n d i c a t e  v e r y  o p t i m i s t i c  
assumptions.  Ne i the r  l i m i t  i s  unders tood  t o  be  a b s o l u t e  s i n c e  
f u t u r e  s o l a r  space  and wate r  h e a t i n g  might be  cheaper  b u t  a l s o  
more expensive.  
Af t e r  t h i s  c a v e a t ,  w e  may conclude t h a t  f o r  t h e  FRG t h e  
op t imal  u s e  o f  s o l a r  space  h e a t i n g  would be  approximately  40-60% 
o f  t h e  h e a t  demand, i n  newly cons t ruc t ed ,  we l l  i n s u l a t e d  houses.  
Worldwide, c l i m a t i c  and phys i ca l ,  c o n d i t i o n s  might raise o r  lower 
t h e  percen tages .  Thus, w e  e s t i m a t e  t h a t  a g r e s s i v e  p o l i c i e s  i n  
t h e  Western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  r eg ions  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  p o s s i b l e  con- 
t r i b u t i o n  o f  s o l a r  space  and water h e a t i n g  t o  50-705 o f  t h e  
s p e c i f i c  demand o f  s u i t a b l e  newly c o n s t r u c t e d  b u i l d i n g s .  I n  t h e  
S o v i e t  Union and t h e  o t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s  o f  t h e  E a s t e r n  
sphere  o n l y  some 30% i s  expec ted ,  due t o  t h e  h igh  s h a r e s  o f  
d i s t r i c t  h e a t  and g e n e r a l l y  unfavorab le  c o n d i t i o n s .  
Assuming no r e t r o f i t t i n g  on t h e  one hand, b u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  s o l a r  equipment f o r  atZ post-1975 c e n t r a l l y  hea t ed  s i n g l e -  
fami ly  houses and low rise commercial b u i l d i n g s ,  s o l a r  space  and 
wate r  h e a t i n g  might p rov ide  up t o  0 .2  TWyr/yr o f  f i n a l  energy i n  
~ollmtor area lm2) Storage volume lm 3 1.
a .  . . very optimistii cost assumptions 
b . . . realistic con aumptions 
'annual mew: 1 m3 2 1 day of storage 
FIGURE 39 Collector area and storage volume o r  storage t i m e  as  
a function of  the share of  so lar  energy i n  a s ing le  family house. 
a . . . very optimistic 
b . . . "realistic" 
.oil ylecific portion $2.100 
t $140,000 
FIGURE 4 0  Relative investment c o s t s ,  share of so lar .  
i n  t h e  developed reg ions .  This  cor responds  t o  s l i g h t l y  less 
than 2% of  t h e  t o t a l  f i n a l  energy demand o f  t h e  High s c e n a r i o  
i n  t h o s e  r eg ions ,  which p u t s  t h e  o r d e r  o f  magnitude e s t ima ted  
i n  t h e  s e c t i o n  on renewables i n t o  p e r s p e c t i v e .  
Y e t ,  t o  r e a l i z e  t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f o r t  w i l l  be 
necessary t o  reduce t h e  c o s t s  which today  a r e  s t i l l  h i g h e r  by a 
f a c t o r  of 2-3 t h a n  convent iona l  systems.  
Local  C e n t r a l i z e d  U s e s  
Other  t han  t h e  s o l a r  house, s o l a r  d i s t r i c t  h e a t i n g  systems re- 
p r e s e n t  a type  o f  l o c a l l y  c e n t r a l i z e d  use .  For s m a l l  communi- 
ties, t h i s  use  can be conceived t o  be  u s e r  o r i e n t e d ,  b u t  n o t  s o  
i n  l a r g e r  s e t t l e m e n t s .  It  can t h u s  be  cons ide red  a s  a t r a n s i -  
t i o n  between use r -o r i en t ed  and commercial a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  s o l a r  
energy.  
W. Xorzen (1979) has  s t u d i e d  t h i s  o p t i o n  by ana lyz ing  i n  
some d e t a i l  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  i n t r o d u c i n g  it i n  Laxenburg, 
t h e  l o c a l  IIASA community o f  about  2000 i n h a b i t a n t s .  The com- 
munity is w e l l  s u i t e d  f o r  d i s t r i c t  h e a t i n g  as 80% of t h e  bu i ld -  
i n g s  i n  t h e  c e n t e r  are a l r eady  equipped w i t h  c e n t r a l  hea t ing .  
Its y e a r l y  f i n a l  energy  demand f o r  space  h e a t i n g  is 8.14 GWh. 
To provide  100% o f  t h e  community's c e n t e r  w i th  s o l a r  d i s t r i c t  
h e a t  would r e q u i r e  a l and  a r e a  o f  50,000 m2 and a s t o r a g e  c a p a c i t y  
of 175,000 m3. The c o s t  o f  t h e  system would amount t o  AS 250 
m i l l i o n  ( 19 x lo6  US$)  compared t o  a cost of  AS 12 m i l l i o n  
( 0.9 x 106 US$) f o r  a convent iona l  d i s t r i c t  h e a t i n g  system 
(Table  43 ) .  The major c o s t  f a c t o r  i s  s t o r a g e .  
A lesser s o l a r  s h a r e  i n  t h e  h e a t  supply  o f  50% reduces  t h e  
s t o r a g e  requi rements  o v e r p r o p o r t i o n a l l y ,  b u t  t h e  system c o s t  
o f  less than  100 m i l l i o n  i s  s t i l l  p r o h i b i t i v e l y  h igh .  
Add i t i ona l  a n a l y s e s  o f  o t h e r ,  l a r g e r  communities i nvo lv ing  
longe r  supply d i s t a n c e s  harden t h i s  conc lus ion .  
I t  is worth n o t i n g ,  however, t h a t  t h e  l and  requi rements ,  
which a t  f i r s t  g l ance  appear  very  h igh ,  are n o t  r e a l l y  a con- 
s t r a i n t  f o r  smatler communities. A c a r e f u l  s tudy  o f  s e v e r a l  
Aus t r i an  agglomera t ions  has  demonstra ted t h a t  enough unused l a n d  
is a v a i l a b l e  t o  h a r v e s t  s o l a r  energy f o r  d i s t r i c t  h e a t i n g ,  should  
i t  be p o s s i b l e  t o  reduce c o s t s  t o  an  a c c e p t a b l e  l e v e l .  But we 
do n o t  f o r e s e e  t h a t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  p r o g r e s s  would a l l ow t h i s  t o  
be  achieved i n  o u r  s tudy  per iod .  Even so t h e  technology i n  ques- 
t i o n  would s e r v e  o n l y  a very  l i m i t e d  h e a t  market.  
S o l a r  Energy on Regional  and Nat iona l  Leve ls  
A s i g n i f i c a n t  use  o f  t h e  l and  a v a i l a b l e  r e q u i r e s  t h e  produc t ion  
o f  energy c a r r i e r s  t h a t  can be  i n t e g r a t e d  i n t o  t h e  r e g i o n a l  o r  
n a t i o n a l  supply systems,  t hus  opening new markets .  I n  t h e  very 
long-term f u t u r e ,  pho tosyn thes i s  i s  conce ivab le  t o  be employed 
t o  produce,  d i r e c t l y  from s u n l i g h t ,  a  s t o r a b l e  and t r a n s p o r t a b l e  
energy c a r r i e r .  I n  t h e  n e a r e r  term f u t u r e ,  two t e c h n o l o g i e s  
cou ld  be a p p l i e d :  s o l a r  thermal  e l e c t r i c  convers ion  ( S T E C ) ,  and, 
perhaps ,  s o l a r  p h o t o v o l t a i c  c e l l s .  
I CURRENT HEATING CHARACTERISTICS I 80% radiator central heating, 20% individual stoves I 
Secondary energy demand 10,000 Goal/yr = 11.63 GWhr/yr 
Efficiency 70% 
I End use energy demand 8.14 GWhr(th)/yr I 
Connection to Conventional District Heating 
System 
Cost 12 million Austrian Shillings 
100% Solar Local District Heating 
Efficiency 30% 
Minimum collector area 24,667 m2 
Land area 50,000 m2 
Storage volume 175,000 m3 
Cost - 250 million Austrian 
Shillings 
TABLE 43 Area and Capital requirements for a 100% solar local district 
heating, Laxenburg (IIASA, Monastery, G e M e b a u  Herzog 
Albrecht Str., Neighboring Buildings) 
In a case study of Austria, N. Weyss (1977) considered the 
possibilities of employing the solar tower concept;illustrated 
in Figure 41, to produce electricity in a temperate zone. 
FIGURE 41 Solar Tower 
Using 175 w/m2 as an estimate for average suns ine, and 
assuming very optimistic collector costs of USIS0 'm and an 
8% discount rate, the payback time for a solar toder installation 
turns out to be at present oil prices less than lb years. It 
comes as a surprise that electrical peak power  pr duction seems 
to be nearing competitiveness even in countries with basically un- 
favorable insolation conditions. 
But there are several caveats. For one, the solar tower 
technology employed is still far from being mastered. Collector 
costs, probably the biggest factor, are still highly uncertain 
and the values given here assume technological progress as well 
as mass production. Moreover, so far only peak power production 
has been envisaged to require no storage but to be limited by 
the grid's capacity to accommodate this type of production. 
If one pushes these reservations aside, there is still storaae 
to be considered. Our studies have shown that this constraint 
might be overcome by coupling solar energy and hydrostorage. Yet 
only very few areas of the world would be able to use this option, 
and the economic ecological price for a significant use would be 
high. For instance, an electricity generation comparable to 
Austria's present volume of production would require building 
6 hydrostorage facilities of 0.6TWh capacity each. This scheme 
would have severe ecological impacts on the Alpine region, 
2 besides the aesthetic burden of some 250 km of solar power 
stations covering the most scenic mountain landscape. 
PhotovoZta ics  have definite advantages over the tower 
concept. Since they are modular they can be employed in a de- 
centralized fashion involving separate and smaller patches of 
land. There are no moving parts and they convert both diffuse 
and direct sunlight into electricity. Their main constraint is 
economics. Today's cost of 10,000 US8 per peak kW(e) for 
silicone arrays are prohibitive and must become smaller by an 
order of magnitude. In spite of the recent substantial progress 
made by projects supported by the US Department of Energy, much 
remains to be done. To become competitive with STEC, the cost 
of photovoltaics would have to be reduced to 50% of the USDOE 
1986 goal of $O.SO/peak watt. But even if the economic constraint 
should be overcome, the use of photovoltaics for electricity 
generation in temperate zones will be limited. Photovoltaic 
systems would, in a sophisticated manner, have to be inter- 
connected with the general grid in order to absorb the dispersed 
electrcitiy generated, and it would have to be backed up by large 
storage facilities. Compared with STEC, the photovoltaic 
situation would be better with regard to ecological impacts, 
worse in view of the grid problem, and qualitatively the same with 
respect to storage. 
It applies to both technologies that they still would have to 
face competition by cheaper products from other sources if they 
were to be used for electricity generation only. 
The Large-Scale Use of Solar Energy on a Global Level 
As we have seen, all the possible uses of solar are constrained 
by various factors. Heating of homes and district heating are 
limited by the mismatch of demand and supply, causing high storage 
requirements that impose economic and physical limits on the use 
of solar. 
Local electricity generation is probably only feasible for 
peak load, though perhaps some baseload can be accommodated in 
regions with a high hydrogen storage potential. A truly large 
scale use of solar energy, therefore, requires above all a system 
which will permit the decoupling of solar energy from local 
demand patterns and physical conditions. 
This means going to locations in sunny, arid regions where 
the "resource" can be optimally used for STEC as well as for 
photovoltaic cells. The use of large areas of waste land and a 
concurrent improvement in the economic conditions of generally 
poor regions are promising aspects of such a scheme. In order 
to implement it the sunlight would have to be converted into 
a suitable secondary energy carrier. 
Two ways seem possible: electricity generation and trans- 
mission and production of hydrogen or another fuel, far away 
from the consumption centers. High voltage DC lines permit 
electricity transmission at low losses over about one thousand 
km. As regards the European communities, for instance, it would 
become possible to build solar power stations in Southern Europe-- 
Portugal, Spain, Italy, and in some parts of France--that are to 
serve consumers in central or Northern Europe. A concept realiz- 
able in a more distant future is to employ underwater cables for 
transmitting the electricity from Northern Africa to Europe. 
J. Weingart (1978), using several studies of STEC under- 
taken by various U.5. institutions, and R. Caputo (1976) have 
estimated the cost of such electricity to be in the range of 
US$ 0.04-0.1 per kW(e)h. The related transmission cost would 
be on the order of US$ O.Ol/kW(e)h. 
The relative steady solar supply in the harvesting areas 
as well as the integration of several sources into an overall 
system would facilitate the use of this electricity in base or 
intermediate load. However, substantial advances in central 
storage technology as well as in load leveling management are 
still required. Production would not fully be decoupled from 
the demand side. 
In contrast, the large-scale production of hydrogen and 
liquid fuels that involve long distance transport and seasonal 
storage imply a complete decoupling of the solar source and 
energy needs. 
Hydrogen can be transported in pipelines over continental 
distances of 5000 km, which is fortunate since all large consumers, 
except for Japan, are less than that away from the sunny zones. 
The cost would be in an acceptable range: approximately US$3/ 
barrel of oil equivalent (Beghi et al. 1972) transported over 
5000 km in 48-inch pipelines. Storage does not pose major 
problems either. Aquifers and natural formations, such as 
depleted oil and gas fields, provide sufficiently large geo- 
physical storage possibilities to serve the needs for years or 
even decades. It would add some US$1 per barrel of oil equivalent. 
On the consumer side, the production of hydrogen would add addi- 
tional flexibility. It could be used directly for energy purposes, 
converted into electricity, or used for enhancing fossil fuels 
(allothermal methanol production from coal). 
Two ways of producing this hydrogen are conceivable. One 
is to use central receivers for a thermochemical splitting of 
water (a forseeable but not yet available technology. The cost 
range could be US$32-82/barrel of oil equivalent at an insolation 
of 2750kWh/m2 year. The other possibility is to employ electro- 
lysis powered by STEC or photovoltaics. With STEC, costs would 
be approximately US$63-103/barrel oil equivalent. The cost of 
photovoltaic hydrogen is much more uncertain. Should such arrays 
become available at a cost of US$2000 per average kW(e), hydrogen 
could be produced at an order of magnitude of US$50/barrel of oil 
equivalent. 
An alternative to hydrogen production would be the production 
of a fuel, for instance methanol, by combining coal with solar- 
produced hydrogen. This would presuppose either proximity of 
the solar sites to large coal deposits or substantial improvements 
in coal transport technology. Figure 42 compares the cost of 
methanol deriving half its energy content from coal and half 
from either solar electrolytic or solar thermolytic hydrogen, 
as a function of the coal price. At USdlOO per ton of coal, 
thermolytic hydrogen, as opposed to electrolytic hydrogen, would 
reduce the cost range to 30 to US$54/barrel of oil equivalent. 
Methanol from coal directly would cost about US$42/barrel of 
oil equivalent. 
The factors constraining the deployment of these technologies 
are technological, physical and institutional in nature. Both 
STEC and photovoltaics have not yet reached a maturity permitting 
their commercialization. For instance, STEC development is 
estimated to take several decades and an R & D effort of the 
order of US$ 1 billion. Institutionally, the location of a 
significant portion of the world's energy supply system in 
desert areas, will require a stable development of international 
trade patterns, guaranteeing the safety of large investments in 
foreign countries and presupposing a general atmosphere of 
trust between the South and the North. 
On a multi-terawatt scale, the construction, operation, 
and decommissioning of solar plants covering hundreds of 
thousands of km2 will result in significant environmental 
impacts. The huge materials requirements will generate secondary 
effects in mining areas or, for instance, in steel production. 
The detrimental effects will partly be counterbalanced by the 
availability of clean energy carriers elsewhere. Furthermore, 
we must expect questions of a "fairn distribution of those 
burdens to arise. A workshop held at IIASA in 1976 (Williams, 
Kromer and Weingart 1977) examined the possible impacts of large- 
scale solar conversion on the climate. Large-scale deployment 
of STEC would lead to regional changes in the surface heat 
balance and hydrological characteristics, each possibly affect- 
ing climatological conditions. 
Physically, the very high materials demand seems to be the 
most stringent factor. For the dispersed quality of the source 
requires large surfaces to be covered with materials. Even if one 
assumes substantial technological improvements to arise that cut 
down on the materials demand, it is unlikely that systems at a 
material density of less than 10kg/mL could sufficiently with- 
stand weather-imposed stresses over a period of decades. A 
system with a material density of 10kg/m2 might be, for example, 
a thin tough film of photovoltaics. Today's heliostat designs 
are characterized (Saumon 1977; Boeing 1977) by a material 
density of 30-&0ku/m2 of steel and qlass. Tq +hat fiuure the 
concrete used in the heliostats adds 190kg/m, and the rest of the 
plant adds 210kq/m2. Figure 4 3  shows material requirements as a 
function of annual installed capacity. At an introduction rate 
of 0.6 TW yr/yr, a solar thermal chemical system would have a 
yearly requirement of 1000 million tons of concrete plus 100 
million tons of steel. This compares to an annual (1975) lobal 
production of 700 x 106 tons/year of concrete and 630 x 10 
tons/year of steel. 
? 
The introduction of solar energy into the market will depend 
on how fast these constraints can be mastered and how the general 
competitive situation among energy sources evolves. In the 
initial phase, we can expect that external support might help to 
overcome somewhat higher costs. Yet in the long term full 
commercial maturity is a must. 
C. Marchetti (Marchetti and Nakicenovic 1978) (see also 
Chapter 5) has shown that market penetration ratios in the 
energy field are remarkably constant. Assuming optimistically 
that by 2000 the direct uses of solar energy would have captured 
1% of the world primary energy market and applying historical 
rates of market introduction, solar energy could reach 6% of the 
market around 2030 as illustrated in Figure 1 (reproduced here 
as Figure 44) . 
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FIGURE 42 Methanol generation cost. SOURCE: Caputo ( 1  979) . 
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Conclusions 
The good news of this analysis is that solar energy can con- 
tribute realistically on a significant scale in the next century 
to the world's energy supply. Though a large-scale use of solar 
energy would entail environmental and other impacts, it would 
be probably more palatable psychologically than the large-scale 
use of other forms of energy. Furthermore, there is a broad 
spectrum of possible applications ranging from local and user- 
oriented (but demand limited) technologies to truly global 
systems. 
The bad news is that solar power harvested on a significant 
scale will be available to us only well after the turn of the 
century. It would be unrealistic to expect it to substantially 
alleviate the energy problem of the coming decades. Yet, during 
this time much effort will have to go into developing and 
deploying solar energy so that by the middle of the 21st 
century the transition from the natural endowment of fossil 
fuels to man-made endowments can progress smoothly. 

4 RISK AND HEALTH 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of each of the energy technologies described in the 
previous chapter is constrained by various infrastructural, 
technological, institutional, economic, and societal factors. 
Most of these factors are specific to a given technology, such 
as radioactivity to the nuclear option, CO to the fossil 
option, etc; some of those factors which ale of a more general 
nature concern all supply alternatives in similar ways. ENP 
has studied several of those latter, so to speak "global", 
constraints. The interactions between energy production and the 
climate system were the subject of a UNEP/IIASA project called 
"Energy and Climate", FP-0700-75-03 (855) (Williams and Kriimer 
1976). The study of market penetration phenomena, i.e. the 
factors limiting the speed at which new technologies can be 
introduced, were examined under a contract from Foundation 
Volkswagenwerk (Marchetti and Nakicenovic 1978); this study 
is briefly described in Chapter 5. 
UNEP/IIASA collaboration on both the environmental risks 
and the health effects possibly associated with various energy 
systems has been the focus of our research on the common con- 
straints of energy technologies. Health and environmental 
risks,of course, are interlinked and, therefore, a joint project 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and IIASA was 
established in 1975 to assess both subjects. In addition, a 
statistical evaluation was carried out to look into possible 
correlations between energy consumption and health as measured 
by longevity and infant mortality. 
The magnitude and sophistication of the problem that had 
to be attacked--and for which often new ground had to be broken-- 
made it clearly impossible to exhaustively examine the related 
issues within the contractual period. Yet we still believe that 
our results have contributed to obtaining a better grasp and 
understanding of the risks and hazards involved in energy 
systems as well as to laying the groundwork for future research. 
THE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH RISKS 
The Components of the Study 
Substantial effort was devoted towards building a framework 
within which the assessment of risks could be carried out. 
Figure 44 illustrates the components of the scheme developed. 
F.1GURE 44 A risk assessment framework. 
Risk estimation deals with the identification and quanti- 
fication of risks. It aims at comprehending the objective con- 
sequences of operating a given technological system, describing 
the events that arise (emission, accidents, etc.), the probability 
of their occurrences, the effects (deaths, increase in illness, 
etc.) and their distribution within the population affected, as 
well as the uncertainties of the estimates. This field being 
by far the most widely studied aspect of the risk problem, our 
project concentrated on the survey and analysis of the results 
of past research efforts; thus duplication was to be avoided and 
it was attempted to conserve scarce resources rather than spend 
them on research for which other groups are much better suited. 
Here one remark is in order. In the past, the methodology 
used to prepare safety decisions, for instance, relied heavily 
on "trial and error;" that is to say, risk was quantified through 
historical experience and only then controlled. This procedure 
is definitely unacceptable in the context of global energy 
systems; for experimenting with the climate or with nuclear 
power station accidents is just impossible. por global, long- 
term energy systems approaches will have to be developed that 
are based on a frame of reference other than experimental results 
proving or disproving a working hypothesis (Hlfele 1975). 
Our project also focused on risk evaluation, for identifi- 
cation and quantification of risks is but a preliminary step to 
the comparison of risks in all their dimensions to various 
attributes of the energy system, such as operating costs, reli- 
ability, etc. Risk evaluation is the compocent of risk assess- 
ment accounting for subjective aspects. This issue is complex. 
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HOW does one compare nuclear proliferation risks to the risks 
associated with a major blackout, or risks faced by the present 
generations to those affecting future generations? 
The "balancing of apples and oranges" will ultimately have 
to depend on subjective value judgments and preferences. Even, 
if it is thus impossible to adopt a single, objectively correct 
procedure, every effort should be made to identify techniques 
that might help to formally and systematically incorporate sub- 
jective values into the complex and multidimensional procedure 
of energy policy decision making. 
Finally, risk management addresses the organizational and 
political aspects of the environmental and societal management 
of energy systems. How does one, in practice, in order to 
negotiate and implement an energy strategy, handle the problems 
arising when competing groups disagree (more often than not) on 
both the estimation and the evaluation of certain risks? At 
IIASA, we focused on one important part of risk management: 
the dynamics of regulatory agencies responsible for setting 
standards for energy systems. 
Quantified Risks of Energy Systems 
C. Starr et al. (1972) has suggested to employ the average 
risk of acquiring a fatal disease as a possible yardstick for 
determining acceptable risk levels. Many accepted technologies 
indeed involve risks comparable to this level, which Starr 
found to be 10-6 per person and hour: three weeks of work in 
a clothing factory, three hours of work in mining, 100 km travel 
by car or 500 km by plane, each of these risks involves the 
probability of one fatality in a million. 
In comparison, Table 43 summarizes the health risks associa- 
ted with the production of 1 GWyr of energy from coal, oil, 
natural gas, light water reactors, and solar thermal power 
stations. Although these data are derived from a relevant 
literature survey some caveats must be made: 
*The data on the effects of sulfur dioxide, particulates, 
and radiation exposure have been based on linear nonthreshold 
extrapolations from high level acute exposure. 
*Because acceptable data are not available the effects of 
vanadium releases, for example, from oil-fired plants, or 
radioactive emission from fossil fuels, in general had to be 
neglected. 
In spite of these uncertainties, the data permit a ranking 
of the various systems considered according to their health 
impacts. As shown in Figure 45, coal and oil appear to have 
the largest impacts on the public, whereas coal and solar-thermal 
systems pose the highest threat to the workers concerned. For 
a one-dimensional comparison one fatality has been assumed to 
equal a loss of 6000 man-days. Of course, much more research 
is required to narrow down the uncertainties (which equal six 
times the lower estimates in the case of coal and oil, for 
instance) and to incorporate those uncertainties that cannot 
be removed into a single parameter for measuring risks. 
Table 43 Estimated Human Health Effects from 1 GWyr (8.76 x 10' kWhr) of Electricity Generation 
Accidental Inluries 
- 
(in man-days lost) Accidental Deaths- Fatal Diseases 
Power Plant Type Occupational Public Occupational Public Occupational Public 
Coal 
Fuel supply 1,920-3,100 1.2-1.8 5.6-8.4 
Transport fuel & materials 640-800 1,500-1,800 0.63-0.73 2.7-3.8 
Normal operation 790 0.05 3.2-22 
Construction 590 0.17 0.006-0.04a 
Total 3,940-5,360 1,500-1.800 2.0-2.8 2.7-3.8 5.6-8.4 3-22 
Oi 1 
Fuel supply 3,850 0.38 
Transport Fuel 8 materials 7 50 2- 3 0.071 0.0048 
Normal operation 110 0.027 1-7 
Construction 4 40 - 0.12 - 0.004-0.03a 
Total 5,140 2-3 0.6 0.0048 1-7 
Gas 
Fuel supply 2,200 2,200 0.23 0.16 
Transport fuel & materials 190 2 0.027 0.003 
Normal operation 110 0.027 0.003-0.02 
Construction 4 - 0.054 0.002-0.014~ - 
To ta 1 2,700 2,200 0.34 0.163 0.005-0.034 
Light Water Reactor 
Fuel & reprocessing 300-400 0.12 0.05 
Transport fuel & materials 5 6 0.0025 0.011 
Normal operation 10 0.03 0.032 0.03 
Construction 310 - 0.002 0.003-0.021a 
- - 
Total 620-720 6 0.23 0.01 1 0.082 0.033-0.051 
Solar thermal 
Material supply 450 0.071 0.05-0.35~ 
Transport of materials 32-44 75-90 0.032-0.037 0.14-0.19 
Construct plant 3400 0.95 
Construct storaye 580-2,300 0.28-0.29 
Normal operation 2,200-2,U00 - 0.0-1.0 
Tvtal 6,700-9.000 75-90 2.1-2.4 0.14-0.19 0.05-0.35 
a Resulting From emissions from coal that was used to melt metals, etc. 
SOURCES: Estimates based on data from U.S. Department of Labor and also on assessments of the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission (1974); Inhaber (1978); Bliss et al. (1977); Lave and Freeburg (1973); Caputo (1977); Hildebrandt and 
Vant-Hall (1977). 
More specifically, events characterized by a low probability 
of occurrence and harsh consequences (low probability-high 
consequence events) merit special attention. Figure 46 plots 
the frequency versus magnitude of several man-made and natural 
events. The data are mostly derived from past statistical 
analysis; the nuclear and petrochemical facilities curves are 
taken from the fault tree and analyses of the Rasmussen (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission 1975) and Canvey Island (1978) studies, 
respectively. Direct comparison between such data is difficult 
because of the qualitatively different nature of the impacts 
of low probability-high consequence events, particularly with 
respect to the related social cost. In fact, the ongoing nuclear 
debate has clearly shown that the public perceives low 
probability-high consequence events as being much more threaten- 
ing than high probability-low consequence events. 
One of the references cited for Table 43 is the Canadian 
Atomic Energy Control Board's report by H. Inhaber (19781, a 
report which has attracted strong criticism. While the only 
Inhaber results that are incorporated in Table 43 are those 
having to do with occupational health effects during con- 
struction, we feel that we should include here some supplemen- 
tary data to Table 43. Presented below are the results of 
J. P. Holdren's critique (J. P. Holdren et al., 1979) of that 
report. The numbers attributed below to Holdren are the 
results of his trying to reproduce Inhaber's numbers using 
Inhaber's methodology. As is evident, there are some impor- 
tant inconsistencies between Holdren's results and Inhaber's. 
Although we were not able to incorporate here a proper treat- 
ment of Holdren's work, we feel that the unresolved disagree- 
ments are important and that the reader should be aware of 
them even if only in the rough form that we have been able to 
present them here. 
Person-Days Lost/GWyr (e) a 
Energy Cycle Occupational Public 
Solar Thermal 
Inhaber 62,000-100,000 9,400-520,000 
Holdren 7,400-15,000 1,000-2,700 
Nuclear (LWR) 
Inhaber 1,700-8,700 300-1,500 
Holdren 3,100-12,000 300-70,000 
Coal Electric 
Inhaber . 18,000-73,000 20,000-2,000,000 
Holdren 19,000-43,000 20,000-1,500,000 
Oil 
Inhaber 2,000-18,000 9,000-1,900,000 
Holdren 3,000-19,000 9,000-1,000,000 
a One fatality was assumed equivalent to 6,000 person-days lost 
except for coal workers, in which case a fatality was assumed 
equivalent to 1,000 person-days lost. 
- 
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FIGURE 45  Man-days l o s t  annually due t o  supplying 1 GWyr(e) 
from each of f i v e  sources.  Power plant  l i f e  i s  
3 0  years.  
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FIGURE 46 Frequency of events causing more than N early 
fatalities for some man-made and natural events 
and estimates for similar events from 5 petro- 
chemical plants on Canvey Island and from 5 and 
100 nuclear power plants (NPP) located at current 
sites in the U.S. SOURCE: Curves for petro- 
chemical plants and for nuclear plants based on 
Canvey Island Study (1978) and USNRC (19751, 
respectively. Data for natural hazards and man- 
made events are derived from statistical analyses 
of past events. 
Risk-Benefit Evaluations 
In such an evaluation two types of cost must be considered. 
I n t e r n a l  c o s t s ,  i.e. costs of operating a given facility and 
e x t e r n a l  c o s t s ,  i.e. costs of, e.g., health impacts. This 
dichotomy requires expression of health effects in monetary 
terms. 
Assigning a monetary value to human life is an obviously 
difficult task, 'which has to be done and interpreted cautiously 
and prudently. With this fundamental caveat in mind, we 
explored several approaches to determining such values 
(Linnerooth 1975). 
human capital--life is evaluated as the discounted future 
earnings of those at risk; 
insurance--life is evaluated on the basis of individual 
life insurance decisions; 
court awards--awards made by courts to compensate for 
loss of life are used as the basis for life value figures; 
. implicit value--life is valued according to the values 
implied by past policy decisions to redeem mortality risks; and 
willingness to pay--risk reduction is valued by the 
public's willingness to pay for it. 
In the present U.S. context, these approaches seem to indicate 
a "value" of one human life of US$ 300r000, reflecting a trade- 
off between risk reduction and GNP maximization. T h i s  v a l u e  
i s  t h e r e f o r e  o n l y  meaningful  i n  p u r e l y  economic t e rms  w i t h i n  
t h e  c o n t e x t  of r i s k / b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s .  
Table 4 4  compares the internal and external (health) costs 
of several electricity supply systems. Internal cost turns out 
to be much higher than external cost. In the latter category, 
nuclear external costs are the lowest. Only if a much higher 
value for human lives lost through nuclear systems were assigned 
in order to account for the different nature of the risk would 
the ordering change. Indeed, there is a striking mismatch 
between public opinion and the results of this cost-benefit 
analysis. 
This divergence is also apparent in the C02 problem. 
Though still at the fringes of subjective public interest, C02 
nonetheless poses a significant objective threat. Simulation 
studies indicate that a fossil fuel consumption of 700 TWyr 
in the coming 50 years might result in an average global tempera- 
ture increase of 1°C possibly affecting, among others, agricultural 
production. Using a study by Bach (1978) we estimated 0.3% of 
the global agricultural production possibly to be lost in this 
way,or an equivalent of US$ 3x109 yr. The external production 
cost of 1 GW(e)yr would then be about $43.5~105 --a much higher 
figure than the external cost of nuclear energy. 
Cost Effectiveness of Risk Reduction 
Resources that can be devoted to risk reduction are limited in 
any society. It is therefore necessary to employ them most 
effectively. The marginal costs of risk reduction in various 
fields are given in Table 45. In the case of low probability- 
Table 44 Costs of Elec t r ic i ty  Generation (lo6 $/GWyr(e)) 
Nat. Solar /  
Type of Cost Coal O i l  Gas LWR STEC 
In te rna l  154 256 216 136 297 
External 3.5-10.1 1.0-2.8 0.65 0.21-0.23 1.4-1.8 
occupational hea l th  1.6-2.2 0.69 0.37 0.16-0.17 1.3-1.6 
Public hea l th  1.9-7.9 0.31-2.1 0.28 0.01-0.02 0.06-0.20 
Major accidents 0 . 0 4 ~  
Total  158-164 258 217 136 298 
External (as % of  t o t a l )  2.2-6.2 0.4-1.1 0.3 0.15-0.17 0.5-0.6 
a The expected values fo r  cos t s  of hea l th  e f f e c t s  due t o  major LWR accidents  
contr ibute  in s ign i f i can t ly  t o  t h e i r  ex te rna l  costs:  
Soc ie ta l  cos t s  (S/GWyr (el  
"Acute" deaths 12 
"Acute" i l l n e s s e s  13 
~ a t e n t  cancers 8,400 
Thyroid nodules 1,400 
Genetic e f f e c t s  8,400 
Property damage 27,000 
"Acute" as used here means either death within 30 days o r  i l l n e s s  occurring 
within 30 days. Health cos t s  are based on $300,000 per  human l i f e  and SlOO 
per lost working day. Soc ie ta l  cos ts  of major LWR accidents  a r e  based on 
data from USNRC (1975), assuming 50 man-days l o s t  per i l l n e s s  and 50 man-days 
l o s t  per case of thyroid nodules. 
Table 45 Marginal Costs of Risk Reduction 
Cost per l i f e  saved 
($lo6)  
~ o o d  poisoning cont ro l  0.03 
~ u t o m ~ b i l e  s a t  b e l t s  0.3 
f i r e  cont ro l  i n  high-rise f l a t s  40 
50% flue-gas desulphurization applied 
to coal-f i red power p l an t  with 
30 m s tack  
120 m s tack  
Nuclear p l an t s  with 
Recombiners 17: 
6 charcoal beds 
12 charcoal bedsb 
43a 
b Iodine treatment 
300a 
1,oOoa 
Remote s i t i n g  10,000 
a Based on 1 f a t a l  e f f e c t  per lob man-rem. 
b!?roposed but  not implemented. 
SOURCE: Based on da ta  from Niehaus and Otway (1977), Sagan (1976). and 
USEF'A (1976). 
high consequence accidents, the marginal costs of saving one life 
turn out to be orders of magnitude higher than with "normal" 
risks. More generally speaking, the marginal cost of risk 
reduction seems to increase with the level of safety achieved. 
In principle, adequate expenditure would apparently permit 
reduction of any risk to any level desired and, consequently, 
safety standards that represent an arbitrary trade-off between 
the objectives of maximum safety and minimum economic cost. 
However, this is only true for a single facility or portion of 
an energy system. For the system as a whole, reducing the risk 
in one facility corresponds to increasing the risk in another 
part of the system. Production of the components of additional 
safety devices implies incremental occupational and public 
risks. Calculations for the FRG (Black et al. 1979) show that 
for each billion US$ worth of machine tool and electrical equip- 
ment, 8.2 deaths result from accidents at work and during 
commuting as well as 52,000 lost working days. 
A comparable value of the public risks involved that could 
be obtained in this way would be one fatality per US$ 3x107 
of safety equipment produced. Any risk reduction at a marginal 
cost greater than US$ 30 million therefore actually d e c r e a s e s  
the overall safety of the system. 
These considerations are obviously not precise. Uncertain- 
ties are considerable and the specific national and regional 
conditions cause substantial variations in the data. Moreover, 
no distinction is made between the life lost now and the 
e x p e c t a t i o n  of saving one life in the future--whereby the inherent 
moral and ethical, if not institutional, issues are disregarded. 
Nonetheless, these procedures help provide insights into the scope 
of reasonable safety expenditures, promoting an understanding of 
the underlying issues. 
Public Preferences 
Public perception often differs greatly from the results of risk- 
benefit calculations. There are essentially two methods for 
examining group preferences. 
The study of reveaZed  p r e f e r e n c e s  starts out by examining 
the choices society has made in similar situations of the past. 
National level statistics may give some indication, but mostly 
it is not possible to distill from them the actual reasons for 
such choices. At the same time, using past behavior as a yard- 
stick for projecting future behavior may be misleading; especially 
in the fast changing environment of present industrial societies, 
rejection of past values is one of the strongest motives for 
many to oppose technology. 
Because of these factors, we concentrated on the study of 
c u r r e n t l y  e x p r e s s e d  p r e f e r e n c e s  obtainable through interviews 
and questionnaires. "Risk perception" was considered as an 
a t t i t u d e  toward a particular risk situation. A person's 
attitude can in turn be measured in terms of the beliefs that 
a person holds about the attitude object, i.e., the "learned" 
associations existing between the attitude object and some set 
of characteristics or attributes. The number of salient beliefs 
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actually determining a person's attitude is judged to average 
between five and nine. 
The IAEA-IIASA work used the Fishbein model (Fishbein 1963, 
Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). This model assumes that the strength 
of belief, weighted by a person's evaluation of the respective 
attributes can be summed up to form a measure of attitude. On 
the basis of an earlier pilot study (Otway and Fishbein 1976), 
a questionnaire was developed for examining the beliefs (and 
consequently the attitude) held by a stratified heterogenous 
sample of the general Austrian public about five alternative 
energy systems (Otway and Fishbein 1976). 
Table 46 shows that the nuclear PRO and CON groups agreed 
on issues of hydroelectric and solar power, but had slightly 
differing opinions on coal and oil. Figure 47 shows highly 
positive attitudes of both groups towards solar and hydroelectric 
power, but somewhat less positive attitudes towards coal and oil. 
In contrast, the attitude towards nuclear energy is characterized 
by three clusters around the two extremes and the neutral attitude 
area. 
TABLE 46 Mean Values of Attitude of Those PRO and CON Nuclear Energy 
Toward Five Energy Sources (possible attitude scores range from 
-15 to 15) 
Nuclear Solar Hydro Coal Oil ~ 1 1 ~  
PRO (N = 50) (10.2) 12.2 12.3 8.3 9.7 10.6 
CON (N 50) (-10.1) 11.1 11.2 6.2 3.1 7.9 
Significance of Not Not Siqnifi- Signifi- Siqnifi- 
difference signif- signif- cant at cant at cant at 
among groups icant icant 5% level 1% level 1% !.eve1 
a 
All energy sources except nuclear. 
SOURCE: Based on Thomas et al. (1979). 
A factor analysis examining 39 beliefs grouped for four 
dimensions (Table 47) was carried out to study the reasons for 
the widely discrepant attitudes towards nuclear energy. It 
turned out that the PRO group's positive attitude resulted from 
beliefs in economic benefits and the perceived absence of environ- 
mental risks. The CON group's negative attitude, in contrast, 
stemmed from their beliefs in negative psychological aspects and 
sociopolitical implications (Table 48). 
Finally, the attitudes held by decision makers and the 
general public towards nuclear energy were studied by testing 
the accuracy of what decision makers think is the public's opinion. 
The attitude of decision makers was generally found to be more 
favorable towards nuclear energy than that of the public, mainly 
because the former group was less concerned about the psycho- 
logical aspects involved. Decision makers in fact tended to 
overestimate the positive attitudes of the PRO group. The 
decision makers significantly failed in recognizing the 
TABLE 47 Belief Dimensions and Most Characterist ic Belief Items About the 
Use of Nuclear Energy 
Psychological Aspects 
Exposure t o  r i s k  without my consent 
Accidents which a f f e c t  large numbers s f  people 
Exposure t o  r i s k  which I cannot cont ro l  
Threat t o  mankind 
Risky 
Economic and Technical Benefits 
Increased l i v i n g  standard 
Increasing Austrian economic development 
Good economic value 
Increased nat ional  pres t ige  
New forms of i ndus t r i a l  development 
Sociopol i t ical  Implications 
Rigorous physical secur i ty  neasures 
Production of noxrous waste 
Diffusion of  knowledge f o r  construct ion of weapons 
Dependency on small groups of experts  
Transport of dangerous substances 
Environmental and Physical Risks 
Exhausting our natural  resources 
Increasing occupational accidents 
Water po l lu t ion  
A i r  po l lu t ion  
Making Austria dependent on o ther  countrres 
SOUIICE: Based on Thomas e t  a l .  (1979) 
TABLE 48 contributiona of Belief Dimensions t o  PRO and CON Attitudes About 
Nuclear Energy 
Belief Dimensions PRO Nuclear ~ r o u p ~  CON Nuclear Group b 
Psychological aspects -1.6 -6.4 
Economic benef i t s  3.4 0 .2  
Sociopol i t ical  implications -1 2 -3.2 
Environmental and physical r i s k s  1.8 -1.4 
d ~ o n t r i b u t i o n s  can range from +9 t o  -9. 
b~ l l  di f fe rences  between PRO and CON groups s ign i f i can t  a t  1% l eve i .  
SOURCE: Based on Thomas e t  a l .  (1979) 
0 
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FIGURE 47 Smoothes frequency distribution of attitudes toward 
energy sources. 
way in which psychological aspects contributed to the formation 
of attitudes towards nuclear energy in the public PRO and CON 
groups. 
An experimental attempt was made to combine the results from 
the risk-benefit analysis with those of the studies of preferences 
and attitudes. By applying multiattribute theory (Keeney and 
Raiffa 1977), the problem of evaluating nuclear waste disposal 
sites was examined (Otway and Edwards 1977) with public attitudes being 
one kind of attribute decision makers would consider. Results 
indicate that the procedure is feasible insofar as decision 
makers can make orderly judgments of the sort required for utility 
measurement, and to the extent that a reasonable agreement could 
be reached among various judgments as to the weights characterizing 
the relative importance decision makers attach to each attribute. 
Risk Management: The Setting of Standards 
Identifying, quantifying, and evaluating risks does not yet answer 
the practical, crucial, question: when, where, and how may an 
energy facility operate? Grappling with issues of that kind 
requires translation of the results of our previous analysis into 
concrete policy and regulatory decisions. 
Of the tools available (market approaches, regulations and 
direct interventions, etc.), standard setting has emerged as the 
most practical and commonly used means of environmental hazards 
control. Standards have thus become a major constraint--and a 
major driving force--for the development and deployment of 
technology. 
, The importance of standard setting,. as a major factor 
contributing towards shaping future energy systems, has been 
acknowledged in several of the ENP analyses; but in most 
efforts of this kind, standards were at first treated as exo- 
genous inputs. 
Under a study contract by Foundation Volkswagenwerk, FRG 
(Winterfeldt et al. 1978), we proceeded to examine the much 
more intricate problem of how to reach--under a given set of 
social conditions as well as institutional and environmental 
realities--equilibrium states and cost optimal strategies for 
parametrically fixed constraints. Several roads were followed 
to that end. 
(a) A literature survey of existing analytical approaches 
and standard setting procedures as well as of related 
fields (legal studies, environmental economies, policy 
analysis, decision theory, game theory etc.) was 
carried out. 
(b) On the basis of the above survey we decided to study, 
in interaction with decision makers, three cases of 
past (and continuing) standard setting processes-- 
specifically radiation standards, chronic oil dis- 
charge standards for UK offshore platforms and noise 
standards for the Shinkansen railway system in Japan. 
In so doing, we put the focus on the development of 
decision and game theoretical models as aids to 
regulatory agencies or similar institutions in per- 
forming standard setting tasks. 
Examination of the three processes clearly revealed the 
variety, complexity, and intricacy of standard setting pointing 
up the need for more formal and more highly organized approaches. 
Biological information on the effects of low-level oceanic 
hydrocarbon concentration is scarce. The UK, therefore, was led 
to set chronic oil discharge standards according to the "best 
practical means" principle, i.e., on the basis of equipment 
availability, cost, and performance. These standards were 
binding. 
Japan, in contrast, set its standards of noise control of 
the Shinkansen railways system using a noice-complaint relation- 
ship for minimizing the number of complaints. These environ- 
mental quality standards, ignoring more or less available 
technical and cost data, were formulated as targets rather than 
as directly binding standards. 
The long-term evaluation of radiation standards shows how 
definitions of standards can be shaped by the availability of 
information, practical necessities, and changing opinions. In 
1955 the ICRP recommended that "every effort be made to reduce 
exposure to all types of ionizing radiation to the lowest 
possible level." In 1958 the wording was changed to "as low 
as practicable," in 1965 "that all doses be kept as low as 
readily achievable, economic, and social considerations taken 
into account," and in 1973 it was suggested to replace "readily" 
by "reasonably. " 
However, in spite of this sometimes puzzling diversity, all 
standard setting processes are similar in some important ways. 
In particular, the main actors and their goals tend to be the 
same. 
The regulator, l.e., the agencies or institutions deter- 
mining a standard, usually pursues important political objectives 
(e.g. consistent policies). The developer--firms, industries 
or organizations whose activities are thus being regulated--is, 
as a rule, chiefly interested in the economic consequences. The 
impactees, i.e. those who "benefit" from the standard are 
obviously interested in minimizing the potential risks. In 
addition, international organizations, expert scientists, 
pressure groups, and, of course, the public might influence the 
process by pushing their respective interests. 
Based on those findings, two decision theoretic models were 
developed. Both assume that only the regulator, the developer, 
and the impactees influence the standard setting process. 
Hapfinger and Avenhaus (1978) constructed a multi-stage 
game theory decision model, attempting to capture in a probab- 
ilistic manner the possibilities for the actors to learn and 
adapt themselves to the various stages of the standard setting 
process. Hopfinger and v. Winterfeldt (1978) applied this model 
to the Shinkansen railway system noise problem, and Hopfinger 
(1978) analyzed the standard setting for environmental carbon 
dioxide concentration. The tests showed that the model developed 
might provide some insight into the structure of the conflict 
between the three actors. It remains to be seen whether models 
of this kind could be refined providing quantitative results that 
could be useful to decision makers. 
A simpler, one-stage decision theoretic model was conceived 
by v. Winterfeldt (1978) and applied to the problem of chronic 
oil discharges in the North Sea. 
The structure of the model is schematically outlined in 
Figure 48. Given the regulator's announcment of his standard 
r, an expected utility model is used to determine the optimal 
response of the developer, d(r). The impactees are assumed to 
respond to the developer's decision d(r) with an optimal response 
a d(r). This set of decisions, together with the associated 
utilities UR, UD, and UA accruing to the three decision units, 
permits exploration for decisions to be made later of the relative 
benefits of given standards in the views of all the parties 
affected. 
The model was applied. In terms of dominance analysis, a few 
alternatives open to each actor were examined. The model quanti- 
fications were hypothetical as they reflect the author's percep- 
tion of the actors' values and opinions. Nevertheless some 
interesting results were obtained: 
Nondominant standards tended to cluster around points at 
which the cost of the next best treatment is equal to the expected 
cost of the discharge. 
Location of these points is largely controlled by the 
physical uncertainties governing detections. 
Penalty variation and nonlinear utility function do not 
strongly affect these points. 
Decision U (r) 
Detection of 
Regulation 
Violation 
Generating 
Events 
FIGURE 48 Schematic representation of the single-stage decision 
model 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the risk assessment problem carried out at 
IIASA has not been conducted in a comprehensive, encyclopedic 
form. Although much remains to be done, within the given limits 
of time and scope, it could not have done otherwise. Its aim has 
been to identify and better understand the elements, the sum of 
which might constitute a "way" of handling energy risks under 
hypothetical conditions, i.e. conditions precluding traditional 
"trial and error" methodology. 
In so doing, we focused on some specific problems and types 
of solutions, by illustrating the difficulties that one encounters 
in this field, and by spotting various roads that might lead 
toward an organized, formalized procedure of dealing with risk 
problems. 
There were some concrete results. For instance, the results 
from risk-benefit analyses of various electricity supply systems 
are quite illustrative. Nuclear power was shown to present the 
lowest human health hazard potential per unit of electricity 
supplied, for both normal operation and accidents. Other than 
coal, nuclear hazards are relatively well understood. In 
general, safety measures in the energy field were seen to 
approach a point where risk reduction is counterbalanced by the 
risk of producing the necessary safety equipment. 
The study of attitudes towards energy-related risks has 
revealed a marked dichotomy between the o b j e c t i v e  size and the 
s u b j e c t i v e  perception of hazards. Groups in favor and against 
nuclear power tend to perceive the issue in very different 
value dimensions, which largely explains their difficulties 
in communicating with each other. Lastly, examination of the 
decision makers' perception of public attitudes towards nuclear 
energy indicates that appropriate methodologies might help to 
alleviate the discrepancies between objective risk assessment 
and the risk perception by the public. 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND HEALTH DEVELOPMENT 
Introduction 
Here the particular concern has been to unravel the de- 
pendence of improved health on energy consumption and other 
factors of development, and to assign some quantitative value 
to those relationships. Economists generally select gross 
national product (GNP) as a standard of economic growth. We 
have chosen to use the closely-related measure of per-capita 
(commercial) energy consumption, which is more advantageous 
for our purposes in several respects. 
(a) Being measured in constant physical units, e.g. 
kilogram of coal equivalent, no arbitrary adjustments 
are necessary in international comparison nor for 
inflation. 
(b) National energy consumption, a measure used to account 
for industrial and commercial activities, avoids the 
implied assumption of GNP presupposing that health 
is related to the consumption of goods and services. 
(c) In times of resource scarcity, when efforts are afoot 
to "decouple" energy consumption from GNP, information 
about the relationship of health to energy consumption 
has its own inherent interest. To what extent can 
energy consumption be restrained or reduced without 
affecting people's well being? 
Both GNP and energy consumption suffer from a common defect-- 
they fail to reflect improvements in technology over time. The 
former does not express improvements in products available at 
steady prices; and the latter fails to account for the increase 
--developed over time--in the thermodynamic efficiency of fuel 
conversion. 
In the present context energy consumption is used as a 
proxy for industrial development. This must be stated explicitly, 
for we do not wish to imply that energy consumption per se 
produces health benefits. 
Energy Consumption and Longevity 
The most suitable measure of health appeared to be mortality 
rates. The aggregate measure of death rates represents longe- 
vity from birth, or life expectancy, as it is sometimes called. 
This is a hypothetical statistic which assigns to a child born 
today an age-specific death rate (in correspondence with current 
rates), and which assumes that the risks involved will remain 
unchanged throughout the child's life. Infant mortality, which 
we have also studied, refers to all deaths during the first 
year per 1000 live births (children surviving the first 24 hours 
of their lives). 
Data for 150 nations for 1975 have been analyzed. Longe- 
vity was best fitted to a logistic function with a "take-off" 
at an annual energy consumption of about 100 kg coal per capita 
followed by a rapid rise and upper plateau at 2000 kg coal 
per capita (Figure 49). Less than 9% of the world's population 
is below the threshold of 100 kg coal per capita, two-thirds 
is in the transition phase, and a quarter is in the plateau 
above 2000 kg coal per capita. 
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FIGURE 49 Relationship between energy consumption and longevity 
for 42 countries (1950-1960-19'0 data) 
In our longitudinal studies covering a smaller sample of 
44 nations over the period 1950-1970, almost half (46%) of the 
improvement in longevity could be "explained" by increased 
energy consumption. The remaining improvement, equivalent 
to approximately five years of longevity, which could not be 
explained was noted for all levels of development. The 35-year 
advantage of the developed nations over the developing nations 
did not reduce over this period. In other words, the benefit 
of economic development remained constant. 
Literacy, ~evelo~ment, and Longevity 
There were also other factors reducing death rates. In examining 
different intermediate variables and their association with 
longevity, we identified a persistent and highly significant 
correlation between literacy and longevity. This relationship 
was stronger than the correlations with certain nutritional 
and/or medical variables. In particular, the literacy variable 
was more highly correlated than other measures of education, 
such as, eligible population enrollment in schools in percent. 
Literacy, defined as the percentage of persons above age 15 able 
to read and write a simple statement, is interpreted as a 
measure of the development of "human capital" and a reflection 
of what sociologists call "modernization" of values. 
We have also studied the use of a new, statistically 
derived, index of health development that combines the effects 
of both energy consumption and literacy. The index relates 
longevity and energy consumption logistically, and longevity 
and literacy in a linear manner. 
* 
Crude index = 0.288 literacy 
+ 1 
0.0439 + 0.0185 e -0.00514 energ-y 
Conversion of the index into a more convenient form, with 
values 0-100, requires the transformation 
Index = 100 (crude index - 16.015) /35.56 . ( 2 )  
The equation obtained is a good description of longevity 
over the years 1900-1975, given the index. This index, which 
does not account for the time effect, can be used as is in 
cross-sectional data, but cannot be used to predict longevity 
in longitudinal data. The equation involving the latter is 
Longevity = crude index ( 3 )  
(Similar models can also be shown to serve as tools for studying 
fertility and infant mortality.) The equation consists of the 
index plus a component representing a time factor that is inde- 
pendent of development. The equation allowed us to split longe- 
vity for each of the 303 cases investigated into two components: 
that due to health development as is estimated by the index, and 
that due to the time effect as is measured by the second function 
in Equation 3. The two components are shown separately in 
Figures 50 and 51. 
FIGURE 50 Longevity gain versus health development index, 
303 data points, 1900 to 1975 
FIGURE 51 Longevity at zcro index versus time (years), 303 
data points 
Rate of Health Development 
Several typical countries for which a long-time series of indices 
were available were plotted against year. The rate of increase 
in this index appeared to be quite consistent over approximately 
50 years for which most of these countries had data. This stability 
was truly remarkable for certain countries subject to considerable 
political turmoil and/or devastation during the period. It 
appeared that there was an inherent momentum to growth of health 
development once commenced, and that this was quite predictable. 
Therefore, a systematic examination of each of the 303 cases 
ranked by index was undertaken, and the number of years required 
to progress from each decile to the next was estimated. From that 
analysis we were able to estimate a regression, the equation for 
which is 
Index = 8.53 + 0.72(years) . ( 4 )  
In this equation, time is measured from the calendar year in 
which the country reaches an index value of 10. Then the national 
data were fitted to this slope, with the mean index value placed 
on the slope and other index points being added at the appropriate 
number of years prior or subsequent to the mean index value year., 
Results are shown in Figure 52. 
FIGURE 52 Health development index as a function of time 
Discussion and Summary 
We have found the use of a simple index a useful tool for in- 
vestigating some demographic variables. Although any simplistic 
equation purporting to explain much of human health and behavior 
is to be treated with scepticism, it is believed that the high 
degree of precision with which this index predicts longevity and 
infant mortality lends credibility and justifies careful considera- 
tion. We are not the first to be impressed with the significance 
of the relationship between literacy and energy. Rottenberg 
(1965) has written: "The critical importance of knowledge in the 
economy can be perceived if all productive inputs are collapsed 
into two classes: knowledge and energy. Nothing can be said 
about the relationship of the two classes because each is an 
aggregate of diverse things; if they were decomposed, some kinds 
of knowledge  would be seen to be substitutable for some kinds of 
energy, and other pairs would be clearly complementary." 
We agree with those comments suggesting substitutability of 
one element for the other, but would add that the two components are 
not of equal weight. If those two components could be hypo- 
thetically isolated, then literacy, in rising from zero to one 
hundred percent, would add 28 years to longevity whereas energy 
consumption, in rising from zero to infinity, would add only seven 
years, a ratio of 4 to 1. The contribution of each of these 
elements to the health development index varies considerably 
from country to country. Figure 53 shows a graph of some selected 
countries to illustrate those variations. Liberia, for example, 
with a relatively low literacy level of 9%, but a relatively 
high per capita energy consumption level of 463 kg coal 
equivalent, achieved an index of 23.9 with a predicted longevity 
of 45.5 years and actual longevity of 44 years. Seventy percent 
of this longevity is "duen to energy, in contrast to the mean 
energy-related share of 20% for all the countries. Sri Lanka, 
on the other hand, reached a longevity of 68 years, with a high 
literacy of 76% and a very low per capita energy consumption: 
the level of 147 kg coal in 1973 was lower than that of India, 
whose longevity in the same year was 50. 
FIGURE 53 Contours of health development index and experience 
of selected countries 
In summary, data have been presented supporting the use of 
a national health development index which has two components, 
energy consumption and literacy. Of the two, the latter is four 
times more powerful than the former. Evidence has been found to 
indicate that a time effect operates independently of health 
development. The two factors are additive, the former producing 
36 years of added longevity, the latter 18 years over the past 
75 years. The index was also shown to be useful in studying 
infant mortality and fertility. 

5 STXATEGIES FOR BALANCING ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
TOOLS AND AIMS 
From the beginning of its work, IIASA's Energy Systems Program 
has been strongly aware of how important it is not only to 
describe new systems that may help solve the energy problem but 
also to identify ways of introducing and deploying these systems 
that permit a smooth transition from the present supply situa- 
tion to the requirements of the future. 
The first tools we used to study strategic energy options 
were decision trees. In a straightforward and transparent 
manner, decision trees illustrate what decisions are necessary 
for the implementation of a given option. See, for example, 
~igure' 54 for the nuclear option (HXfele and Sassin 1975). 
It summarizes the steps in implementing a large nuclear system 
and identifies alternative choices at each decision point. 
But decision trees, though generally helpful in clarifying 
and conceptualizing complex relationships, turned out to be in- 
adequate for analyzing a long-term energy strategy in depth 
and detail. Therefore, a more formalized approach was needed 
for our work. 
Next, we applied the linear programming approach, which 
we found to be well suited for studying energy strategies. This 
was due not so much to its capacity for identifying optimal 
solutions as to the possibility of including constraining 
factors in the consideration. 
The first LP model we developed and operated was the so- 
called HZfele-Manne model (Hafele and Manne 1974). It was con- 
ceived in order to study cost optimal transitions from fossil 
to nuclear fuels for meeting an exogenously given energy demand. 
The main constraints considered were the scarcity of oil and 
gas resources as well as the limits on related investments. 
The resulting strategy showed what capacities of what techno- 
logies were required at what time. The model was extended 
and improved by Voss, Agnew and Schrattenholzer (Agnew,Schratten- 
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FIGURE 54 A decision tree for advanced energy systems. 
FIGURE 55 An example of optimal allocation of primary energy 
sources for meeting electricity demands. 
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holzer and Voss 1979) to include solar and other sources if so 
desirable. A typical result generated by the model is given in 
Figure 55. 
In November 1975 Academician M. Styrikovich of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences suggested that the Energy Systems Program 
should develop a set of computer models to capture the complexi- 
ties of energy strategies and the high interdependence of world 
regions. 
Conceptualization of this project began in 1976 when a 
scheme was devised for developing and describing what models 
would be required and how they could be interlinked. As is 
illustrated in Figure 56, three time phases: the present (until 
1985), the transition (1985-2030), and the long-term future 
(after 2030); were identified and three strata: the world, the 
regions, and technology; were defined. Long-term lifestyle 
scenarios and conceivable evolutions of energy demand patterns 
served as modeling targets. Representation of the economies in 
transition on a regional level translates the targets into con- 
crete data on energy needs, which in turn serve as inputs to 
a model exploring technological strategies. This model feeds 
into another model identifying detailed investment requirements 
on the regional stratum. On the global level, separate con- 
sideration of international energy trade patterns establishes 
the consistency in the allocation of supply technologies in the 
various regions. 
FIGURE 56 Interlinking models for energy strategies 
From this scheme a methodological approach evolved that is 
described in Figure 57 and which was first mentioned in the 
Introduction. The upper part of the scheme describes the 
development of the economy and the evolution of energy demand; 
these were explained in some detail in the Energy Demand 
chapter. The lower section, in particular, the supply model 
MESSAGE and the economic impact model IMPACT, is considered 
in the following. 
MESSAGE and IMPACT were our key instruments for identify- 
ing supply strategies and for assessing their impacts. 
The MESSAGE Model 
As mentioned, MESSAGE (Model for Energy Supply Systems Alterna- 
tives and Their General Environmental Impact) is a dynamic 
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FIGURE 57 IIASA's set of energy models: a simplified 
representation. 
linear programming model conceived at IIASA by T70ss, Agnew, and 
Schrattenholzer. It has evolved on the basis provided by the 
Hzfele-Manne linear programming model. 
MESSAGE functions as the central balancing element in 
IIASA's set of energy models by allocating energy resources 
and technologies in order to satisfy a given energy demand. 
It optimizes costs of energy supply and conversion over a 50 
year time horizon. The impacts these technologies may have on 
the environment are monitored by the model. By changing the 
assumptions, several alternative supply cases--and alternative 
supply futures for that matter--can be explored in order to 
identify possible transitions towards new energy systems based 
on technologies that are less constrained by resource 
availability. The major constraints the model considers are 
primary energy resource availability, conversion technology 
characteristics, technological introduction rates, and 
environmental impacts. 
* 
The Objective Function of MESSAGE - 
The objective function of the MESSAGE model is the sum of 
discounted costs of capital, operating/maintenance, and fuels 
(primary energy) : 
n 
Z B(t) 5{bTr(t) + cTx(t) + dTy(t) 1 
t= 1 
where t = current index of time period 
n = number of time periods 
B(t) = discount factor 
5 = number of years per period 
b = vector of energy resources costs 
r = vector of resource activities (LP variables) 
c = vector of operating/maintenance costs 
x = vector of energy conversion activities (LP variables) 
d = vector of cauital (investment) costs 
Y = vector of capacity increments (LP variables) 
The discount factor is calculated from an annual discount 
rate of 6A, applied to a constant dollar investment stream. AS 
MESSAGE is intended to minimize societal costs this discount 
1 
rate is to be understood as a pre-tax one . 
The cost of increments to capacity still operating at the 
end of the planning horizon is corrected by a "terminal 
valuation factor", tv: 
tvt = (1  - B 5(n+l-t)) 
e-g. the terminal valuation factor for the last period is 
n t, = I - B  5 
1 In these analyses, taxes are taken as part of the difference 
between prices and costs, and so are not included in these 
cost-minimization calculations. Because of it, the discount 
factor here may be thought of as a "socialn discount factor, 
applied equally to all regions of the world. 
The model covers 
primary energy resource consumption and transport, 
central station conversion 
decentralized conversion energy: and 
the environmental impacts of each of the above activities, 
i.e., discharge of residuals. The fundamental features of the 
model are summed up in Figure 58. 
FIGURE 58 The components of the energy supply system modelled 
by MESSAGE. 
In a first step primary energy sources (except solar and 
hydropower) are subdivided into an optional number of classes 
according to the cost of extraction, purity of resource, and 
location of deposit. The central station processing and con- 
version section describes the various processes transforming 
these resources into secondary energy carriers which meet an 
exogenously given secondary energy demand; the latter is pro- 
vided by ?%DEE as time series data per type of energy carrier 
(electricity, solar, solids, liquids, gas,and district heat). 
Figure 59 illustrates the primary energy flows through the 
conversion and processing stages. The model deals with the 
various technological steps in a way that permits consideration 
of a multitude of possible pathways from a given primary energy 
source to the various secondary energy carriers. 
Transportation, distribution, and end-use of energy are 
considered in a separate module, where impacts are minimized 
and savings are maximized by choosing the most efficient and 
least costly path to the consumer. Each end-use sector can 
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FIGURE 59 Structure of the central station conversion 
technology module. 
in turn be supplied with energy by way of various end-use 
technologies. Given certain assumptions on the distribution and 
transportation costs as well as on the availability of end-use 
technologies the shares of a certain end-use technology can be 
determined. Via the secondary energy requirements for these 
technologies a link is established between this module and the 
central processing and conversion section of the model. 
A final environmental module facilitates assessment of the 
impacts of a strategy on the environment. Several pragmatic 
simplifications were required to make this module more easily 
manageable. Discharges are grouped by severity and type of 
impact on the environment in Table 49. Emissions of classes A 
and B are converted to average ambient groundlevel concentra- 
tions in two ways: local effects are accounted for by a simple 
dispersion model, and global effects by dilution factors. A 
model of population distribution relates local concentrations 
to the local population if applicable. Global concentrations 
of class B are assumed to affect the world's population as a 
whole. By varying the standards of environmental burden one 
can investigate the influence these standards may have on the 
energy supply strategy. C02 and residual discharges (class E) 
are treated differently. Only the total amounts are calculated 
to reflect the aggregated impact on a region. 
Constraints affect strategies in two ways, namely by the 
choice of a given technology or by the introduction of abate- 
ment measures. 
TABLE 49 Classification of Impacts 
Class A: Atmospheric emissions with local impact including short-lived 
radioisotopes. 
- Sulphur oxides 
- Nitrogen oxides 
- Particulates 
- CO 
- Xe133 
Class B: Emissions of relatively long-livedradioisotopes to the atmosphere 
and water with global impacts. 
- Tritium 
- Krypton 
Class C: Fmissions of CO 
2 '  
Class D: Occupational accidents. 
Class E: All other residual dischargeslike water, thermal pollution, land 
requirements, solid wastes, etc. 
Balancing Oil Imports and Exports 
Some of the input values and constraints used in the MESSAGE 
code depend on international oil trade dynamics. These include 
among other things prices of oil and coal imports, costs of 
domestic production, and the maximum amountsof oil available 
for imports. The procedure developed permits us to assess 
three dynamic elements of the world oil market: regional 
domestic oil production, interregional oil trade, and oil 
prices. This procedure is schematized in Figure 60. It was a 
first attempt to incorporate into the models the problem of 
world trade. More sophisticated approaches, such as a gaming 
model, are under development. 
For this procedure, Regions I1 and VII are assumed to be 
self-sufficient and Regions I, 111, IV and V act as potential 
importers. Region VI which dominates the market, exhibiting 
a cartel-like behavior, maximizes its revenues and thus acts 
as the main driving force. Oil exporters other than those in 
Region VI follow the price levels set by this region. 
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F I G U R E  60  Interregional oil balancing methodology. 
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FIGURE 62 Interregional oil trade, 1975-2030, High and Low 
scenarios, primary equivalent. 
Under such conditions, the way in which importing regions 
respond to oil price increases depends on their domestic oil 
supply elasticities. These elasticities are generated on the 
basis of the oil production profiles given in Figures 20 to 21, 
incorporating different estimates of various types of oil 
resources available at varying prices. The price dependent 
profiles of potential regional oil production that are obtained 
in this way are a first major input to the procedure. Other 
inputs are the dynamic demand for liquids and the cost of 
synthetic liquids produced from coal. 
The next step in the oil balancing methodology is to 
compare, region by region, domestic oil supplies available at 
varying prices and liquid demands. The curves obtained 
describing regional economic oil imports vs. prices can be 
generalized for the entire group of importing regions (e.g. 
Figure 61a). The import and price levels selected accordingly 
provide exporters with maximum profits within the preset 
export limits (Figure 61b) . 
To obtain satisfactory results, several iterations must be 
run. For instance, oil prices influence the amount of synthetic 
liquid production from coal that can be considered economical, 
affecting in turn the availability of coal for other purposes. 
These feedbacks are handled with the help of the energy supply 
nodel MESSAGE, and permit us to test the consistency of the 
results of the balancing procedure with an acceptable general 
development of the energy supply systems. 
The horizon of this procedure is long term. While the 
method does not serve to explain short-term prospects of the 
oil market--which would presuppose a much more disaggregated 
and detailed consideration of national policies--it enables 
us to better understand the forces governing the oil market 
over the study period. 
Under the conditions set forth in our scenarios, prices 
are projected to increase in real terms by 4%-5.5% per year, 
reaching USb(1975) 19-21 per barrel in 1990 and remaining 
constant thereafter until 2030. Figure 62 illustrates the 
corresponding world oil trade dynamics. The demand for oil 
imports from Region VI declines over the next 10 to 15 years 
as a result of the price jump in the 1970s. After the turn 
of the century, domestic resources of importing regions become 
increasingly expensive, and overall the volume of oil exports 
increases. 
In our scenarios, this is the time when North America 
would become self-sufficient, relying on its own relatively 
large resources of cheap oil and very large resources of 
cheap coal. Self-sufficiency also is expected for Region IV, 
Latin America, which could make use of its remarkable uncon- 
ventional resources. Regions I11 and V will be left to import 
oil from Xegion VI. 
The IMPACT Model 
The IMPACT model, if applied to a given strategy for developing 
an energy supply system,evaluates the direct and indirect 
requirements in terms of investment, material, equipment, and 
Future energy mix 
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FIGURE 63 Schematic description of IMFACT. 
TABLE 50 Capital Costs of Fuels Used i n  the IMPACT Model (1975 $ / k ~ )  
Regions 
Resource Cost I (NA) and I11 N V I  v ( A ~ / S E A )  
Category 11 (SO/EE) (WE/JANZ) (LA) ( M E / N A ~ )  and V I I  (C/CPA) 
O i l  1 110 135 130  35 110 
1A 205 205 185 110 190 
2 305 3 30 260 270 290 
3 410  4 10 4 10 4 10 
Gas 1 100 160 85 25 100 
1A 2 8 0  315 250 8 0  270 
2 455 455 4 20 250 435 
3 665 668 665 668 
Coal 1 32 74 7 0  37 
1A 74 150 95 74 
2 160 225 190 115 
NOTE: These resources are  defined i n  Chapter 3, Tables 30, 32, and 35. They 
cover fue l  resources from present marginal production cos t  (Category 1) t o  
$25/boe (Category 3) .  The regional differences in  cap i t a l  cos t  of the same 
resource categories r e f l e c t  differences in:  known resources, present cap l ta l  
cost  of t h e i r  extractron and time of exhaustion of given resource category 
( in  accordance with the scenarios).  The data do not include lntraregional 
transportation costs  fo r  moving energy from resource s i t e  t o  end user. 
manpower, to be provided by the major sectors of the economy. 
Direct refers to energy system investments and WELMM* needs. 
Indirect requirements encompass resources and investment 
requirements of nonenergy sectors, the additional development 
of which is induced by the development of the energy supply 
system. 
The first version of IMPACT was conceived by Kononov and 
Tkachenko at the Siberian Power Institute, Irkutsk, USSR. At 
IIASA, Kononov (Kononov and Por 1979) has adapted the model to 
meet the requirements of the long-term study period (50 years) 
of our energy systems investigation. 
IMPACT is an energy-oriented dynamic input-output model. 
It accounts for lags between the inception of investment 
activities and the putting into operation of production capaci- 
ties. For each year of the period considered the model identi- 
fies: 
the necessary level of production of certain products and 
services ; 
the resulting requirements for operating and building up 
the energy supply system and its related branches of 
the economy; 
the conditions for introducing extra capacities in the 
energy-related branches; 
the respective i n v e s t m e n t  and WELMM r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
The modeling process is outlined in Figure 63. 
The main difficulty in operating the model arose from its 
hlgh data intensity. We are much indebted to Bechtel Corpora- 
tion (1978, and Gallagher et al. 19781, whose data sources were 
particularly useful. In addition, several other data sets 
were analyzed and used. Tables 50 to 53 summarize the data so de- 
duced, giving cost structures of resource extraction, power plants, 
and energy conversion facilities. Whereas costs of extraction 
vary greatly under local conditions, the variation in the 
specific investment indices (and their structure) of power 
plants is not so significant. Therefore, the plant indices 
in all the regions were assumed to be similar to prospective 
US data. 
Given a lack of information particularly for the developing 
countries, it was not possible to compute average regional 
indices for the input-output and capital coefficients of the 
nonenergy sectors of this level of aggregation. "Typical" 
countries had to be chosen instead, such as India for Region V, 
or the FRG for Region 111. For each representative country, 
the coefficients were aggregated and then generalized for the 
entire region. 
MARKET PENETRATION AND BUILDUP RATES 
Mansfield (1961), pioneer of the analysis of technological 
substitution, developed a model to explain rates at which an 
innovation is introduced by a number of firms in a market. 
%LMM stands for  Water, - - Energy, +d, Materials,  - Manpower requirements. 
TABLE 51 Composition of Costs of Energy Production and Conversion Facili- 
t i e s  as Used in the IMPACT Model ($1 
shore shore shore shore ground face 
Materials 33 30 36 33 15 5 
Primary iron and s tee l  15 12 14 17 3 1 
Nonferrous metals 1 0.5 
Fabricated metal products 3 12 2 9.5 7.5 1.5 
Glass, clay, and stone products 7 2 13 3 1 1 
Chemical and a l l i ed  products 6 3 7 3 1.5 0.2 
Miscellaneous materials 2 1 0.5 2 0.8 
~ q u i ~ n t  31 41 18 31 49 61 
Electrical  1 1 1 1 3.5 1 .S 
O i l  f i e ld  20 34 9 24 
Mining 32 52 
Transportation and 
material handling 7.5 4.2 
Fabricated p la te  products 4 1 3 1 2.5 -2 
General industry 3 1 2 1 1 0.3 
Kiscellaneous 3 4 3 4 2.5 1.0 
mnpower 26 13 28 18.5 22 19 
Services and Other Constructor 
Costs 10 16 18 17.5 14 15 
Total Constructor's Costs 1 0 0  1 0 0  1 0 0  1 0 0  1 0 0  1 0 0  
Owner's Costs a s  % of Con- 
s t ructor ' s  Costs 5 1 96 5 1 94 76 29 
NOTE: These figures are  based on Bechtel data. They re f lec t  the conditions 
of the U.S. but are used in  IMPACT with small corrections for  other regions 
because of lack of data. Owner's costs include Lnterest during construction. 
land lease, etc. 
TABLE 52 cost Assumptions for Major Competing Energy Supply and 
Conversion Technologies 
Capltal Varlable Final Product 
cost cost cost 
(1975$/kW) (19758/kWyr) (1975P/iKyr) 
Electricity Generation 
Coal wlth scrubber 550 23 154 
Conventional nuclear 
reactor (e. g. LPIR) 700 50 136 
Advanced reactor (e.9. EBR) 920 50 143 
Coal, fluidized bed 480 36 152 
Hydroelectric 620 8.5 85 
Oil-fired 3 50 19 256 
Gas-f ired 325 16 216 
Gas-turbine 170 17 241 
Solar central station 1,900 28-60 297 
Synthetic Fuels 
Crude 011 refinery 50 3.7 75 
Coal gasification ("hrgh 
Btu") 480 40 125 
Coal lrquefaction 480 40 125 
District Heat Technologies 
Combined Heat and Power (Region I1 - S U f i Z )  
Variable Final Product 
Capital Cost Coat Cost 
Type 
E1ec'eat Ratio 1 9 7 5 W s E  (1975B/kWyrsEai (1975Z/kWyrSEal i. b 
LWR 38/62 320 25 65 0.7 
Coal 23/77 220 18 79 0.75 
Liquids 23/77 180 15 137 0.75 
Gas 23/77 180 15 74 0.75 
.Heat Production (Region I1 - SU/EE) 
LWR 0/1 160 13 35 0.7 
Coal 0/1 90 9 5; 0.85 
Liquids 0/1 60 5 100 0.85 
Gas 0/1 60 5 46 0.85 
a SE < secondary energy. 
bLZ load factor. 
NOTES: The figures for electricity generation and synthetic fuels are 
assumed to apply, mostly, to both developed and developing regions; differ- 
ences are noted in the text. The costs are assumed to apply, as averages, 
over the 50-year planning horizon. 
Capital cost: Capital costs per kW of capacity. Assumed to represent 
average capital costs (paid at once) for standard facilities of 30-year 
lifetime; intended to include owner's costs (interest during construction, 
land lease, etc.). Escalation is not included. Extraordinary other costs 
(litigation, unspecified social costs) are not included. 
Variable costs: Operating and maintenance plus fuel cycle costs (not in- 
cluding fuel costs) per kWyr of product (electricity or synthetic fuel:. 
Final product cost: S t a t i c  cos t  per kWyr of secondary energy ( e l e c t r i c i t y  
or synthet ic  fue ls )  including fue l  costs.  Fuel cos ts  a r e  taken t o  be the 
cheapest category of the corresponding fuel .  The cost  f igures  i n  t h i s  column 
a r e  not the dynamic f igures  i n  MESSAGE; here they serve only the  purpose of 
w i c k  comparison. The data on plant  l i f e  (30 years, hydro 50 years) and on 
the load factor  (70% hydro and 57% so la r )  en te r  the calculat ions,  a s  does t h e  
discounc r a t e  ( 6 % ) .  For a time in t e rva l  of 5 years and a plant  l i f e  of 
30 years, the formula for  the annualized c a p i t a l  cos t  is 
cap - 6' - 1 
( B ~ ~  - 1) B ~ . ~  5 
here) and cap is the  t o t a l  w h e r e  6 i s  the one-year discount fac tor  (- 1-09 
c a p i t a l  cost .  In order t o  g e t  the l eve l l r ze  c a p i t a l  cos ts  per kWyr of 
output, (1) must be divided by the load factor.  For example, a LF of 0.7 
y i e lds  a l eve l l iz ing  fac tor  of 0.101. 
Hydroelectric: The high, but so far unexploited po ten t i a l  of hydroelectric 
i n  Regions I V  and V l ed  t o  a specif icat ion of two c a p i t a l  cos t  categories 
f o r  hydro i n  each of these regions; the second category including addition- 
a l  cos t s  r e f l e c t s  transmission from remote s i t e s .  
Solar  cen t r a l  s ta t ion:  Including storage cos ts  allowing an annual average 
load factor of 57%. Variable cos t s  include an estimate f o r  long distance 
transmission costs,  and a r e  lower in high insolat ion developing regions. 
SOURCES: The following sources (often contradictory and/or incomplete) 
were aggregated t o  generate rough average (sometimes consensus) estimates: 
r epor t  of the Modeling Resources Group of the Synthesis Panel of CONAES; 
inputs t o  PILOT model (G. Dantzig, Stanford University, Cal i forn ia) ;  Brook- 
haven National Laboratory, Upton, New York; American G a s  Association, Arlmngton, 
Virginia* Pac i f ic  Gas and Elec t r i c  Co., San Francisco, Cal i fornia;  Bechtel 
Corporation, San Francisco, California.  
TABLE 53 Expected Production and Investment Costs for Sources of Liquid 
and Gaseous Fuels (1975 U.S.$) 
Production 
cost 
Investment Cost 
Energy Source ( $ h e )  ruel Fuel 
Natural Fuel 
Giant fields (Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, Algeria) 1- 3 4 - 5.5 1.6- 3.2 
Relatively favorable conditions 
(present U.S. and North Sea 
deposits) 4- 7 7.5-10 6.5-10 
Unfavorable conditions and en- 
hanced recovery (U.S. and North 
Sea deposits) 10-12 15 -18.5 16 -20 
Extreme conditions (deep off - 
shore and polar areas) 20-25 25 -38 33 -40 
Synthetic m e 1  
Tar sands, heavy oils 10-20 15 -20 
Shale oils 15-25 19 -26 
Coal liquefaction and 
gasification 17-28 20 -29 19 -26 
Rydrogen (electrolyt~c) > 25 > 1 0 0  > 70 
NOTES: The data for synthetic fuels include not only costs of conversion but 
also costs of primary energy production. Investment costs means cor.structor's 
plus owner's costs and includes the cost of refining. 
To reflect the uncertainties in cost estbates, figures are given here as 
ranges. Such uncertainties force judgnents to rely more on criteria other 
than cost. They also imply that over reliance on purely economic models for 
finding "precise" or "optimal" energy solutions for 40 to 50 years ahead is 
meaningless. Still, this does not diminish the utility of models as tools 
for exposing new trends and problems in energy futures. 
His basic hypothesis was that the adoption of a new technology is 
positively related to the profit it may create and negatively 
related to the investment this requires. 
Fisher and Pry (1970) considered the fractional shares of two 
competing technologies in a market. They postulated that the 
rate at which a new technology penetrates the market is propor- 
tional to 
*the fraction of the market already conquered, and 
*the fraction of the market still held by the old 
technology. 
The resulting path of substitution takes on the S shape of a 
loqistic function. 
- 
At IIASA, Marchetti and Nakicenovic (1979) extended the 
Fisher-Pry approach to include more than two competitors. In so 
doing they introduced the constraint that all the market shares 
must add up to 1, assuming the oldest technology that is still 
growing to supply the market residual. 
This model has undergone extensive empirical testing by the 
authors. Sixty data bases in the field of energy alone were used 
to examine over 300 examples of primary energy consumption and 
energy use by various subsystems in 30-odd countries or regions. 
In almost all the cases, the quality of prediction of the 
historical substitution process was consistently very good. 
Figure 64 compares the historical data (straight lines) with 
the model calculations (smooth lines) with the estimation of the 
model coefficients relying on an analysis of the period 1900-1920. 
Significant deviations from the trend lines appear to be scarce, 
and the actual development quickly returns to the long-term trend. 
Two interesting observations can be made. First, that the 
slopes of practically all the technologies represented by logistic 
market contributions are almost identical. This indicates that it 
would take a new technology in the world primary energy market 
some 100 years to increase its market share from 1% to 50%. 
Second, that some time is needed for a new technology to stabilize 
and adjust to the long-term trend. For example, oil penetrated 
the market faster than other technologies until it reached 2%, 
whereas gas remained almost constant at 1% for a decade. Table 
54 summarizes the characteristics of several energy markets in 
terms of buildup and penetration rates. 
TABLE 54 New Technology Buildup Rates 
Penetrations Build-UpD 
Technology ?.ate Rate 
(%/yr) (%/yr) 
World primary energy supply O i l  4 .9  6.8 
Natural gas 4.8 6.8 
U.S. primary energy supply O i l  5,3 7.7 
Natural gas 4 . 5  7 . O  
OECD-Europe primary energy supply O i l  10.0  13.3 
Natural gas 15.7 20.7 
Nuclear 6 . 9  10.1 
U.S. inputs t o  e l e c t r i c i t y  supply Nuclear 31 .O 3 6 . 0  
a Penetration rate i s  the annual growth rate of the market shares ~ ( t )  ex-
pressed as i n  ( F ( t l / l - F ( t ) ) .  
bBuildup rate i s  the exponential growth rate of the new technology in  ab- 
solute terms as it  grows from 1 t o  10% of the market it serves. 
Peterka and Fleck (1978) complemented the phenomenological 
approach pursued by Marchetti and Nakicenovic by undertaking a 
theoretical study of market penetration. Peterka, who treats 
economic conditions as the engine driving the substitution 
process, assumes a simplified investment policy and compares 
the costs with the expected profits. Prices are eliminated by 
the introduction of fractional shares of total production levels, 
and only cost or price ratios are used. In general, Peterka's 
theoretical approach of multiple substitution processes fits 
the phenomenological projections well--even if the assumption 
that specific investments for all energy sources are equal is 
allowed to be relaxed slightly. 
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FIGURE 64 Global primary energy substitution, short data base. 
Logarithmic plot of the transformation F/(1-F where 
F is the fractional market share. Smooth lines are 
"backward and forward" extrapolations of energy use 
from 20-year historical data segment although data 
for entire historical period are plotted; straight 
lines show the logistic model substitution paths. 
Fleck's model in contrast follows a microscopic approach. 
Several assumptions are made for an innovation that is adopted 
by a single individual. His decision to accept an innovation 
once it has proved successful depends on his imitation behavior. 
TABLE 55 Startup and Buildup Constraint Assumptions for New Energy 
Technologies 
Increment, As % of Start-up Commercially 
Previous Perlod's Capaclty Available 
Expansion GW/yr After 
a For Developed bgions 
Conventional nuclear b 
reactor (e.9. LWR) 150 2 today 
Fast breeder reactor 200 2 1995C 
Coal, fluidized bed 200 2 1990 
Coal liquefaction 200 6 1390 
Coal gasification 200 6 1990 
For Developing Regions d 
Conventional nuclear b 
reactor (e.g. LWWb 120 0.4 today 
Fast breeder reactor 120 0.4 2000 
Coal, fluidized bed 140 0.4 1995 
Coal liquefaction 140 2 2000 
Coal gasification 140 2 1995 
Solar electric 140 0.5 2035 
a Regions I (NA) , I1 (SU/EE), and III (WE/JANZ) . 
b ~ o r  nuclear technologies, a total (LWR plus FBR) build-up constraint is 
also imposed 
%he year 2000 for Region I: 1995 for Regions I1 and 111. 
d~egions IV (LA) , V (Af/SEA) , YL (ME/**) and VII (C/CPA). 
NOTE: The numbers in Table 55 are transformed into constraints for the 
MESSAGE model as follows: The asymptotic increment and start-up parameters 
refer to y and g, respectively, in 
t 
< yyt-I + g y - (11 
where yt is the annual addition to t!!e capacity of the respective tech- 
nology in time period t ( y o  being a boundary condition). Thus, the 
maximum capacity in the first period in which, say, FBRs in developed 
regions are allowed in 5 [~rsl X 2[GW/~rl = 10 GW of installed capacity. 
This occurs in the period labeled 2000--i.e. FBRs are "comercially 
available after* 1995 by the third column in the Table. The maximal in- 
crease in the period "2005". according to formula (1) is 30 GW/yr 
yielding a maximum total of 40 GW/yr for that period. In addition to 
these build-up constraints, there is a constraint on the buildup of total 
nuclear capacity. This constraintis based on the following assumptions: 
An asymptotic value of 30 lW(e) of installed nuclear capacity 
(reached only well after the year 2030) is shared among the regions accord- 
ing to their share of global population in 2030. 
The values of the first three periods are estimated for each region 
on the basis of present knowledge of plans, ~~Inmitment~, etc., making up the 
start of an S-shaped curve toward the asymptotic value above. 
The model postulates that the rate of imitation of all individuals 
together is proportional to the market share achieved: the higher 
the level of adoption, the larger is the flow of information and, 
consequently, the incentive to adopt the new technology. The non- 
stationary, absorbing Markovian chain is applied to describe the 
substitution process of two competitors, where the transition 
probabilities can be interpreted as the rate of imitation. 
This body of phenomenological and theoretical work clearly 
indicates that the rate of introduction of a new energy technology 
cannot exceed certain limits. In order to capture this constraint 
for our modeling effort, relative maximum buildup rates were 
defined, with the annual buildup rate in one five-year period being 
smaller by a given percentage than the buildup rate of the previous 
period (Table 55 ) .  The initial startup condition was made a para- 
meter. Furthermore, care was taken to reflect characteristics 
of the developing economies, such as lower productivity, lack of 
infrastructure, etc.; and somewhat more divergent constraints were 
assumed for these regions. 
ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND BALANCES 
The Global Energy Supply in 2 0 3 0  
In Chapter 2 we identified two distinct demand scenarios which 
we labeled "High" and "Low." In the subsequent chapter we examined 
the potential of several different resources and technologies to 
contribute to meeting energy demand. In the present chapter we 
have introduced the MESSAGE model and the constraints within which 
this model seeks to balance demand and supply. The next step in 
the analysis, then, was to apply the MESSAGE model iteratively 
to arrive at a balancing of supply and demand for each scenario. 
The final results aggregated for the world, are summarized in 
Figure 65 and in Table 56.* 
The use of h y d r o c a r b o n s  is not over. Their share in primary 
energy supply declines in both scenarios, but they still provide 
very large amounts of energy (2.5 times the 1975 value in the 
High scenario), with a large fraction derived from unconventional 
sources. Thus, in spite of the assumed shifting of liquids to 
essential uses (Chapter 2 ) ,  oil supply will remain the crucial 
problem in the decades to come. 
Coal  use will grow quickly in importance after the turn of 
the century. Increasingly through conversion into synthetic 
liquids, it will capture part of the market share held by hydro- 
carbons. 
N u c l e a r  e n e r g y ,  though expanding rapidly to a level where it 
would fill all new nonpeak load electricity demand in the 
developed regions, nonetheless remains significantly beneath its 
potential. 
Renewable  e n e r g y  sources and s o l a r ,  by 2 0 3 0 ,  contribute a 
noticeable, nonnegligible share in the primary energy supply. 
But even if a significant portion of their potential were 
realized (suppose one third of the realisable potential in the 
High scenario) they do not represent a dominant factor in the 
supply system. 
*The results presented here were derived by implementing MESSAGE in  a somewhat 
simpler form than what was described earl ier  as the conceptual framework of the 
model. 
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FIGURE 65 World primary energy: two supply scenarios, 1975-2030. 
Notes for Figure 65 
Gas: Natural gas production, including conventional 
and unconventional gas 
Oil: Crude oil production, including conventional and 
unconventional oil, oil shales, heavy crude oils 
and tar sands 
Synliq: Synthetic liquid fuel produced from coal; counted 
here as primary coal input 
Coal : Coal production 
LWR: Converter (burner) reactors; assumed to be mostly 
light water reactors 
FBR: Advanced reactors and breeders; assumed to be 
mostly light water reactors 
Hydro: Hydroelectric primary equivalent; also includes 
small amounts of geothermal 
Renewables: Soft solar heat systems; centralized solar electric 
systems; also other such as biomass, wood, municipal 
wastes, etc. 
TABLE 56 Two Supply Scenarios, Global Primary Energy by Source, 1975-2030 
(TWyr/yr) 
Base 
Year Iiiqh Scenario Low Scenario 
a 
Primary Source 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
oil 3.62 5.89 6.a3 4.75 5.02 
Gas 1.51 3.11 5.97 2.53 3.47 
Coal 2.26 4.94 11.98 3.92 6.45 
Light water reactor 0.12 1.70 3.21 1.27 1,89 
Fast breeder reactor 0 0.04 4.88 0.02 3.28 
Hydroelectricity 0.50 0.83 1.46 0.83 1.46 
5 0 l d  0 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.30 
otherC - 0.21 - 0.22 - 0.81 - 0.17 - 0.52 
Total d 8.21 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39 
a~rimary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or 
refining processes; for example, coal used to make synthetic liqsid fuel 
is counted in coal figures. 
b~ncludes mostly "softn solar--individual rooftop collectors; also small 
amounts of centralized solar electricity. 
C"~ther" includes biogas, geothermal, commercial wood use, as well as 
bunkers used for international shipments of fuels; for 2000 and 2030, 
bunkers are not estimated. 
d~olumns may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
Comparing the two scenarios we find that the associated 
primary energy mixes in 2030 are strikingly similar. While in 
absolute terms the amount contributed by any source is greater 
in the High scenario (except for hydro) than it is in the Low 
scenario, the percentage contribution from each source changes 
little between the two scenarios. Perhaps the only difference 
worth mentioning is that the High scenario is a little more 
coal dependent (34% compared to 29% in the Low) and the Low 
scenario is a little more oil dependent (22% compared to 19% 
in the High) . 
In summary, it can be said that up to 2030 the transition 
from today's resource-constrained technologies to ones sustain- 
able in the long run is not complete. By 2030, a mere first 
step of the necessary transition will have been taken, preparing 
for and introducing to a certain extent a second step, towards 
the dominance of "unlimitedn technologies (i.e. technologies unre- 
stricted by resource scarcity) in the world's energy supply 
system in the second half of the 21st century. 
This is the aggregate global background derived from our 
studies on balancing supply and demand. Although these overall 
results are significant in themselves, it is important to look 
more closely at the various features certain options and certain 
regions exhibit in the analysis. 
Balancing Liquid Demand and Supply 
The most prominent change in the world's liquid energy system 
will be its move towards unconventional oil and synthetic 
liquids.* The share of conventional oil will decline in the 
High scenario from nearly 100% in 1975 to 80% by 2000 and 30% 
by 2030. The corresponding figures for the Low scenario are 
80% and 47%. According to our analyses,economic production 
from natural sources of unconventional oil will not exceed 
3.5TWyr/yr in the High and 1.6TWyr/yr in the Low scenario, 
however. Therefore, to meet a primary liquid demand of, 
respectively, some 11TWyr/yr and 7.3TWyr/yr, some 4.4TWyr/yr 
and 2.2TWyr/yr of synthetic liquids from coal would be needed. 
World oil production would thus peak (Figure 66) around 2020 
in the High case with 6.9TWyr/yr and around 2015 in the Low 
case at 5.6TWyr/yr, declining slowly thereafter. (These pro- 
duction rates can be compared to total resource estimates given 
earlier in Table 30. 
The situation of North America (Region I) is of its own 
kind. (Figure 67) Due to its significant resources of very 
cheap oil and enormous resources of less cheap oil, this region 
should become self-sufficient by the turn of the century. In 
the High scenario,the peak of oil production would be reached 
hy 2000 at a level of 1.2TWyr/yr (2010 and l.lTWyr/yr in the 
Low). Coal liquefaction starts around 1995 in the ffigh scenario 
(2000 in the Low) and could provide 1.0 TWyr/yr by 2030 (0.75 
TWyr/yr in the Low). 
*NOW that while the term conventional usually includes at  least  a l l  of 
Category 1 o i l  and only some of Category 2 o i l ,  the terms Category 1 o i l  
and conventional o i l  are not generally interchangeable. 
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FIGURE 66 World oil supply and demand, 1975-2030 
(crude oil equivalent). 
The developed planned economies (Region I11 are projected 
to stay self-sufficient for the next 50 years exploiting their 
large resources of oil and cheap coal (Figure 68). By 2030 
a gap of 0.4-0.9myr/yr could develop between liquids demand 
and conventional oil supply. Coal liquefaction might there- 
fore start around 2010-2015 as well as oil shale production. 
By 2030 coal liquefaction could provide 0.3-0.7TWyr/yr. 
The remaining developed countries (Region 111) continue 
to be highly import dependent. Their domestic oil production 
would peak around 1985-1990 at a level of 0.5TWyr/yr, but will 
rapidly decline thereafter. In 2030, therefore, 1.9TVlyr/yr 
and 1.5TWyr/yr1 in the High and Low scenarios, respectively, 
will have to be imported. Some 1.7TWyr/yr of coal providing 
1.2-1.3Twyr/yr of liquids would be included in these imports, 
whether as liquids made from coal or as solid coal yet to be 
converted. In the Low scenario the dependence on imported oil 
is almost total: oil is easier to get and still cheaper than 
coal liquefaction (Figure 69). 
Diversity among the developing regions is also quite 
considerable. The situation of Latin America (Region IV) is 
outlined in Figure 70. Its conventional oil resources are 
small. By the year 2000 the demand will exceed production by 
0.3TWyr/yr and 1.0-1.6TWyr/yr by 2030. Therefore, the region 
will have to fall back on its remarkable resources of heavy 
crudes. In the High scenario it would become self-sufficient; 
in the Low scenario it could possibly export 0.2-O.STWyr/yr 
around 2005-2010, but no more exports are expected as of 2025. 
Region V, the fastest growing developing region 
of Africa and Asia, is a net exporter today. Under the scenario 
conditions it could become a net importer starting between 
1990 and 2000 (Figure 71). Although some liquefaction of domes- 
tic coal resources is possible, by 2030 liquid demand will by 
- - 
Notes to Figu~e 66 
Cat. 1: Oil available at production costs of $12/barrel of 
crude (conventional known oil reserves and some 
remaining to be discovered) 
Cat. 1A: Oil available at production costs of $12-16/barrel 
of crude (this special category for Regions I and IV 
only include some shale oils, tar sands and heavy 
oils) 
Cat. 2: Oil available at production costs of $12-20 (or 
16-20)/barrel of crude (some remaining to be dis- 
covered resources; enhanced recovery, polar areas, 
deep offshore oil resources) 
Cat. 3: Oil available at production costs of $20-25/barrel 
of crude (mostly shale oils, tar sands, and heavy 
crude oils) 
Synliq: Synthetic liquid fuels produced from coal, at a cost 
of about $21.50/barrel of refined product 
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FIGURE 67 Oil supply and demand, Region I, 1975-2030, High 
and Low scenarios, crude oil equivalent. (See 
Table 66 for definitions of categories.) All the 
plots of this figure result directly from the linear 
programming MESSAGE model runs and do not include 
constraints for the gradual buildup and depletion of 
separate oil categories. (There are constraints on 
total oil production, of course.) Therefore, the 
dynamics of the exploitation of different oil cate- 
gories should not be taken literally. Also note: 
only the five year period around 1975 is the base 
for the scenario calculations. 
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FIGURE: 68 Oil supply and demand, Region 11, 1975-2030, High 
and L o w  scenarios, crude oil equivalent. 
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FIGURE 6 9  O i l  supply and demand, Region 111, 1975-2030, High 
and Low s c e n a r i o s ,  crude o i l  e q u i v a l e n t .  
Region IV, LA, High Scenario 
GWyrlyr 
1500 -. 
lo00 - -  
Total Crude 
Oil Production 
I 
> 
\ 
1975 1985 200n 201 5 2030 
Year 
Region IV, LA, Low Scenario 
Total Primary 
Liquids Demand 
Total Crude 
1000 Oil Production 
7 
I NC - 
Exports ! 
500 7'"' 
/ # @  
Cat. 1 
1975 1985 2000 201 5 2030 
Year 
FIGURE 70 O i l  supply and demand, Region I V ,  1975-2030, High 
and Low s c e n a r i o s ,  crude o i l  e q u i v a l e n t .  
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FIGURE 71 Oil supply and demand, Region V, 1975-2030, High 
and Low scenarios, crude oil equivalent. 
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FIGURE 72 Oil supply and demand, Region VI, 1975-2030, High 
and Low scenarios, crude oil equivalent. 
far outstrip domestic production, and 0.7-0.8TVJyr/yr will have 
to be imported. 
Region VI, North Africa and the Middle East, continues to 
be the main conventional oil supplier. By 2030 in our scenarios, 
this region will have produced 63%-80% of its available (con- 
ventional) oil. Domestic uses will grow and reach 20%-40% of 
the oil production by 2030 (Figure 72). 
Finally Region VII, the planned economies of Asia, will as 
is indicated in Figure 73 experience a rapid growth of both liquid 
demand and liquid production. Domestic oil and coal resources 
might prove to be adequate for the region to stay self-sufficient. 
Large-scale coal liquefaction might enter the market after 2000. 
Balancing Gas Demand and Supply 
Both scenarios project the use of natural gas--a clean but 
difficult to transport energy source--to increase significantly 
in the developed regions possessing or being close to large gas 
resources. With the exception of. Region VI, whose gas consump- 
tion will jump dramatically given the enormous domestic resources, 
the use of gas in the developing regions will not exceed a 
moderate level, due to infrastructural reasons. Figure 74 
illustrates these discrepancies: North America and the planned 
developed economies have large resources of their own while the 
remaining developed regions would import substantial amounts 
from the Soviet Union. Region V, in contrast, would produce 
a limited amount of its domestic conventional resources and 
use biogas covering 13-17% of its demand. 
Figure 75 presents the global picture. The demand in 
both scenarios exhausts the cheap conventional resources costing 
less than US $12/barrel of oil equivalent (boe), and draws on 
some 35% (High) and, respectively 15% (Low) of resources costing 
US $12-20/boe. 
Note for Figure 72 
The drop in Region VI oil production (and exports) from 
1975 to 1980 is due to a combination of two complementary 
factors: 1) world liqulds demand would level off or even decline 
from 1975 to 1980 (as a result of various assumed conservation 
measures), and 2) non-Region VI crude oil production would in- 
crease markedly from 1975 to 1980 (from about 2200 to about 
2600 GW), due to North Sea, North Slope and other new fields. 
In retrospect, it may be that these assessments, made in 1977 
and 1978, were overly optimistic; the course of events so far 
(at this writing, mid 1980) would not bear them out. The 
implications of higher global liquids demands, and higher 
requirements for Region VI oil could well have greater difficulty 
in reaching and sustaining the assumed production ceiling in 
this region after the year 2000. Perhaps a recognition of 
this is partly motivating the constrained production and high 
prices characteristic of Region VI in 1979 and 1980. 
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Balancing Coal Demand and Supply 
In both scenarios only the cheapest coal is used. This involves 
in the High scenario, 61% of the category 1 resource base and 
40% in the Low scenario. Developed planned economies and North 
America avoid early depletion of their resources. The remaining 
developed countries, however, might use 83% of their resources, 
should no coal be imported. Of the developing regions, Latin 
America, the Middle East, and North Africa would not develop 
coal significantly, in view of their large hydrocarbon resources. 
According to the scenarios, China and the centrally planned econ- 
omies of Asia are concerned with using nuch of their domestic coal 
resources for their own growth (in the High case almost all of 
their category 1 coal). The remaining developing countries, in 
contrast, should be able to keep within their regional resource 
limites . 
Coal can be used directly as a solid or after conversion 
as liquids, gas, or electricity. The solid uses of coal were 
outlined in Chapter 3. Its role as a primary source of 
electricity will probably decline in the long-run future. 
Our scenarios, as is indicated by Figure 76,have as a 
result very large future liquefication industries. Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union dispose of very large coal 
resources. For North America we assume a maximum 2.9 billion 
tons of coal per year (2.7TWyr/yr) possibly to be produced. 
This is an enormous amount, approximately twice the present 
world extraction rate or five times the US extraction in 1978. 
There are chances that it could be done; our scenarios indicate 
a strong need for success. 
The same can be said for the Soviet Union, as well as for 
the other centrally planned developed countries, for which we 
have assumed a maximum yearly extraction of 3500 billion tons 
of coal. 
The two regions do not differ greatly with respect to the 
supply and demand balance, as Figure 77 illustrates. Electri- 
city generation declines when in the High case the output ceiling is 
reached. An increasing shift to synthetic liquids can be ob- 
served. In contrast to North America, a significant amount of 
coal in Region I1 is used for district heating or in combined 
heat and power plants. 
Part of the coal produced in Region I1 is exported to the 
remaining developed world. For one, Region I11 must import 
coal to meet its liquid demand, in view of the limited amounts 
of oil available at home and from Region VI. Its domestic coal 
production though fairly large will be insufficient for adequate 
synthetic liquids production. Imports from Regions I and I1 
might be either in the form of coal or as synthetic liquids, 
reaching about l.STWyr/yr in the High scenario. 
In Region V (most of Asia and Africa) domestic coal pro- 
duction would have to climb by a factor of 11 in fifty years 
in the High scenario. Other than in the developed regions, 
the emphasis would be on the solid use of coal with a major 
share devoted to electricity generation (Figure 78). 
Worldwide about 6.7TWyr/yr, that is, 56% of the coal 
production, would under the conditions of the High scenario 
go into liquid production, providing 38% of the liquids demand. 
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New conversion technologies, such as a methanol production from 
nuclear or solar hydrogen (see Chapter 3) might alleviate the 
problem slightly as would a further exploitation of gas resources 
(and conversion of gas into liquids). 
Centralized Heat Supply 
Particularly in the developed planned economies (Region II), 
steps have been taken to enhance the use of indigenous primary 
sources for the centralized production of heat or heat and 
power (cogeneration). Already today 70% of the low- and medium- 
temperature heat requirements of the region is supplied by 
district heat or cogeneration plants. Plans for vigorous 
expansion of facilities are plenty, with coal and gas being the 
main primary sources for district heating and with coal as well 
as a growing share of nuclear energy being used for cogeneration 
(Figure 79) . 
Other regions are projected in our scenarios to increase 
the use of centralized heat supplies, but on a scale not com- 
parable to that of Region 11. In Region 111, for instance, in 
spite of a clearly higher use, the total centralized supply 
remains small, i.e., 138GWyr/yr by 2030 (or 3% of the total 
secondary demand) . 
Electricity Generation 
Today, in the developed regions, electricity is generated from 
coal, oil and gas, hydroelectricity, and nuclear energy. In 
Europe and Japan the role of fossil fuels is somewhat less, 
and that of hydro power is larger. In developing regions 
hydroelectricity is the primary source, with coal as well as 
oil and gas equally sharing the remainder. 
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FIGURE 79 Centralized heat supply in Region I1 (SU/EE) , 
High scenario. 
The picture will be quite different by 2030, as Figure 80 
indicates. Nuclear energy will have largely taken over electri- 
city generation in the developed regions (Region I: 8l%, Region 
11: 60%, Region 111: 76-85%) and make significant contributions 
in the developing regions. The great potential of hydropower 
in the developing regions still has to be exploited (see Figure 
81). It could supply a substantial and growing increment of 
electricity generation. Different regions can therefore be 
expected to take highly divergent energy paths. 
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Figure 81 Global hydroelectric resources, total 
installed and installable capability, 
world regions. Top arrow in racir 
regional column is the assumed 
maximum realizable by MESSAGE. Bottom 
arrow is the actual realized by MESSAGE 
in 2030, both High and Low scenarios; 
area of column proportional to total 
potential installable capacity. 
Total secondary electricity demand grows to 3000 GW(e) of 
capacity in 2030 in the Low scenario and 47,000 GW(e) in the 
High scenario. This compares, for instance, with a potential 
nuclear capacity of 10TW(e) (see Chapter 3). Most of the 
electricity is optimally used and applied for special purposes. 
Renewable Resources 
The theoretical and practical potentials of renewables have been 
considered in some detail (see Chapter 3). Use of these 
continually available sources has been limited so far by their 
unfavorable economic and harvesting conditions, which might 
change in the future. As was mentioned, large-scale hydro- 
electricity holds an important share in our scenario projections. 
In some favorable locations, small-scale wind and hydropower 
might profitably be applied. Our scenarios project that these 
sources could meet up to 80% of the agricultural electricity 
needs and 30% to 60% of the electricity demand of small towns and 
villages in developing regions. The contribution for all develop- 
ing regions would be 6-8% of their electricity demand. 
In Region V, biomass might contribute 272-303GWyr/yr in the 
form of charcoal from natural forests, 0-153GWyr/yr as charcoal 
from plantations, and 35-40GWyr/yr, as biogas from agricultural 
and animal wastes if an aggressive policy were pursued. In 
Region IV, only charcoal from natural forests is assumed to 
contribute significant levels of 206-317GWyr/yr. In each region, 
approximately one third of the potential regenerative capacity 
of the forest area would have to be harvested to that end. Eleven 
to 43% of the wastes in Region V would be converted into biogas. 
FOSSIL FUEL USE AND C02 PRODUCTION 
Fossil fuel use remains high in both scenarios. Of the total 
fossil resources recoverable at costs less than US$12/boe 
(estimated at 464TWyr), the High scenario consumes 317TWyr and 
the Low scenario 264mJ/yr (Table 57). 
Exploitation of such large amounts of fossil fuels is bound 
to lead to substantial releases of C02 to the atmosphere and to 
possibly significant impacts on the world's climate. 
A model simulating the global carbon cycle has been developed 
by Niehaus (1976) of the joint IAEA/IIASA Risk Project. This 
model permits relating increases in C02 concentrations to the 
warming up of the atmosphere. Combining this model with a method 
developed by Augustsson and Ramanathan (1977) for estimating 
changes in global average temperature due to increasing C02 
concentration in the atmosphere, one obtains an overall tempera- 
ture rise in the lower troposphere of l.g°C if the atmospheric 
C02 content is doubled (from 300 to 600 ppm); the effect is 
larger by a factor of 3 to 5 in polar regions. 
Both tools have been applied to our scenarios (Figure 82). 
It appears that, by the year 2030, the atmospheric C02 would 
have increased to about 430 and 500 ppm, respectively, and t h e  
t empera ture  changes i n v o l v e d  be on t h e  o r d e r  o f  0.80C and 1.1oC 
above 1967 l e v e l s ,  w i t h  a22 o t h e r  c l i m a t i c  parameters held  
c o n s t a n t .  
TABLE 57 Cumulative Uses of Fossil Fuels, 1975 to 2030, 
High and Low Scenarios 
High Low 
Total Scenario Scenario 
Resource2 Total Remaining 
hvailable Consumed Resource4 Resource 
Oil 
-
( TV7w ( 9- (yezrs) (TVJW (years) 
Cat. 1+2 464 317 2 2 264 4 0 
Cat. 3 373 4 54 0 74 
~atural Gas 
Cat. 1+2 408 199 35 145 76 
Cat. 3 130 0 2 2 0 3 8 
Coal 3 
-
Cat. 1 560 34 1 18 224 52 
Cat. 2 1019 0 85 0 158 
1 For definition of terms and categories, see Figure 66. 
2 Total resources, including to be discovered, as of 1975. 
3 Coal use includes coal converted to synthetic liquids and gas. 
4 Number of years the remaining resource would last if it were 
consumed at the 2030 annual rate of fuel use and if it all 
came from the designated category. 
What does this imply? For the time being it is not possible to 
say much in detail about the climatic impacts that may result. 
Shifts in climatic zones or in the rainfall patterns are con- 
ceivable. But the climatic system is a changing one as we know 
from several rapid changes on the order of Z0-40c that have 
occurred over the past 20,000 years in central Europe (Flohn 
1979). If the presently estimated "green house" effects are 
accurate we may note a "signal" stronger than the usual varia- 
tions still before the turn of the century. If then this 
warning were taken seriously and fossil fuel consumption were 
reduced drastically, the atmospheric CO2 concentration would 
go on rising for another 40 years or so. 
These are disturbing aspects necessitating intensive 
research. For the implications could be enormous and the lead 
times are long. 
ALTERNATIVE CASES 
A main focus in the energy debate is nuclear energy. Our scenarios 
indicate that the potential role of nuclear energy in the world's 
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future supply is an important one. In order to better under- 
stand the role of nuclear energy we have expanded our analysis 
to include two alternative cases, a Nuclear Moratorium case, 
and a scenario of accelerated growth of nuclear power called 
Enhanced Nuclear case. 
The Nuclear Moratorium case  was quantified on the basis of 
the Low scenario by the supply constraint that no new nuclear 
power capacities would be introduced after 1979. In contrast, 
fossil exploitation limits would be higher, and solar power 
buildup would set in earlier. 
The moratorium is considered to affect most strongly the 
developed regions, where the reference scenarios envisage the 
highest nuclear shares. There coal extraction is allowed to 
rise to the High scenario levels. Solar energy would meet the 
balance, expandinq at a maximum rate that is discussed in 
Chapter 3, - by p;oviding about 6% of the world's energy supply 
by 2030. 
How does the resulting energy use compare with that of the 
Low scenario (Table 58)? Electricity generation would have to 
depend mostly on coal for baseload and intermediate load, and 
solar power could provide peak load. But so mugh coal would 
be needed for electricity that Less would be available for 
liquefaction in the Moratorium case (33%) than in the Low 
scenario (39%). Here natural gas could give some relief. With 
an only slightly bigger share (as it is demand constrained), 
and provided there exists a reasonable conversion process (which 
has yet to be developed), natural gas could significantly con- 
tribute to meeting the demand for liquids. 
TABLE 58 Primary Energy, Nuclear Moratorium Case and Low Scenario, 2030 
(% of Total Primary Energy) 
Nuclear 
Energy Low Moratorium 
Form Scenario Case 
Coal 29 39 
O i l  22 24 
Natural gas 15 20 
Nuclear 23 
Elydro/geothermal 7 7 
Solar and other renew- 
able sources 4 10 
The nuclear moratorium case shows that with a low energy 
demand, primary energy needs until 2030 might be met without 
the use of nuclear energy. It also means, however, that the 
concomitant high use of fossil fuels would leave an uncomfortably 
low resource base for the times thereafter. Whereas, the 
transition to non-resource constrained systems cannot be avoided 
eventually it will be the more difficult the later the world 
prepares for it. 
The Enhanced NucZear c a s e ,  based on the High scenario, 
imposes tighter limits on fossil fuel production and assumes an 
earlier introduction of the nuclear breeder than the High 
scenario. With such a more rapid, maximum nuclear energy 
buildup as is outlined in Chapter 3. More energy would 
become available for the production of liquid fuels and more 
depletable and nonrenewable reserves could be earmarked for 
specific non-energy purposes. 
Coal consumption would be lowered by 2 TWyr/yr--a con- 
siderable reduction. More important, it would allow the main 
coal importing Region I11 to loosen its dependence on the finite 
coal supplies of others. Nuclear energy expands only modestly 
in terms of market shares (from 23% in the High scenario to 
29%; see also Table 59. Absolutely speaking, 1000GW(e) of 
additional capacity would be required, a certainly challenging 
effort, even if the analysis of Chapter 3 indicates that it 
could be done. 
TABLE 59 Primary Energy, Enhanced Nuclear Case and High Scenario, 2030 
(% of Total Primary Energy) 
Energy High Enhanced 
Form Scenario Nuclear Case 
C o a l  
O i l  
Gas 
Nuclear 
Hydro/geothennal 
Solar and other renew- 
able sources 
Total 100 100 
Fossil resource depletion as compared to the two scenarios 
would be somewhat less severe but still considerable. For in- 
stance, coal resources would be stretched by just 6 years in 
Category 1 and by 8 years in Category 2. An essential shift 
would occur in the liquids sector, where instead of 39% synthetic 
fuels and 61% oil the break up would be 31% synthetics, 55% crude 
oil, and 14% methanol of nuclear origin. 
In summary, the Enhanced Nuclear case would take away some 
of the pressure on the fossil resource base invoking at the same 
time a large effort which would, on the supply side, have to 
overcome substantial infrastructural, institutional, and psycho- 
logical constraints. Another prerequisite for its feasibility 
is that methanol-producing technology be commercialized in time. 
The full impact of this case would be felt in the period 
after 2030. Provision of 14% of liquid demand from nuclear 
or solar energy would signal a first move in the direction of 
"endowments;" it would speed up the development towards an 
energy system where technologies "unlimited" by natural resource 
availability serve as the cornerstones of the world's energy 
supply. 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE STRATEGIES 
The new energy supply systems will be characterized by an 
increasing capital intensity. In parallel, the capital costs 
of many other natural resources will enlarge. More capital 
will also be needed for improvements in agricultural production, 
the cleaning of the environment, expansion and improvement of 
all infrastructures, investments in new economic activities, etc. 
If the energy industry is to be presented as one of many 
competing for the capital available it is necessary first of all 
to seek to grasp the order of magnitude involved in the switching 
to a new energy form. This is attempted below, but the 
figures presented must be taken with a pinch of salt. For un- 
certainties in projecting costs and prices are enormous, and 
the usefulness of these figures lies in their qualitative nature 
rather than in their quantitative face value. 
The High and the Low scenarios were analyzed by using the 
IMPACT model described above. Both scenarios appear to require 
very large capital investments indeed: for direct energy invest- 
ments in the Low case US$ (1975) 7 billion (1012) for 
1975-2000 and US$ 20 trillion for 2000-2030, representing 2.9% 
and 3.8% of the cumulative world gross product (GWP) during 
the two periods, and US$ 9 trillion, US$ 33 trillion, 3.1% and 
3.9%, respectively, according to the High scenario. 
The corresponding annual investment rates are given in 
Figure 83. With US$ 135 billion (or 2.2% of the GWP) needed in 
1975, these annual investments would increase to a level of 
US$ 840 billion and US$ 1400 billion by 2030, in the Low and 
High scenarios, respectively. The monetary requirements of the 
world's energy system, here described in terawatts, are on the 
scale of teradollars. The share of gross world product this 
requires appears much less disconcerting than the scenario result 
that of the global energy investments necessary the developing 
regions would have to account for 32%-38% in 2000 and 40%-44% 
in 2030. 
With cheap hydrocarbons being exhausted first investments 
for the harvesting of lower quality resources will grow faster 
than energy consumption. Significant structural changes in the 
industrial energy supply system will occur at the same time, and 
the distribution of such investments will be adjusted according- 
ly (Table 60). With the investments in synthetic fuels produc- 
tion and in nuclear plants and supporting facilities growing 
rapidly, total electricity-generation investment, measured in 
percent of total energy investment, will drop. Investment for 
renewable small-scale technologies will grow from 6% to 12%. 
The two strategies require indirect investments as is shown 
in Figure 84, both in absolute terms and in percent of direct 
investments. Present indirect investments total US$ 22 billion/yr. 
They would increase to US$ 90 billion in the Low scenario and 
US$ 150 billion/yr in the High scenario. Indirect investments would 
peak between 2010 and 2020, preceding a maximum of direct invest- 
ments 10 to 20 years later. In the developing regions, including 
Region VII, 35%-50% would be spent on the development of engineer- 
ing and chemical industries. Most of the indirect investments in 
the developed reglons (30%-35%) would go into ferrous metallurgy. 
Table 61 summarizes total investments, both direct and 
indirect, 1980-2030. They could amount to US$ 30 trillion in the 
Low and US$ 46.5 trillion in the High scenarios, representing 
3.9% and 4.1% of the gross world product. Investments in the 
energy system grow faster than GWP. 
Developed and developing regions differ substantially. In 
the developing regions, which invested 2% of their GDP for energy 
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FIGURE 83 Direct annual investment requirements for energy 
supply systems for the two scenarios. These figures 
include requirements for energy supply and transporta- 
tion facilities; they do not include investments in 
final energy consumption and investments in energy 
conservation. 
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TABLE 60 The structure of direct global energy investment, 
High scenario (in % )  . 
Natural Fuels 
Synthetic Fuels 
Fuel Transportation 
and Distribution 
Nuclear Power Plants 
Other Power Plants 
Electricity Transmission 
and Distribution 
Other 
Total ( % )  
Total (1  09$/year) 
Note: "Other" consists of decentralized energy sources 
and certain others not listed, i.e., solar heating 
and cooling systems, district heat and cogeneration 
systems, and renewable small-scale heat or power 
supply systems. 
purposes in 1975, investments in the energy system would reach 
a maximum of 6.1% of GDP in the Low scenario.and 6.7% in the 
High. Region V has a slightly lower maximum investment level 
than the remaining developing regions, but will have to struggle 
with severe balance of payment problems due to its high oil 
imports (see also Figure 85). 
The investment shares of developed regions are smoother 
and generally lower in contrast. Region I11 investments in the 
energy sector would not exceed 3% of GDP (the other regions might 
go up to 5%). This is due to the continuing high imports into 
the region. Maintenance of this import volume, as it grows from US$ 
80 billion in 1980 to US$ 220 billion in 2030, will demand a 
substantial expansion of the export industry, which in turn 
requires investments that are not considered here. 
In the Nuclear Moratorium case two main forces counteract. 
There is the switch away from a nuclear buildup and towards 
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FIGURE 84 Global indirect investment. These figures include 
capital requirements for additional development of 
metallurgy, engineering, chemical, and other indus- 
tries associated with implementation of the energy 
supply scenarios. 
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TABLE 61 Total (Direct and Indirect) Cumulative Energy Investment 
Requirements, 1980-2030. 
Developed Developing 
Regions* ~ e ~ i o n s b  World 
Sigh Low High Low Ugh Law 
Period Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario Scenario 
1980-1990 
(10" $/period) 2.8 2.3 1.4 0.8 4.2 3.1 
(as t of GDP) 3 . 6  3 . 3  6 . 0  4 .2  4 . 0  3 . 5  
1990-2000 
(10' $/period) 3.6 2.9 2.1 1.4 5.7 4.3 
(as % of GDP) 3.3 3.2 6 . 0  5 .2  3 .9  3.7  
(as t O ~ G D P )  4.1 3 .5  6.4 5 .9  4 .6  4.1 
2010-2020 
(10' $/period) 7 -7 4.6 5.1 2.9 12.8 1.5 
(as t of GDPJ 4 .0  3 .6  6 .6  6.0 4 . 7  4 .3  
2020-2030 
(10' $/period) 7.8 5.2 6.6 3.6 14.4 8.8 
(as t of GDP) 3.2  3.6 6.1 5 .8  4.1 4 .2  
Total 1980-2030 
(10' $/period) 28.0 18.8 18.5 10.9 46.5 29.7 
a Regions I (NA), 11 (SU/EE), 111 (WE/JANZ). 
' ~ e ~ i o n s  IV (U), V (Af/SEA) , VI (ME/NAf), VII (C/CPA) . 
more coal, which will make the system less capital intensive. 
But the investment requirement will rise with the necessarily 
larger additions of expensive oil and gas. As a result, the 
nuclear moratorium case is less capital intensive over the next 
20 years but requires substantial additional investments after 
2000. 
Altogether, cunulative direct investment is hisher by 
US$ 4.6 trillion (by about 19%) than in the Low scenario. The 
largest share (US$ 3.3 trillion) must come from the developed 
regions. Worldwide indirect investments surpass those in the 
Low scenario by 2 4 % ,  i.e., about US$ 0.9 trillion. Total 
direct and indirect investments would be 17% higher than in 
the Low scenario. Table 62 compares the investment data for 
both cases. 
In contrast to the High scenario, the Enhanced NucLear 
case  would require direct investments that are larger by 8% 
in the developed regions and greater by 10% in the developing 
regions (excluding the oil producers in the Middle East and in 
North AErica). Worldwide, some US$ 3.4 trillion would be 
required, most of which after 2015, concurrently with a rapid 
large-scale introduction of the breeder. Indirect investments 
would be Lower, both in absolute and relative terms, than in the 
High scenario. Table 63 highlights this comparison. In the 
TABLE 62 Total (Direct and Indi rec t )  Cap i t a l  Requirements of the Nuclear 
Moratorium Case (10" $/period) 
Nuclear Moratorium C a s e  
Developed regions (I-NA. II-m/EE, 2.2 2.9 4.5 5.7 
III-=/JAN2 22 - - 
Developing regions (N-LA, 
v-A~/SEA, VI-ME/W, VII-C/CPA) 0.7 1.3 2.3 3.3 4.4 12 
World 2.9 4.2 6.8 9.0 1.1 34 
Deviation from Low Scenario 
Daveloped regions 0.7 1.1 1.5 3.3 
Developing region@ 0.1 0.4 0.8 1.3 
World 0.8 1.4 2.2 4.6 
a Excluding Region V I  (ME/NA~) . 
TABLE 63 Total (Direct  and Indi rec t )  Capi ta l  Requirenrents fo r  the En- 
hanced Nuclear Case (1012 $/period) 
Enhanced Nuclear Case 
Developed regions (I-NA, 11-SO/EE, 2.9 3.7 6.3 8.2 8.8 29.9 
111-WE/JANZ) 
Developing regions (IV-LA, 1.3 2.1 3.45 5.55 7.35 19.75 
V-MISEA. VI-ME/NA~. VII-C/~PA) 
World 
Deviations from t h e  Bigh Scenario 
Developed regions 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 .O 1.9 
Developing regionsa 0.05 0.45 0.75 1.2 
World 0.1 0.1 0.25 0.95 1.75 3.1 
'~xcluding Region V I  (fiE/N~f) .
Enhanced case, the sum of direct and indirect investments would 
be only 6.5% and 8% higher in the developed and developing 
regions, respectively. The annual GWP needed for related 
investments would at most be 7 . 4 % ,  compared with 6.4% in the 
High scenario. 
IMPACTS ON OTHER RESOURCES 
Capital requirements is one dimension of the requirements and 
impacts of energy strategies. Another class of impacts, as 
important as the first, includes the requirements in terms of 
basic resources, that is, manpower, materials, energy, land, and 
water, or--to use the acronym coined by M. Grenon--the WELMM 
impacts of energy strategies. As we look at energy possibilities 
over the next fifty years, this class of impacts becomes 
especially important for two reasons. First, the natural 
resources (such as water, land, or materials) that are required 
by the various energy conversion and processing technologies 
will become ever more strained. Second, as lower quality, more 
expensive fossil fuels in particular are developed, both the 
natural and social resources needed to provide an additional 
unit of energy will increase. That is, energy will become more 
WELMM intensive. 
The principal tools of the WELMM analysis are two data 
bases, a Facility Data Base and a Resource Data Base. The 
Facility Data Base, the more important in the case of the analy- 
sis described here, contains data in the form of resource require- 
ments (water, energy, land, materials, and manpower) for various 
typical energy facilities. For most energy facilities such as 
coal unit trains, pipelines, tankers, conversion plants, or power 
plants it is not overly difficult to define a standard reference 
facility size to use in resource accounting. An exception arises 
in the case of coal mines as will be discussed below. For each 
facility the dataare further divided into two sub-categories, 
a construction file describing the resource requirements 
associated with facility construction, and an operation file 
containing the impacts of operating the facility. 
The data included were derived from four different types 
of sources. First, there has been close cooperation with a 
number of industrial companies or organizations concerned with 
the energy sector in various countries. Second, existing data 
bases were used, although they are generally more restricted 
in their scope and content. The third source of information 
was from questionnaires distributed to companies, research 
institutions, and public organizations. Some data were derived 
from an extensive literature search. To integrate all these 
data, each was assigned a quality rating according to Hittman's 
(1974) classification scheme, thus allowing us to account for 
differences in data reliability. The specific data management 
systems used to analyze and synthesize the data were the INGRES 
system developed at the University of California at Berkeley 
in the USA and the ENERTREE system developed at IIASA (Medow 
(1979)) which links the data base and the application programs. 
In the case of coal mines, it is practically impossible to 
reduce the large number of coal mines to a few representative 
examples. Here the approach has been to develop for  each 
important  c o a l  b a s i n  a few representative mines. The data 
sources here were primarily the literature (particularly environ- 
mental impact statements) and questionnaire responses. 
The approach of the Resources Data Base was to begin with a 
given natural deposit and examine theregion around it that would 
be affected by possible exploitation. However, this data base 
was only developed for the case of unconventional oil resources, 
and did not contribute to the analysis of WELMM impacts for other 
primary resources. Again the principal data sources were the 
open literature and questionnaire responses. 
The IMPACT model could then use the WELMM data base, in- 
corporating these various components in order to compute the 
order of magnitude of the resource requirements associated with 
the two scenarios. This was the approach followed for Regions 
111, IV, V, VI, and VII. For two regions, North America (Region 
I) and the developed planned economies (Region 111, we employed 
the results of similar studies obtained by Bechtel Corporation 
(1978; Gallagher et al. 1978) and the Siberian Power Institute 
(Kononov and Makarov 1975). 
Manpower for operation and construction of the global 
energy system would grow by 0.4%/yr until 2000 and by 0.7%/yr 
thereafter in the Low scenario and l%/yr and 2.3%/yr in the High 
scenario. In 2030 some 13 million people (High) and 4.4 million 
people (Low) more than today would be engaged in the energy 
sector. Indirect manpower requirements would grow at 1.2%/yr 
in the High and 0.3%/yr in the Low scenarios. Figure 86 
captures the dynamics of that development. 
The Nuclear Moratorium case would by 2030 require 14% 
more labor than in the Low scenario, and the Enhanced Nuclear 
case would require 13% l e s s  manpower than in the High scenario. 
The total labor force requirement (26 million to 42.5 
million people) does not appear too serious a problem. However, 
the quality of the work force enlisted (Table 64) might be a 
criterion more difficult to meet; in the developing regions, for 
example, in the High scenario, some 9-10 million skilled workers, 
technicians, and engineers will be needed in 2030 in the energy 
sector alone. 
Figure 87 summarizes the scenario m a t e r i a t  and equipment 
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  In the High case, material requirements (direct 
and indirect) would increase by a factor of 5.9, 1975-2030. 
The Low case would necessitate 30-40% less materials than the 
High. In both the material needed for chemical products would 
zoom up rapidly. The need for equipment will be even greater 
still, namely 7-12 times larger in 2030 than what is needed today 
for primary energy extraction facilities. The Nuclear Moratorium 
case increases material and equipment requirements in 2030 by 
25% over the Low scenario. Twelve percent could be saved in the 
Enhanced Nuclear case as compared to 14% in the High scenario. 
Figure 88 shows that the shares of materials and equipment 
in total world production would increase only slightly, except 
in the Nuclear Moratorium case. Apart from that, material 
and equipment requirements do not appear insurmountable. 
The energy  needed to produce these amounts of equipment 
and materials can be seen as constituting the indirect energy 
requirements of the strategies. In the High scenario, 1.85TWyr/yr 
(4.6% of demand) and in the Low scenario l.lTWyr/yr (4.2% of 
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FIGURE 86 Total manpower requirements. 
TABLE 64 Structure o f  Direct  Energy Manpower Requirements f o r  the  High 
Scenario, 2030 (%)  
Developed Developing 
RhgiOnSa Reqionsb World 
O i l  and gas industry 5 .5  11 .5  9 
Coal industry 2 5 37.5 3 1 
Synthetic f u e l s  p r d u c t i o n  14 8 11 
fuel transportation 14 25 24.5 
Electricity generation 17.5 11 14.5 
Electricity transmission and 
d i s tr ibut ion  14 7 10 
Total 100 100 100 
of which unski l l ed  labor 9 . 5  11 10.4 
a Regions I (NA), I1 (SU/EE),  I11 (WE/JANZ). 
b ~ e g i o n s  IV (LA) ,  v (AF/SEA), VI (ME/NA~) ,  VII  (C/CPA) 
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FIGURE 87 Aggregated global materials and equipment require- 
ments for the scenarios and alternative cases. 
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F I G U R E  88 Energy supply system requirements as share of 
global output of materials and equipment. 
demand) would be needed in 2030. The Nuclear Moratorium case 
adds 0.4TWyr/yr to the Low scenario 2030 figure; the Enhanced 
Nuclear case reduces the High scenario demand by 0.25TWyr/yr. 
Table 65 illustrates the differences between the various 
strategies with respect to Zand and water  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  The High 
and the Low scenarios would require in 2030 500,000km2 and 330,000km2 
respectively and, in addition about 400,000km2 to 750,000km2 
for nonexclusive energy use (e.g. power transmission). The 
Nuclear Moratorium case requires 25% more land for exclusive 
uses than the Low scenario, and the Enhanced Nuclear case 6% 
less than the High scenario. 
TABLE 65 Land and water requirements. 
Fixed Land (103 knzIa Water (lo4 m=/year)b 
Developed Developing Developed Developing 
~ e g i o n s ~  egionsd World Regionsc ~ e ~ i o n s ~  World 
LOW scenario 170 160 330 143 34 177 
Nuclear Moratorium 240 
case 
175 415 123 33 
Difference 70 15 85 -20 -1 -21 
High scenario 260 240 500 210 60 270 
Enhanced Nuclear 250 220 4 70 215 70 285 
case 
Difference -10 -20 -30 5 10 15 
'~umulative ( 1980-2030) direct and indirect requirements. 
b~verage (2010-2030) annual total consumption. 
C~egions I (NA), IS (SU/EE), 111 (WE/JANZ). 
d~egions IV (LA) , V (Af /SEA) , VI (ME/NA~)  , VII (C/CPA) . 
About 80% of the water demand would originate in the 
developed regions, where this requirement might become a very 
severe constraint indeed. This situation is somewhat better in 
the Nuclear Moratorium case but less so in the Enhanced Nuclear 
case: nuclear power plants require 30% more water than fossil 
fired plants. 
A FINAL COMPARISON OF THE STRATEGIES 
Enough capital and basic resources would be available for the 
world to take the Low scenario path. In doing so it would shift 
the problems to the second half of the 21st century, however. 
The High scenario, in contrast, presupposes a significantly 
higher economic activity and exhausts resources more quickly. 
Difficulties in providing enough capital might arise in 2005- 
2020. The Enhanced Nuclear case on the other hand, would be 
slightly more capital intensive than the High scenario, but 
would somewhat re1,ieve the pressure on resources (except for 
water demand). In terms of materials and equipment require- 
ments it would have an edge over a 2 2  other cases. In contrast, 
the Nuclear Moratorium alternative is, relatively speaking, 
the most intensive case in terms of capital, labor, and 
material. 
In all the cases considered, the requirements for capital, 
labor, and materials rise much faster in the developing regions 
than in the developed regions. These requirements taken together, 
will increase from 20-25% at the present time to 40-50% by the 
year 2030. Thus, availability of capital, skilled manpower, and 
investment goods are likely to become constraining factors 
worldwide. Balance of payment problems that are due to substantial 
import requirements for equipment and resources might aggravate the 
situation. 

SUMMARY IN TEN POINTS 
The main ob3ectlve of our work under this contract has been to 
develop and apply a method appropriate for comparing alternative 
energy options. In view of the changing energy systems of most 
of the nations and their growing interdependence, a global ap- 
proach to a "comparison of energy options" has been mandatory. 
This approach was bound to lead to a long-term study period of 
some 50years--for only over the long run can the consequences 
of alternative global energy strategies be adequately conceptu- 
alized and assessed. 
The first few chapters of this report were concerned with 
energy demand, energy supply technologies and related resources-- 
or options for short--and the constraints upon their deployment. 
These were the elements presumed to determine in one way or an- 
other the process of striking a balance of energy demand and 
supply over time. The tools we used to identify "optimaln solu- 
tions to this balancing problem over a time horizon of half a 
century were discussed under the heading of energy strategies. 
We used this kit of basically a set of distinct computer 
models to quantify two global scenarios, called Low and High, 
specifying two different conceivable evolutions of seven compre- 
hensive world regions. Each region is characterized by demo- 
graphic and technoeconomic parameters. The fact that not just 
one but two reference cases of different economic growth were 
explored is indicative of the big uncertainties involved and 
of the "decisions yet to be maden that any meaningful attempt 
at quantifying the future must account for. One of the most 
important methodological achievements of this study was a rather 
extensive separation and disentanglement of the various types 
of uncertainties entering any long-term projections. 
For reasons of uncertainty, not even all of the technically 
identified constraints could be incorporated in the process of 
designing "optimal" energy supply-demand balances. Strictly 
speaking, the supply scenarios are the results of cost optimi- 
zations within estimated deployment limitations (e.g., buildup 
rates). Some of these limitations, such as those imposed by 
economic interaction, were explored and, to some extent, were 
made internally consistent through an iterative procedure. Other 
limitations or constraints, particularly social, institutional, 
and political factors, entered the analysis in the form of 
assumptions or were treated as potential problems. An example 
of the latter is the climatological impact of a buildup of atmo- 
spheric carbon dioxide, which as such was not considered in the 
allocation of fossil energy production capacity in the supply 
scenarios. 
This chapter is meant to give a synthesis of the results. 
To this end we should first of all look at the most crucial 
assumptions and acknowledge the "new" problems that the scenarios 
have brought forward. 
In a broader sense, the scenarios are conceptualizations 
rather than projections of the future. They are neither the 
likely nor the inevitable paths of evolution. Rather they depend 
on the realization of certain, difficult to achieve conditions 
outside the energy domain. They imply informed and rational 
decisions of the energy sector that are taken on a worldwide 
basis. These scenarios can therefore not be separated from the 
process of describing real world behavior by formalized computer 
models. 
Ten observations are given below which briefly summarize 
the results we obtained comparing alternative energy options. 
These observations also illustrate both the possibilities and 
the limitations of the analytical method that has been developed 
under this contract. 
A balance between gZobal energy  demand and supp ly  w i t h i n  a  
t ime  frame of t h e  n e x t  f i v e  decades i s  p o s s i b l e ,  b u t  t h e  
energy  problem i s  l i k e l y  t o  i n f  Zuence d e c i s i v e Z y  t h e  w o r l d ' s  
economic development .  
Table 66 gives the per-capita economic growth rates for the 
High scenario and the Low scenario, 1975-2030. These scenario 
pathways of economic development largely fall short of current 
aspirations and plans, in particular of those for the developing 
regions of the world. The growth rates in Table66were obtained 
after several iterations involving downward revisions of initial 
projections as a response to excessive pressure on the energy 
supply potential. For higher economic growth paths, the demand 
for a rapid buildup of new energy supply capacities would have 
exceeded reasonable limitations, even under very optimistic as- 
sumptions about energy conservation. 
a I n  f a c t ,  energy  c o n s e r v a t i o n  appears  t o  be a permanent 
n e c e s s i t y .  But energy c o n s e r v a t i o n  i s  l i m i t e d  by e n e r g y ' s  
f u n c t i o n  o f  s e r v i n g  as an i n d i s p e n s a b l e  produc t ion  f a c t o r  
i n  t he  development o f  genera l  economic p r o d u c t i v i t y .  
Improvements in technical energy efficiency have a long 
history in the developed countries. There has been impressive 
progress along this line since the first industrial revolution 
TABLE 66 1975 Per Capita GDP, Historical and Projected Real Growth Rates 
for Two Scnenarios to 2030 
Historical 
Growth Rate Projected Grcbrth ilate of Per - 
of Per GD? Per Capita G2p (%/:.~r) 
Capita G3P Capita High Scensrio Low S c e x i r  io 
(%/vr) (dollars) 1975- 2000- 1975- 2 W -  
. . #  
Region 1950-1975 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
I (NA) 1.9 7,046 2.9 1.8 1.7 0.7 
11 (SU/EE) 6.7 2,562 3.6 3.2 3.1 1.9 
111 (Wi/JANZ) 4.0 4,259 3 -0 1.8 1.7 0.9 
rV (LA) 2.9 1,066 3.0 2.4 1.6 1.9 
V (Af /SE;'.) 2.5 239 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.4 
VI (ME/NA~) 5.7 1,429 3.8 2.8 2.4 1.2 
VII (C/C?A) 5.1 352 2.8 2.4 1.6 1.4 
t1OTE: All growth rztes are average annual growth rates (roundel) over t h e  
time period shown; actual-projections have decreasing growb! rztes. 
(Figure 89). For some technologies with rather high effi- 
ciencies Further progress will have to come slowly; but 
overall the prospects for additional technological improvement 
are substantial. Figure 89 suggests that technological progress 
adaptable to economic conditions is a time consuming process. 
However, the technical potential for energy conservation 
must be considered separately from what could be called the 
"energy efficiency" of an economy. Economic development in this 
context is the result of deploying an increasing number of 
technical devices per head of population, which in turn requires 
more energy to run this equipment. Consequently, a substantial 
"decoupling" of energy growth from economic growth due to 
technological progress will be confined to those economies al- 
ready availing themselves of a high per-capita level of produc- 
tive technical equipment. In these cases only may savings in 
the operation of existing capital stock outweigh the incremental 
energy demands that must be met in order to operate such addi- 
tions to the productive capital stock. Figure 90 is a historical 
representation and quantification of this process for the seven 
world regions considered. 
Figure 90 contains the projected energy intensities (Low 
scenario) for the seven world regions as a function of the 
development level, given as economic productivity in terms of 
GDP per capita. The projections are optimistic in two respects. 
In highly developed regionssaturation in energy-intensive equip- 
ment and improvllrent in technical efficiency combine into a 
significant decoupling of energy growth and overall economic 
growth. For the less developed regions the economic viability 
of energy efficient advanced basic technologies is taken for 
granted; hence much less energy is postulated as being invested 
in the early development of the developing countries than in the 
first few decades in the developed nations. 
FIGURE 9 0  Energy i n t e n s i t y  i n  d i f f e r e n t  world r e g i o n s ,  Low 
scena r io .  
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FIGURS92 Primary energy (or equivalent) supply, world; 
Low scenario, 1930-2030. 
The o v e r a l l  gZobal energy  demand i n  t h e  two r e f e r e n c e  
s c e n a r i o s  presupposes  an e s s e n t i a l l y  u n r e s t r i c t e d  a c c e s s  
t o  aZZ t h e  worZdls  energy r e s o u r c e s .  
In the same way that the availability of advanced produc- 
tion--and energy conservation technologies for that matter--is 
postulated for all the world regions, the supply scenarios are 
based on the unrestricted availability of supply technologies. 
With the exception of classical oil resources largely controlled 
by Middle East/North African oil exporting policy, energy pro- 
duction from all other sources for meeting the calculated 
pattern of final energy is allocated according to "cost prices 
Figures 91 and 92 give the respective shares of primary energies 
for the High and the Low scenarios. 
Our considerations in projecting regional economic develop- 
ment and consequently energy demand were based on the fundamental 
interdependence of the principles governing general trade." 
and the exchange and transfer of technology with the principles 
governing energy trade and exchange. The balance between demand 
and supply that we attempted to strike in the scenarios rests on 
that basic interdependence. It by and large excludes restric- 
tions on the production of energy resources that are due to 
increases in the economic value of the resources over time. 
Although t h e  r e s o u r c e  base  i s  l i m i t e d  i t  i s  c r u c i a l  t o  
v i g o r o u s l y  deveZop an a d d i t i o n a l  f o s s i l  energy  s u p p l y  
c a p a c i t y .  
The physical size of the future energy problem is captured 
by Table 67 reproducing the--cost-oriented--scenario allocations 
of the various fossil and nonfossil energy sources in terawatts. 
There is a marked contrast between these supply scenarios and 
the recent changes and trends in world energy markets. According 
to the scenarios, the contributions from all the sources, in- 
cluding oil, will have to be expanded during the next five de- 
cades. The rate of growth of each source that this larger supply 
capacity would require appears prohibitive. And  at if this balanced 
pressure as quantified in Table 67 were assumed not to materialize 
and the distribution of the sources were rearranged? Then, by 
using somewhat different cost estimates, for example, or by 
allowing for certain national resource conservation policies, 
even higher burdens would be put on some of them. But, in fact, 
there is no option in the sense that some sources could be chosen 
and others be discarded completely. 
Among t h e  v a r i o u s  energy  s o u r c e s ,  f o s s i l  r e s o u r c e s  w i l l  pZay 
t h e  main p a r t  i n  m e e t i n g  t h e  g l o b a l  energy  demand o v e r  t h e  
n e x t  5 0  y e a r s .  T h e i r  e x t e n s i v e  u s e  i s  c o n f i n e d  t o  t h i s  
i n t e r m e d i a t e  per iod  however.  
Both the exceptionally optimistic estimates for ultimately 
recoverable resources of oil, gas, and coal and the cumulative 
consumption of these resources in the High and the Low scenarios 
are given in Table 68. The resources in cost categories 1,2 and 3 
total as much as 3000 TWyr, which is about 3 times higher than 
the (presently known and indicated) economically viable fossil 
TABLE 67 Two Supply Scenarios, Global Primary Energy by Source, 1975-2030 (TW) 
High Scenario Low Scenario 
a 
Primary Source 1975 2000 2030 2000 2030 
Oi 1 3.83 5.89 6.83 4.75 5.02 
Gas 1.51 3.11 5.97 2.53 3.47 
Coal 2.26 4.95 11.98 3.93 6.45 
LWR 0.12 1.70 3.21 1.27 1.89 
E'BR 0 0.04 4.88 0.02 3.28 
Hydro 0.50 0.83 1.46 0.83 1.46 
solarb 0 0.10 0.49 0.09 0.30 
Other'= 0 
- 
0.22 
- 
0.81 
- 
0.17 
- 
0.52 
- 
Totald 8.21 16.84 35.65 13.59 22.39 
a 
Primary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or refining 
processes; for example, coal used to make synthetic liquid is counted in coal 
figures . 
*~ncludes mostly "soft" solar--individual roof top collectors; also small 
amounts of centralized solar electricity. 
'="othern includes biogas , geothermal, conmercial wood use. 
d Columns may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
TABLE 68 Cumulative Uses of Fossil Fuels, 1975 to 2030, High and Low Scenarios 
Total High Scenario Low Scenario 
Resource Total Remaining Total Remaining 
~vailable~ Consumed Resource Consumed Resource 
; W r )  (TWyr) (years) d ( W r )  (yearsld 
Oil 
-
Cat. 1+2 b 464 317 22 264 40 
Cat. 3 373 4 5 4 0 74 
Natural Gas 
cat. 1+2 
cat. 3 130 0 22 o 38 
coal 
-
cat. 1 
Cat. 2 
a~otal resources, including to be discovered, as of 1975. 
b~ost categories represent estimates of costs at or below which the stated 
volume of resources are recoverable (in constant 1975 US$). 
For oil and gas, cat. 1: 12$/boe 
cat. 2: 12-20$/boe 
cat. 3: 20-25$/boe 
for coal cat. 1: 25$/ton 
cat. 2: 25-50$/ton. 
C Coal use includes coal converted to synthetic liquids and gas. For coal, 
only a part of the ultimate resource (-15%) has been included, because 1) the 
figures are already very large for the time horizon of 2030; and 2) there are 
too many uncertainties on the very long term coal resources and production 
technologies. 
%umber of years the remaining resource would last if it were consumed at the 
2030 annual rate of fuel use and if it all came from the designated category. 
reserves. cost categories 2 and 3 encompass "unconventional" 
energy forms; unconventional by type, location, or production . 
technology. In spite of a significant contribution by nonfossil 
sources (Figures 91 and 92), conventional fossil reserves will 
practically be used up by 2030 in the supply scenarios. Only 
coal of category 1 will have another 18 or 52 years for meeting 
the specific demand after 2030. The exhaustion times of all the 
unconventional fossil resources at the end of the study period 
are so low--at least in the High scenario--that a much speedier 
change in the energy infrastructure will be needed for them 
after that cutoff point. 
It is appropriate to say that energy strategies for imple- 
menting a supply systems in a way described in Figures 91 and 92 
would not solve the long-term basic energy problem by 2030. 
These strategies largely shift the transition to nonfossil energy 
sources to the next generations. For them it would be more diffi- 
cult to make this transition, as the scenarios use up the better 
part of the easily accessible fossil resources. Thus the essential 
safety margin needed to compensate for unexpected difficulties 
would be significantly lower after 2030. 
During t h e  n e x t  5 0  years  nuc lear  energy  l a r g e l y  c o n t r i b u t e s  
by s t r e t c h i n g  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f o s s i l  energy .  I n  
e l e c t r i c i t y  produc t ion  i t  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  low-grade f o s s i l  
energy ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  c o a l .  
The baseload electricity for the conservation societies 
assumed in the High and the Low scenarios requires a nuclear 
contribution to the global energy balance of 20% (thermal heat 
equivalent) already shortly after the year 2010. If nuclear 
energy from fission is to be maintained as a potential long- 
term energy source thereafter, fission breeders must be intro- 
duced early. The resource situation of natural uranium would 
foreclose a wider substitution of fossil energy for conventional 
nuclear energy production beyond 2010 or 2020--a time when 
fusion will not yet be able to supply energy on a relevant world 
scale. 
Since the nuclear option is able to provide a broader non- 
depletable future energy base by the breeding of fissile material-- 
which is contingent upon the establishment of a nuclear fuel 
cycle--nuclear strategies have to be oriented towards long-term 
goals. Any comparison of the fossil and the nuclear options 
therefore is particularly difficult and ambiguous--a dilemma 
that we also faced and could not really solve with the method- 
ology of this study. 
' x c e p t i n g  d i r e c t  conver s ion  of  i n c i d e n t  s o l a r  r a d i a t i o n  
one f i n d s  t h a t  a i l  o t h e r  renewable energy  sources  prov ide  
a  r a t h e r  l i m i t e d  supp l y  p o t e n t i a l .  T h e i r  va luab l e  b u t  
small  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  g loba l  energy  balance  by 2 0 3 0  
i s  1 0 - 1 5 % .  
The amounts of power natural systems dissipate in the form 
of biomass, wind, warm or cold ocean currents, or continental 
run-offs are very large considering man's energy needs. Practi- 
cally all of these natliral power flows constitute patterns of 
nature, however. Thus for reasons of system stability only 
limited fractions thereof might be diverted for man's purposes-- 
disregarding the fact that man's hold on or reach for these 
systems can at best be limited (inthe case of atmospheric motion 
only the power flows in the thin boundary layer between the atmo- 
sphere and the land or the sea can be tapped). Last but not 
least, natural power flows are stochastic processes; and man's 
energy needs more often than not originate from the partial ab- 
sence or failure of natural phenomena on which we normally live. 
Instead there is the need to convert, store, and transport energy 
that is derived from rather dilute sources. Table 69 puts all 
these factors together summarizing the technically and practical- 
ly realizable potentials of renewable energy sources. Measured 
in oil equivalent, the practically realizable potential of re- 
newable~ is about 1.5 times the world's present energy consumption 
level. The term "practically realizablen refers to an all-out 
effort neglecting economic constraints. Exploiting these sources 
at what appears a reasonable level wouldcover a limited fraction 
of the global energy supply and demand balance. The scenarios 
indicate that some 20-30s of the practially realizable potential 
would be absorbed by 2030. 
Large-scale direct uses of solar radiation, that is most 
likely centralized electricity and hydrogen production from 
desert areas, come into focus only after our cutoff point. Note 
that the methodology developed is not suitable for assessing 
whether the long-term solar option would be a partner or a com- 
petitor to nuclear energy. 
Over t h e  n e x t  5 0  y e a r s ,  primary energy  s o u r c e s  w i l t  hold  
r e l a t i v e  s h a r e s  t h a t  a r e  n e a r l y  i d e n t i c a l  i n  t h e  High and 
t h e  Low economic growth s c e n a r i o s .  
This outcome reflects the low flexibility of a large techno- 
economic system striving for efficient resource allocation. It 
is important to recall that the near identity of Figures 91 and 
92 is clearly not maintained for each subregion on the globe. 
Both the timing and the relative size of the contributions of 
new energy sources vary between regions in the High and the Low 
cases. Moreover, interregional energy trade and thus the burden 
of adequate energy supply are distributed differently among the 
two scenarios. 
On a global scale, however, it becomes obvious that energy 
conservation by cutting back economic growth does not buy time 
for decisions necessary for the buildup of an intermediary fossil 
supply solution. 
The b u i l d u p  and maintenance o f  new energy  s u p p l y  c a p a c i t i e s  
presupposes  a  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  problem of  c a p i t a l  format ion  
and t r a n s f e r .  
All the alternatives to present energy production from 
classical resources are capital intensive and greatly raise the 
share of energy-related investments in national capital formation. 
The faster these expensive energy technologies have to be built 
up, the bigger is the burden on a given economy. Figures 93 and 
94 relate the direct and indirect annual investments for energy 
TABLE 69 Comparison of Technical and Realizable Potentials. 
Technical Realizable 
Potential Potential 
Source (TWyr/yr) (lWyr/yr) Constraint C m e n t  
Biomass 6 5.1 Land uee Partial mismatch between sources and 
customers. The only renewable source 
of reduced carbon. 
Hydroelectrioity 3 
Wind 
Geothermal (wet) 2 
1.5 Bcologiaal. sooial Iligh quality product (electricity). 
Very small fraction available from 
self-collected sources. 
1.0 Land uae.  nom mi on fligh-quality product (electricity), but 
must be used mostly in conjunction with 
grids or hydro. Small fraction could I 
N 
be self-collected (for water pumping). 0 
m 
Resource uncertainty Relatively low-temperature heat. Best I 
used for comfort and process heat, but 
convertible to electricity at i20% 
efficiency. 
Direct solar heata Enonaous 0.9 Bconoaiom 
OTEC 
Only self-collected applications counteda 
mostly hot water in sunny locations. 
1 0.5 Bconomioa, market Still speculative. 
penetration 
Tides, ocean 0.04 0 
currents, and 0.005 
waves 
Computational Amount available insignificant compared 
with uncertainties of'other estimates. 
Total a15 9.6 
a Not included in Table 22. For general diaouasion aee this chapter's section 
on the Solar Option. 
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to the economic outputs in the two groups of regions. Thus 
energy investments will have to grow quickly particularly in the 
developing regions. Nevertheless, the fractions of GNP required 
for a timely buildup of new energy supply capacity still appear 
feasible, in particular for the developed countries. However, 
the process of aggregating and averaging the information over 
developed and developing regions hides a much higher spread that 
exist for each region. In fact, extreme capital investments 
must be expected on the national levels due to the unequal di- 
stribution of fossil resources: most of the global energy 
capital derived from the supply scenarios will have to cross 
borders, flowing to countries with unconventional fossil re- 
sources. This result points to an unprecedented problem of inter- 
national monetary control. 
Over and above the funding aspects of new energy supply 
technologies there are the implications of investing into energy 
conservation. Like the renewable energy sources or like nuclear 
power, energy conservation suffers from a front loading of 
capital--the more so the bigger the conservation effort. Our 
demand scenarios imply a considerable amount of conservation 
(see the comments on Figure 90 above) by the postulate of an 
ever increasing sophistication of the general economic infra- 
structure. A balanced strategy in this context then is one 
where the costs of energy saving equipment eventually do not 
exceed the costs of incremental additions of new supplies. 
While this condition cannat be verified with the methodology of 
the present analysis, one can conclude that the capital require- 
ments for the conservation efforts not included in Figures 93 
and 94 will be of the same order as those calculated for the 
energy supply. This might well double the capital problem of 
the developed regions towards the end of the 50-year horizon. 
These questions of capital formation and transfer cannot be 
answered by a methodology geared mainly to the comparison of 
alternative energy options. 
a Any s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  w o r l d ' s  energy problem e n t a i l s  s i g n i f i -  
c a n t  impacts  on t h e  gZobaZ env i ronment .  Recogn i t i on  o f  t h e  
l i m i t s  o f  s t a b i l i t y  o f  environmentaZ s y s t ems  or t h e i r  
a c t i v e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  a re  pos tuZated .  Such a d a p t a t i o n s  or  
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  e f f o r t s  a re  n o t  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  g loba l  demand- 
supp ly  s c e n a r i o s  c o n s i d e r e d .  
A critical global feature of an intermediate fossil energy 
phase is the carbon dioxide buildup. The increases in atmo- 
spheric C02 concentration monitored for the past 20 years are 
attributed mainly to the combustion of fossil fuels. We should 
take this buildup as an early sign of warning, although the reli- 
ability of the explanatory models presently available is not yet 
well established. As regards the possible climatic consequences 
of our scenarios, it is for these reasons that the calculated in- 
creases in atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration and the re- 
lated temperature change for the High and the Low supply scenarios 
(Figures 95 and 96) indicate a risk rather than predict a likely 
consequence of growing fossil fuel consumption. 
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A comparable uncertainty about the actual levels of risk 
and their acceptability exists for the contributions of the 
nuclear option in the scenarios and, no doubt, also for the 
rather modest scenario allocations of renewable energy sources. 
A yield of 4-6 TWyr/yr from biomass, wind, hydropower, and local 
small-scale solar heat translates into average yield densities 
of about 0.1 watt per square meter of inhabitable land. This rate, 
which is close to estimated average sustainable yield densities 
of natural forests, implies an all-out effort in ecological terms. 
Rigorous exploitation of a major fraction of all biomass or of 
the global continental run-offs, or of wind, wherever to be found 
and used reasonably, would mean to transform nature into a world 
"garden." What consequences such a recourse to renewables will 
have and how viable it will be, in the face of competing land 
use requirements, for example, cannot be assessed so far. 
These ten points taken together clearly transpose the global 
energy problem from the energy "subsystem" into other areas that 
interact with it. It is in these other areas that the 
validity of the assumptions structuring our scenarios must be 
evaluated. 
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